The Mental Symptoms of Myxædema and the Effect on them of the Thyroid Treatment

1894 ◽  
Vol 40 (168) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
T. S. Clouston

In Sir William Gull's classical description of “A Cretinoid State,” which we now call Myxódema, in 1873 he thus describes the mental condition of his first patient: ∗—“In the patient whose condition I have given above there had been a distinct change in the mental state. The mind, which had previously been active and inquisitive, assumed a gentle, placid indifference corresponding to the muscular languor, but the intellect was unimpaired.” He noticed “changes in the temper,” and assumed that the mental changes were pathological and a part of the disease. In Dr. Ord's almost equally classical paper, in which he gave the disease its present name,† he referred to the “slowness of thought,” the “long and diffuse letters” of one of the patients. In every full description of any case of myxódema that I have seen some such morbid mental change has been referred to. In the Report for 1888 of the Committee of the Clinical Society of London on Myxódema, the mental condition of the patients was inquired into, but there is internal evidence that the reporters did not all understand mental symptoms in the same light. Slowness of mental action was the symptom most common, for its absence was only noted in three of the 109 cases. Delusions and hallucinations are stated to have been present in 15 cases, or 14 per cent., and actual insanity in 24 cases, or 22 per cent. There is very frequent mention of morbid suspicions under the mental heading, and memory is usually stated to be impaired where reported on. In his experiments on monkeys, detailed in the report, Horsley specially refers to mental symptons that followed extirpation of the thyroid. He says the “mental operations, normal at first, soon diminished in activity, and then follow apathy, lethargy, coma.” “Gradually the intellect became duller, the energy of the animal diminished, and apathy alternating with idiotic activity resulted.”

1856 ◽  
Vol 2 (18) ◽  
pp. 479-494
Author(s):  
C. Lockhart Robertson

“The knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and the body” saith the founder† of modern science, in discoursing of human philosophy, or the knowledge of ourselves, as he terms it, is “fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself. The consideration is double: either how and how far the humours and effects of the body do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far the passions and apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of these,” (the influence of the body on the mental state,) continues Bacon, “hath been enquired and considered as a part and appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the body in the sect of Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mahomet do exceed. … The root and life of all which prescripts is besides the ceremony, the consideration of that dependency, which the affections of the mind are submitted unto, upon the state and disposition of the body.”


2021 ◽  
pp. 125-147
Author(s):  
Loreta Vaičiulytė-Semėnienė

This article deals with the content of neighbour on the basis of the forms of the noun ‘neighbour’ (Lith. kaimynas). Efforts are made to strike a balance between the structural and the cognitive approach to its meaning. The sample base for the study consists of 700 published sentences sourced in the Corpus of the Modern Lithuanian Language (CMLL) compiled by the Centre for Computational Linguistics at the Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas.The study has revealed a neighbour to be someone who experiences a certain mental state, someone who, in his or her (un)favourable response to the environment, affects another person in a relatively close space. Emotionally charged, this effect shows a neighbour who is a nice or a bad person to live next-doors with. The (dis)harmony of attitudes, values, and actions grounded on an (un)favourable mind-set defines a dynamic coexistenceof neighbours, or a failure to coexist.When it comes to the perception of neighbour that shifts in time, what matters is the shared space of the neighbours that has its relative boundaries and is measured as a distance – the closeness resulting in the distinction between a close > distant neighbour; yet even more important is the camaraderie – the proximity of attitudes, values, and the actions that they define – something that the dictionary definitions of the word neighbour tend to omit – and the related gradational differences between a homey > strange neighbour. When it comes to building and maintaining proximity, it is the neighbour’s temper, polite and supportive interaction, and behaviour that favours another person, such as sharing things with them and all kinds of assistance, especially in need, that matters. As the mind-sets, values, and behaviours assimilate, the neighbours become one – they become homey to each other. And the axis of oneness grounded on favour in neighbourhood is God.


Author(s):  
Eduard Krylov

The value and importance of the integrative bilingual teaching/learning foreign language and engineering is building bridges between cognition and communication, finding ways for establishing a dynamic balance between them in the mind of an engineering student. This explains the choice of study exercises and activities, related to mental operations and psychological patterns. The chapter discusses the peculiarities of solving problems, other active exercises, and gives some practical recommendations. Here also is the eternal problem of CLIL-like integrative education: How much language? How much content? Concerning language material, it is determined by some basic volume, demand driven by professional duties and interests. All the suggested ideas were tested at a Russian technical university for years. The difficulties, findings, and results of the pilot projects for bachelors and masters are discussed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 292-358
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter considers the most commonly occurring ‘mental condition defences’, focusing on the pleas of insanity, intoxication and mistake. The common law historically made a distinction between justification and excuse, at least in relation to homicide. It is said that justification relates to the rightness of the act but to excuse as to the circumstances of the individual actor. The chapter examines the relationship between mental condition defences, insanity and unfitness to be tried, and explains the Law Commission’s most recent recommendations for reforming unfitness and other mental condition defences. It explores the test of insanity, disease of the mind (insanity) versus external factor (sane automatism), insane delusions and insanity, burden of proof, function of the jury, self-induced automatism, intoxication as a denial of criminal responsibility, voluntary and involuntary intoxication, dangerous or non-dangerous drugs in basic intent crime and intoxication induced with the intention of committing crime.


