Multiple Representations of Belief States and Action Values in Corticobasal Ganglia Loops

2007 ◽  
Vol 1104 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. SAMEJIMA ◽  
K. DOYA
Author(s):  
FRANS VOORBRAAK

In this paper, we describe an approach to handling partially specified probabilistic information. We propose a formalism, called Partial Probability Theory (PPT), which allows very general representations of belief states, and we give brief treatments of problems, like belief change, evidence combination, and decision making in the context of PPT. We argue that the generality of PPT provide new insights in all the mentioned problem areas. More detailed treatments of these issues can be found in several papers referred to in the text.


Author(s):  
Fitria Arifiyanti

The purpose of this research was to find out the effectiveness of the implementation of problem based learning model with multiple representations to reduce the percentage of students’ difficulty in XIth Science SMAN 1 Pontianak. The research design was one group pretest-posttest design, and the instrument used was an essay test. Test reliskill (0, 5) was classified as medium, and test validity (3,56) was classified as a medium. The effect size of this research (2,18) was classified high, but the reduction percentage of the student’s difficulty (41,33%) was classified as a medium. The percentage increase in the students’ skill in multiple representations (52,38%) was classified as a medium. The research doesn’t find a significant correlation between the posttest result of students’ difficulty and the posttest result of studentS’ skill in multiple representations (C = 0,935, p = 0.348). The research result was expected to the development of the implementation problem based learning model with multiple representations approach.Keywords: Implementation, Multiple representations, Problem Based Learning


Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood

Wedgwood focuses his discussion around two evaluative concepts: correctness and rationality. Wedgwood proposes that these two concepts are related in the following way: one belief state is more rational than another if and only if the first has less expected inaccuracy than the former. He argues, however, that this view should not be understood as a form of consequentialism since it is not the total consequences of a belief state that determine its rationality. The view is rather a version of epistemic teleology. Wedgwood deploys this view to illuminate the difference between synchronic and diachronic evaluation of belief states as well as to disarm objections that have been leveled against epistemic consequentialism.


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