scholarly journals Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (11) ◽  
pp. 3238-3274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malin Arve ◽  
David Martimort
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Design ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Basic Service ◽  
Dynamic Contract ◽  
Risk Effect ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions, contract renegotiation, and the value of incomplete contracts. (JEL D47, D81, D86)

Relationship-Specificity, Contract Enforceability, and Income Smoothing

2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 1629-1656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiwei Dou ◽  
Ole-Kristian Hope ◽  
Wayne B. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Optimal Investment ◽  
Income Smoothing ◽  
Additional Risk ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship

ABSTRACT: Contracting parties, such as the firm and its supplier, have cost-reducing incentives to make investments that support the unique transactions between them. However, to the extent that one party may renege on its contractual obligations, the other party incurring the cost of the relationship-specific investment bears additional risk and is less willing to invest such that sub-optimal investment occurs. In countries where enforceability of explicit contracts is particularly weak, parties have incentives to signal their willingness to fulfill implicit claims and maintain long-term relationships. We predict that firms engage in income smoothing to send such a signal to their suppliers. Consistent with these expectations, we find that firms that both reside in countries with weak contract enforceability and operate in industries with a greater need for relationship-specific investments tend to smooth reported income more. We further decompose income smoothing into “informational” and “garbled” components and find that results are driven by the informational component of income smoothing. Our results support the important role that accruals play in providing information in the presence of incomplete contracts. JEL Classifications: F14, K12, L14, M41, M43

Debt financing puzzle and internationalization

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karren Lee-Hwei Khaw
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
International Perspective ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Decisions ◽  
Business Operations

PurposeThis study aims to examine the relation between long-term debt and internationalization in the presence of the agency costs of debt and business risk.Design/methodology/approachSample firms consist of 517 non-financial listed firms in Malaysia, with 4,197 firm-year observations from the year 2000 to 2014. This study uses panel data regressions and a series of robustness tests to examine the hypotheses.FindingsThe results show that multinational corporations (MNCs) are more likely to sustain less long-term debt than domestic corporations (DCs) to mitigate the costs related to agency problem and firm risk. Meanwhile, foreign-based MNCs maintain less long-term debt than local-based firms, and the finding is more significant at a higher degree of internationalization. Robustness tests confirm the negative relations.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings indicate that the ongoing debate on the debt financing puzzle can be explained by internationalization. Moreover, the findings suggest that in addition to the systematic differences between MNCs and DCs, studies on the debt financing and internationalization should also account for the systematic differences among MNCs such as the local-based MNCs, foreign-based MNCs and DCs that later expand their business operations abroad.Practical implicationsMNCs have to be responsive to the diverse institutional environments as they diversify their business operations geographically. When the adverse effects of internationalization outweigh the benefits, MNCs could use the long-term debt financing decision to mitigate the costs of doing business abroad. This is because debt financing is also a primary concern in the corporate financial decisions for the maximization of shareholders’ wealth.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the debt financing literature from the international perspective by providing evidence from an emerging market. In addition, this study highlights the importance of recognizing firms by their firm-specific characteristics, such as internationalization, given the systematic differences among firms.

Risk Preferences and Incentives for Evidence Acquisition and Disclosure

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-342
Author(s):  
Erin Giffin ◽  
Erik Lillethun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Optimal Design ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Low Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Good Decision ◽  
Legal Rules

Abstract Civil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing legal rules to balance good decision making against the costs of acquisition. We characterize the optimal design, which differs from equilibrium decision rules. Notably, for very risk-averse litigants, the design is “over-incentivized” with stronger rewards and punishments than in equilibrium. We find similar results for various common legal rules, including admissibility of evidence and maximum awards. These results have implications for how rules could differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals) and low risk aversion types (e.g., corporations) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency.

scholarly journals CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 1757-1791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cziraki ◽  
Moqi Groen-Xu
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Firm Risk ◽  
Employment Contracts ◽  
Corporate Policies ◽  
Ceo Contracts ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Remaining Time

We study the role of the contractual time horizon of chief executive officers (CEOs) for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

Understanding Consumer Dynamic Decision Making Under Competing Loyalty Programs

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 422-444
Author(s):  
Jia Liu ◽  
Asim Ansari
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Dynamic Decision Making ◽  
Loyalty Programs ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Decision Strategies ◽  
Optimal Dynamic ◽  
Optimal Action ◽  
Promotional Strategies

The authors develop an incentive-aligned experimental paradigm to study how consumer purchase dynamics are affected by the interplay between competing firms’ loyalty programs and their pricing and promotional strategies. In this experiment, participants made sequential choices between two competing airlines in a stylized frequent traveler task for which an optimal dynamic decision policy can be numerically computed. The authors find that, on average, participants are able to partially realize the long-term benefits from loyalty programs, though most are sensitive to price. They also find that participants’ preferences and levels of bounded rationality depend on the nature of the competitive environment, the particular state of each decision scenario, and the type of optimal action. Accordingly, the authors use an approximate dynamic programming model to incorporate boundedly rational decision making. The model classifies participants into five segments that exhibit variation in their performance and decision strategies. Importantly, they find that participants are able to adapt their decision strategies to the environment they face, and thus the overall market outcome and the performance of each firm are influenced by both the competitive environment and the assumption on the extent of consumer optimality.

scholarly journals Risk aversion and allocation to long-term bonds

2003 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica A. Wachter
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion

Wechselkursrisiko und Risikopolitik in internationalen Unternehmen

2008 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Broll ◽  
Jack E. Wahl
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Income Effect ◽  
Exchange Rate Risk ◽  
Hedge Ratio ◽  
International Firm ◽  
Rate Risk ◽  
Risk Effect ◽  
Optimal Hedge ◽  
Mean Variance

SummaryThe aim of this study is to analyze the importance of the elasticity of risk aversion with regard to an increase in exchange rate risk for exports and hedging in an international firm. Mean-variance preferences allow for an immediate study of the entailed substitution and income effect. These effects may cancel out, that is to say, the optimal hedge ratio remains unchanged although the exchange rate risk increases. The elasticity of risk aversion provides an unambiguous answer to the question how to measure such risk effect.

scholarly journals Optimal Dynamic Capital Budgeting

2018 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 1747-1778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrey Malenko
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Design ◽  
Capital Budgeting ◽  
Capital Allocation ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Investment Projects ◽  
Empire Building ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
Optimal Dynamic ◽  
Over Time

Abstract I study optimal design of a dynamic capital allocation process in an organization in which the division manager with empire-building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects, and headquarters can audit projects at a cost. Under certain conditions, a budgeting mechanism with threshold separation of financing is optimal. Headquarters: (1) allocate a spending account to the manager and replenish it over time; (2) set a threshold, such that projects below it are financed from the account, while projects above are financed fully by headquarters upon an audit. Further analysis studies when co-financing of projects is optimal and how the size of the account depends on past performance of projects.

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