National Security Executive Orders and Legal Issues

Author(s):  
Roy Shannon
2022 ◽  
pp. 193-205
Author(s):  
Mohammad Sheikhi ◽  
Nima Norouzi

The onset and spread of COVID-19-related disease and the measures taken by the government to combat it have given rise to several legal issues. The most important of these issues can be considered the government's legal framework in the fight against this disease and the responsibility for compensation. Examining the first issue through Iran's current laws and regulations, it became clear that choosing the appropriate legal framework in the fight against this disease could be more than the basic and ordinary regulations. Instead of creating a national headquarters to fight COVID-19 under council approvals, the Supreme National Security Service shall use the capacities of the crisis management organization and the relevant law and the provisions of Article 79 of the Iranian constitution.


Subject US interagency procedures for sharing signals intelligence. Significance The administration of President Barack Obama is in the final stages of issuing new rules governing the sharing of signals intelligence (SIGINT) among federal agencies involved in national security. These rules, which the intelligence community has long expected, would clarify how the federal government may share communications-based intelligence, such as wiretaps and intercepts, among diverse agencies, and -- critically -- set boundaries on the use of such intelligence by agencies that did not originally collect it. Impacts The next administration -- whether Republican or Democratic -- will probably be less responsive to privacy groups in this area. The Obama administration's focus on executive orders governing emerging technologies has set precedent but offers few lasting restrictions. Privacy issues will hinder US international trade negotiations, further derailing TTIP talks for the foreseeable future.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-694
Author(s):  
David E. Graham

Much has been written over the past several years regarding the increased U.S. employment of UAVs as a weapon system against both combatants on a battlefield and terrorists far removed from an active zone of military operations. As an element of this dialogue, there has occurred a growing discussion as to whether, given what some view as the appearance of new threats to national security—existing in the form of al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations—there is now a need for enhanced clarity and transparency concerning the legal principles applicable to when, where, and how such systems might be used. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, if, in fact, uncertainty exists as to the legal norms to be applied in the employment of UAVs against those who threaten U.S. security interests—it is an uncertainty of a U.S. self-inflicted nature. In truth, the old law, i.e., currently existing codified and customary international legal principles, can quite sufficiently regulate the lawful use of these systems. Any confusion surrounding this subject is, in reality, due to the consistently self-serving and highly questionable manner in which the U.S. government has both interpreted and applied these norms. Before turning to a discussion of the relevant legal issues, however, it would be helpful to briefly examine the basic nomenclature of commonly U.S.-deployed UAVs.


Author(s):  
Nuri Gökhan Toprak

The concept of influence can be defined as a tool of international actors, a form of power, the ability to overcome obstacles in order to achieve different purposes or the desired result in the process of power relations established between actors in international politics. According to the approach that aims to reach the concept of influence as the desired result, in the process of setting up influence states try to influence each other through different methods and tools in which can be used through states’ own capacities. In addition to political and military tools, economic impact tools related to the field of foreign trade and finance are frequently used today. Economic impact tools, such as external aid, which may be positive or rewarding, may also be negative or punitive in a range from the boycott to the blockade. The study aims to provide a qualitative assessment of the United States' (US) economic sanctions against Iran in the context of the use of economic impact tools in international politics. In order to achieve this aim, 12 executive orders issued by the US on the grounds that Iran poses a threat to its national security, foreign policy and economy will be examined. In the conclusion of the study, the assumption that the US sanctions against Iran almost for 40 years has become a multilateral structure such as commercial and financial blockade from a structure related to bilateral relations such as boycott and embargo will be tested.


Author(s):  
Schmitt Michael N

This chapter discusses the international law of cybersecurity, which, at just over two decades old, remains in a relative state of infancy. States continue to struggle with such basic issues as sovereignty in cyberspace. In great part, the challenge is that many States are conflicted over the application and interpretation of key aspects of international law in the cyber context. After all, although international law can serve as a normative firewall against hostile cyber operations, the principle of sovereign equality means that protective norms also can act as barriers to a State's own cyber operations, some of which may be deemed essential to the State, especially with respect to national security. These differences in normative perspective often play out domestically in disagreements between ministries with different roles vis-à-vis cyberspace, and internationally between States wielding offensive cyber capability and those that see themselves primarily as victims thereof. To examine the relationship between cybersecurity and international law, the chapter begins by cataloguing the development of the international law of cyberspace. It then turns to the substantive legal issues, paying particular attention to those matters that presently are the source of contention amongst States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Anna K. Rozhkova ◽  
Irena V. Kochetkova

The subject of the article is the typology of national security, and controversial issues of the selection. The purpose of the article is to identify causes of a large number of security’s forms both in theory and in practice, also to analyze acts in this sphere. The methodology of the article includes analysis, synthesis, formal-legal and comparativelegal methods. The main results of the research. The author focuses on the problem of types of national security. The author investigates the national security and methodological, theoretical and legal aspects of the classification of national security’s forms. The reason for the diversity of types of national security should also be recognized as the lack of a clear classification of them. Author investigates the mechanism for detaching forms of national security in acts of the Russian Federation in the field of security and suggests that new forms of nation security (moral security and culture security) should appear in base document of strategic planning of the national security. Moral security includes cultural, ideological, informational, psychological, scientific, educational, and religious security. Cultural security in its most general form is the stable existence of culture, the protection of this sphere from internal and external threats, for example, such as the emasculation of spiritual and moral values and globalization. Conclusions. The identification of new types of national security is an objective process due to the very versatility of such a phenomenon as national security. At the same time, it should be recognized that the sphere of spirit and morality in the context of spiritual security does not belong to the legal science, but rather to the field of philosophy and religion. In this regard, their inclusion, even as an adjective, in the text of the strategic planning document raises doubts, so the use of the phrase "moral security" in legal acts in the near future, in our opinion, can hardly be expected.


2021 ◽  
pp. 99-146
Author(s):  
Carlos A. Ball

This chapter explores how Congress, the courts, and we the people have permitted presidents for the last ninety years to accumulate an immense amount of power with few meaningful and effective restraints. In doing so, the chapter shows how Trump’s abuses of presidential authority were not only the actions of a reckless and autocratic leader, but were also the outgrowth of the steady accumulation of presidential powers that has taken place since the 1930s under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Although progressives since the Vietnam War have worked to limit presidential authority in matters related to armed conflicts and national security, they generally have not pushed for restraining that authority in domestic matters. It is time for progressives to take into account the extent to which proposed laws, regulations, and executive orders expand presidential domestic powers when determining whether such measures merit their political support. This means that there may be times when progressives should refuse to support measures that unduly expand presidential authority even in instances in which the exercise of that authority advances progressive goals. To illustrate this point, the chapter argues that progressives should have been more cognizant of the extent to which President Barack Obama’s humanitarian but unilateral decision to cease deporting Dreamers—the large number of undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as children—expanded presidential powers.


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