scholarly journals Music Composition from the Brain Signal: Representing the Mental State by Music

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Chaoyi Li ◽  
Yu Yin ◽  
Changzheng Zhou ◽  
Dezhong Yao

This paper proposes a method to translate human EEG into music, so as to represent mental state by music. The arousal levels of the brain mental state and music emotion are implicitly used as the bridge between the mind world and the music. The arousal level of the brain is based on the EEG features extracted mainly by wavelet analysis, and the music arousal level is related to the musical parameters such as pitch, tempo, rhythm, and tonality. While composing, some music principles (harmonics and structure) were taken into consideration. With EEGs during various sleep stages as an example, the music generated from them had different patterns of pitch, rhythm, and tonality. 35 volunteers listened to the music pieces, and significant difference in music arousal levels was found. It implied that different mental states may be identified by the corresponding music, and so the music from EEG may be a potential tool for EEG monitoring, biofeedback therapy, and so forth.

Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker

A mental state is luminous if and only if being in a state of that kind always puts one in a position to know that one is in the state. This chapter is a critique of Timothy Williamson’s margin-of-error argument that no nontrivial states are luminous in this sense. While I agree with Williamson’s rejection of a Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, I argue that an externalist conception (one based on information theory) can be reconciled with the luminosity of intentional mental states such as knowledge. My argument, which uses an artificial and simplified model of knowledge, is not a direct rebuttal to his argument, as applied to a more realistic notion of the knowledge of human beings, but I argue that it shows that a luminosity assumption is compatible with externalism about knowledge, and it suggest an intuitively plausible strategy for resisting his argument.


Author(s):  
Frank Jackson

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?


1874 ◽  
Vol 19 (88) ◽  
pp. 519-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. A. F. Browne

The power or process by means of which Time is mentally recognised and estimated independently of, or before, its external and artificial measurement, has not received a clear or comprehensive solution at the hands of those who have dealt with the subject. Certain metaphysicians connect the idea of duration with that of extension, and conceive that the child, or the savage, may have acquired a notion of intervals, or interrupted extension, from seeing and feeling through the muscular sense the alternate extension and flexion of his limbs; all comparison of such events with the successive changes in objective phenomena, as in days and nights, being the result of subsequent experience. Certain others conceive that our notion of Time originates in our consciousness and observation of succession in our thoughts, feelings, and mental states, a succession which necessarily involves a series of changes separated in time, and order, and nature. Sir W. Hamilton, apparently aware of the difficulty of the problem, says that “Time is a form of thought,” and “if we attempt to comprehend Time, either in whole or in part, we find that thought is hedged in between two incomprehensibles.” Other philosophers, belonging to a more practical school, who may be claimed as psychologists, contend that the subjective element of Time is imparted by the communication of impressions upon the external senses to the sensorium, coming as these must always do in succession with intervals of different length, and, as they often do, of regular length and intensity. It will be observed that in all these hypotheses it is taken for granted that the mind is capable of directing attention to its own conditions, and, to a certain extent, of analysing these, of marking their course, their swiftness, or slowness, their regularity, or irregularity. On the other hand, the phrenologists contend that there is a primitive and special faculty connected with a portion of the anterior lobe of the brain, by which Time, or the succession of events and intervals, is perceived or becomes known to us. My own speculations formerly led me to the theory that the perception of rhythm, or regular sequence, in sensorial impressions was conveyed by the pulsations of the cerebral arteries, either to the whole brain, or to such portion of it as may take cognisance of internal movements or changes. Sir H. Holland, that noble veteran, that learned and travelled and philosophic physician, who has just passed from amongst us, dedicated a chapter in his “Medical Notes and Reflections,” p. 499, to the exposition of “Time as an element in Mental Functions,” in which his chief object is to show that ideas or different modes of mentalisation arise and are propagated in different degrees of velocity and intensity in Time in different temperaments, and in the same individual at different periods, in accordance with the predominant physical or mental condition.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paco Calvo ◽  
Vaidurya Sahi ◽  
Anthony Trewavas

AbstractFeelings in humans are mental states representing groups of physiological functions that usually have defined behavioural objectives or purpose. Feelings are thought to be coordinated in the brain stem of animals and are evolutionarily ancient. One function of the brain is to prioritise between competing mental states, and thus groups of physiological functions and in turn behaviour. Anger, fear or pain call for immediate action whereas hunger, or thirst, signify longer term needs and a requirement for search. Plants use groups of coordinated physiological activities to deal with defined environmental situations but currently have no known mental state to prioritise any order of response. Plants do have a nervous system based on phloem which is highly cross linked. Its potential for forming a mental state is unknown but it could be used to distinguish between different and even contradictory signals and thus determine a priority of response. The vascular nervous system stretches throughout the whole plant providing the potential for assessment in all parts and commensurate with its self-organising, phenotypically plastic behaviour.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gheysar Maleki ◽  
Abbas Zabihzadeh ◽  
Mara J. Richman ◽  
Zsolt Demetrovics ◽  
Fatemeh Mohammadnejad