2021 ◽  
pp. 42-84
Author(s):  
Susan B. Levin

“Basic-emotion” and “dual-process” theorists, joined by transhumanists, view the mind as a set of compartments whose functionality is explained by dedicated areas or systems in the brain. The two theoretical approaches reflect core misconceptions and have been supplanted by “appraisal theory.” Beyond capturing well the entwining of reason and emotion in our mental operations, Klaus Scherer’s version of appraisal theory is compatible with mounting evidence of the brain’s complexity. Having developed a scientific line of argument against transhumanists’ lens on the mind and brain, the author turns to Aristotle’s rational essentialism. Wrongly invoked to support transhumanists’ extreme version, Aristotle’s rational essentialism incorporates a necessary role for nonrational faculties and intrapsychic harmony. While transhumanists’ lens on the mind and brain is at odds with contemporary findings, Aristotle’s view of the mind shares important commitments with Scherer’s appraisal theory and is broadly compatible with an emerging picture of the brain’s complexity.


Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker

A mental state is luminous if and only if being in a state of that kind always puts one in a position to know that one is in the state. This chapter is a critique of Timothy Williamson’s margin-of-error argument that no nontrivial states are luminous in this sense. While I agree with Williamson’s rejection of a Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, I argue that an externalist conception (one based on information theory) can be reconciled with the luminosity of intentional mental states such as knowledge. My argument, which uses an artificial and simplified model of knowledge, is not a direct rebuttal to his argument, as applied to a more realistic notion of the knowledge of human beings, but I argue that it shows that a luminosity assumption is compatible with externalism about knowledge, and it suggest an intuitively plausible strategy for resisting his argument.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Chaoyi Li ◽  
Yu Yin ◽  
Changzheng Zhou ◽  
Dezhong Yao

This paper proposes a method to translate human EEG into music, so as to represent mental state by music. The arousal levels of the brain mental state and music emotion are implicitly used as the bridge between the mind world and the music. The arousal level of the brain is based on the EEG features extracted mainly by wavelet analysis, and the music arousal level is related to the musical parameters such as pitch, tempo, rhythm, and tonality. While composing, some music principles (harmonics and structure) were taken into consideration. With EEGs during various sleep stages as an example, the music generated from them had different patterns of pitch, rhythm, and tonality. 35 volunteers listened to the music pieces, and significant difference in music arousal levels was found. It implied that different mental states may be identified by the corresponding music, and so the music from EEG may be a potential tool for EEG monitoring, biofeedback therapy, and so forth.


1874 ◽  
Vol 19 (88) ◽  
pp. 519-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. A. F. Browne

The power or process by means of which Time is mentally recognised and estimated independently of, or before, its external and artificial measurement, has not received a clear or comprehensive solution at the hands of those who have dealt with the subject. Certain metaphysicians connect the idea of duration with that of extension, and conceive that the child, or the savage, may have acquired a notion of intervals, or interrupted extension, from seeing and feeling through the muscular sense the alternate extension and flexion of his limbs; all comparison of such events with the successive changes in objective phenomena, as in days and nights, being the result of subsequent experience. Certain others conceive that our notion of Time originates in our consciousness and observation of succession in our thoughts, feelings, and mental states, a succession which necessarily involves a series of changes separated in time, and order, and nature. Sir W. Hamilton, apparently aware of the difficulty of the problem, says that “Time is a form of thought,” and “if we attempt to comprehend Time, either in whole or in part, we find that thought is hedged in between two incomprehensibles.” Other philosophers, belonging to a more practical school, who may be claimed as psychologists, contend that the subjective element of Time is imparted by the communication of impressions upon the external senses to the sensorium, coming as these must always do in succession with intervals of different length, and, as they often do, of regular length and intensity. It will be observed that in all these hypotheses it is taken for granted that the mind is capable of directing attention to its own conditions, and, to a certain extent, of analysing these, of marking their course, their swiftness, or slowness, their regularity, or irregularity. On the other hand, the phrenologists contend that there is a primitive and special faculty connected with a portion of the anterior lobe of the brain, by which Time, or the succession of events and intervals, is perceived or becomes known to us. My own speculations formerly led me to the theory that the perception of rhythm, or regular sequence, in sensorial impressions was conveyed by the pulsations of the cerebral arteries, either to the whole brain, or to such portion of it as may take cognisance of internal movements or changes. Sir H. Holland, that noble veteran, that learned and travelled and philosophic physician, who has just passed from amongst us, dedicated a chapter in his “Medical Notes and Reflections,” p. 499, to the exposition of “Time as an element in Mental Functions,” in which his chief object is to show that ideas or different modes of mentalisation arise and are propagated in different degrees of velocity and intensity in Time in different temperaments, and in the same individual at different periods, in accordance with the predominant physical or mental condition.


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