Austerity and politically motivated changes – wage bargaining in Hungarian municipal services

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Neumann ◽  
Erzsébet Berki ◽  
Márk Edelényi
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Municipal Services

Strategic management in municipal services

10.15535/87 ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
L.M. Chepurda ◽  
I.A. Vlizlo
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Management ◽  
Municipal Services

Proposing a Way to Develop the Substantive Content of the Right of Access to Adequate Housing: An Alternative to the Reasonableness Review Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-93
Author(s):  
Gustav Muller
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Municipal Services ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Cultural Rights ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Convincing Case ◽  
Close Proximity ◽  
Review Model ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

In this article an attempt is made to put forward a convincing case for giving substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing and looks towards relevant international law elaborations on the meaning of this right as contained in the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It does so while being aware of the Constitutional Court’s prior rejection of an international law-based minimum core interpretation of the right and opting, instead, for the so-called model of reasonableness breview. Given that the court has so expressly taken and stuck to this stance, it is argued in the article that an international law-based substantive interpretation of the right is possible – given that South Africa has recently ratified the ICESCR – and that it is preferable given the shortfalls of the model of reasonableness review. The article further highlights what difference the preferred reading of section 26(1) would make as to how courts ‘interpret’ reasonableness, that is, how courts review compliance with section 26 at present if ‘adequate’ housing is understood as having security of tenure and access to basic municipal services; is affordable, habitable and accessible; is located in close proximity to social facilities; and is culturally adequate.

First Meeting of the PIDE Committee on Devolution Reforms in Pakistan

2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-161
Author(s):  
Durre-e- Nayab
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Health Education ◽  
Service Delivery ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Human Development ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Public Services ◽  
Municipal Services ◽  
Fiscal Decentralisation ◽  
National Reconstruction

The Local Government Ordinance (LGO), formulated by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) in 2000 and promulgated by provincial governments in August 2001, assigns powers, responsibilities, and service delivery functions to three levels of local governments: district, tehsil, and union. Responsibilities for the delivery of social and human development services, such as primary and basic health, education and social welfare, are delegated to the district level, whereas municipal services, such as water, sanitation and urban services are assigned to the tehsil level. The LGO does not only deal with the delivery of public services in its plan but also stresses the need for fiscal decentralisation, claiming that “Fiscal decentralisation is the heart of any devolution exercise. Without fiscal decentralisation no authority is devolved.”

Experimentalism as a Tool of Economic Innovation in Germany

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Jacoby ◽  
Martin Behrens
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Social Actor ◽  
Comparative Political Economy ◽  
System A ◽  
German Model ◽  
Economic Innovation

Our purpose in this article is to analyze changes in the German wagebargaining system, a system that has attracted enormous attentionfrom scholars of comparative political economy and comparativeindustrial relations. We argue that the wage bargaining portion ofthe German model is neither frozen in place, headed for deregulation,nor merely “muddling through.” Rather, we see the institutionalcapacities of the key actors—especially the unions and employerassociations—making possible a process we term “experimentalism.”In briefest form, experimentalism allows organizations that combinedecentralized information-gathering abilities with centralized decision-making capacity to probe for new possibilities, which, oncefound, can be quickly diffused throughout the organization. We willshow that the capacity for such experimentalism varies across actorsand sectors. And, to make things even tougher, neither major Germansocial actor can sustain innovation in the longer term withoutbringing along the other “social partner.”

Understanding Rising Income Inequality and Stagnating Ordinary Living Standards in Germany

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Bosch ◽  
Thorsten Kalina
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Labour Market ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Household Income ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Living Standards ◽  
Social Model ◽  
Real Wages ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Over Time

This chapter describes how inequality and real incomes have evolved in Germany through the period from the 1980s, through reunification, up to the economic Crisis and its aftermath. It brings out how reunification was associated with a prolonged stagnation in real wages. It emphasizes how the distinctive German structures for wage bargaining were eroded over time, and the labour market and tax/transfer reforms of the late 1990s-early/mid-2000s led to increasing dualization in the labour market. The consequence was a marked increase in household income inequality, which went together with wage stagnation for much of the 1990s and subsequently. Coordination between government, employers, and unions still sufficed to avoid the impact the economic Crisis had on unemployment elsewhere, but the German social model has been altered fundamentally over the period

scholarly journals Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Speed Of Convergence ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Dynamic Version ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

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