Abstract Background: Major depression (MDD) and social anxiety (SAD) disorders are debilitating psychiatric conditions characterized by disturbed interpersonal relationships. Despite these impairments in social relationships, research has been limited in simultaneously evaluated the dysfunction in MDD or SAD within two aspects of theory of mind (ToM): decoding mental states (i.e., Affective ToM) and reasoning mental states (i.e., cognitive ToM). Taking this into consideration, the current study assesses both decoding and reasoning mental states abilities in MDD, SAD, and healthy controls (HC). Methods: Subjects included 37 patients with MDD, 35 patients with SAD, and 35 HCs. ToM was measured with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) and the Faux Pas Task, which assess decoding and reasoning mental states, respectively. Results: Results revealed that in decoding of mental states, both the SAD and MDD groups had lower scores than the HC group; there was no significant difference between the SAD and MDD groups in decoding mental states. Conversely, in reasoning mental states, the SAD and HC groups had higher scores than the MDD group; no differences were found between the SAD and HC groups. Conclusions: Clinicians and researchers should further consider parsing generalized impairment in ToM into two aspects: decoding and reasoning of mental states by using the aforementioned measurements. By further understanding the two aspects, we can create a potentially new clinical profile for mental health disorders, such as in this context with both decoding and reasoning mental state impairment in MDD and a reasoning dysfunction in SAD.


Author(s):  
Ercenur Ünal ◽  
Anna Papafragou

This chapter discusses how children’s conceptual representations of the mind make contact with language. It focuses on two domains: the understanding of the conditions that lead to knowledge, and the ability to attribute knowledge to oneself and others. Specifically, it asks whether language provides the representational resources necessary for representing mental states and whether cross-linguistic differences in encoding of mental states influence sensitivity to the features that distinguish the conditions that allow people to gain knowledge. Empirical findings in these domains strongly suggest that language scaffolds the development of these cognitive abilities without altering the underlying conceptual representations of mental states.


Author(s):  
Alex Byrne

T&SK sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge—knowledge of one’s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans’ discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is “transparent”: self-knowledge is achieved by an “outward glance” at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an “inward glance” at one’s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ‘p’ to ‘I believe that p.’ One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ‘p’ is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ‘I intend to ϕ‎,’ or ‘I feel a pain’? T&SK argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one’s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one’s mental states (peculiar access).


Author(s):  
Robin Hanson

The concept of whole brain emulation has been widely discussed in futurism ( Martin 1971 ; Moravec 1988 ; Hanson 1994b , 2008b ; Shulman 2010 ; Alstott 2013 ; Eth et al. 2013 ; Bostrom 2014 ) and in science fiction ( Clarke 1956 ; Egan 1994 ; Brin 2002 ; Vinge 2003 ; Stross 2006 ) for many decades. Sometimes emulations are called “uploads.” Let me now try to be clearer about the technological assumptions whose consequences I seek to explore. When I refer to a “brain” here, I refer not just to neurons in a head, but also to other supporting cells in the head, and to neurons and key closely connected systems elsewhere in the human body, such as the systems that manage hormones. Using that terminology, I assume, following a wellestablished consensus in the cognitive and brain sciences, that “the mind is just the brain” ( Bermúdez 2010 ). That is, what the brain fundamentally does is to take input signals from eyes, ears, skin, etc., and after a short delay produces both internal state changes and output signals to control muscles, hormone levels, and other body changes. The brain does not just happen to transform input signals into state changes and output signals; this transformation is the primary function of the brain, both to us and to the evolutionary processes that designed brains. The brain is designed to make this signal processing robust and efficient. Because of this, we expect the physical variables (technically, “degrees of freedom”) within the brain that encode signals and signal-relevant states, which transform these signals and states, and which transmit them elsewhere, to be overall rather physically isolated and disconnected from the other far more numerous unrelated physical degrees of freedom and processes in the brain. That is, changes in other aspects of the brain only rarely influence key brain parts that encode mental states and signals. We have seen this disconnection in ears and eyes, and it has allowed us to create useful artificial ears and eyes, which allow the once-deaf to hear and the once-blind to see. We expect the same to apply to artificial brains more generally. In addition, it appears that most brain signals are of the form of neuron spikes, which are especially identifiable and disconnected from other physical variables.


2014 ◽  
Vol 599-601 ◽  
pp. 1484-1486
Author(s):  
Hua Bo Xiao ◽  
Zhen Dong Mu

People in a different state of fatigue, mental status will be significantly different, brain waves are a direct reflection of mental state, and then the brain waves in different states collected will not have a significant difference as well? In this paper, Fisher distance to calculate the difference between fatigue characteristics, by the characteristics of the different states to analyze, to use brain waves to reflect the purpose of human fatigue.


2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reginald B. Adams ◽  
Nicholas O. Rule ◽  
Robert G. Franklin ◽  
Elsie Wang ◽  
Michael T. Stevenson ◽  
...  

The ability to infer others' thoughts, intentions, and feelings is regarded as uniquely human. Over the last few decades, this remarkable ability has captivated the attention of philosophers, primatologists, clinical and developmental psychologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists. Most would agree that the capacity to reason about others' mental states is innately prepared, essential for successful human social interaction. Whether this ability is culturally tuned, however, remains entirely uncharted on both the behavioral and neural levels. Here we provide the first behavioral and neural evidence for an intracultural advantage (better performance for same- vs. other-culture) in mental state decoding in a sample of native Japanese and white American participants. We examined the neural correlates of this intracultural advantage using fMRI, revealing greater bilateral posterior superior temporal sulci recruitment during same- versus other-culture mental state decoding in both cultural groups. These findings offer preliminary support for cultural consistency in the neurological architecture subserving high-level mental state reasoning, as well as its differential recruitment based on cultural group membership.


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