Memory, Party Politics, and Post-Transition Space: The Case of Poland

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Korycki

In this work I analyze and interpret Polish political field as a field of memory. I make three claims. First, I claim that programmatic identities of Polish political parties are weak. Despite this weakness political competition remains fierce, because parties fashion enduring political identities. I identify three mainstream political identities of political actors in Poland, given by their temporal orientation and their judgment of communism. Second, I claim that the field of the political competition predicated on the turn to the past and on moral opprobrium is the particular achievement of the party that captured political power in Poland in 2015. Similarly to its 2005 electoral success, the party narrated the country’s main problem as communist state-capture. It claimed that (former-) communists and their post-dissident allies captured political, material, and symbolic levers of power. This way of presenting the problem polarized the field, casting political opponents as essential enemies, and casting the narrators as country’s saviors. Third, this achievement was possible because the party narrated communism as essentially and existentially anti-Polish: it presented it as equal to Nazism, it made it foreign, and it made it coincidental with Jewishness. It then launched such discursive “weapon” against its present-day opponents.

2018 ◽  
pp. 79-94
Author(s):  
Andrzej ANTSZEWSKI

Among the numerous functions of political parties, the role of creating the governance system is highly significant. It manifests itself in the ability of political parties to establish permanent relations with the other parties and in this way provides the essence of a party system. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate the role the Law and Justice party (PiS) plays in the creation of the governance system. Since 2005, PiS has been one of the two dominant political parties struggling to win the parliamentary and presidential elections. In order to determine the scope of this party’s influence on the shape of the party system, their achievements in elections, parliament and Cabinet activity need to be analyzed. Such a quantitative analysis allows us to grasp PiS’s development trends in political competition. The paper discusses the reasons for their electoral success in 2005 as well as their defeat in 2007 and the aftermath of both these elections for the party’s competition to the government. The achievements of PiS confirm that this party has won the status of a party that structures the political competition, a status that has not been lost irrespective of the five elections at different levels that the party has lost. PiS has successfully adopted the postulates of the Left in terms of the economy and social issues, whereas it has maintained the image of a right-wing party in terms of the shape of the state and its moral foundations. PiS has managed to form an electorate that differs from other parties’ electorates in terms of its social and demographic properties as well as its political attitudes, which reinforces the position of PiS in the electoral struggle. Yet PiS has failed to establish a permanent coalition government. The elimination of Self-Defence (Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) from the Sejm has practically deprived PiS of any coalition potential, or has at least significantly reduced this potential. This, coupled with a continuously growing negative electorate, may turn out to constitute the main obstacle to PiS regaining power.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard S. Katz ◽  
Peter Mair

We restate and clarify the idea of the “cartel party,” a concept that has found considerable traction in studies of parties throughout the democratic world, including those far from the original research site and data on which the cartel model was based. The cartel party thesis holds that political parties increasingly function like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success. The thesis has been subject to varied empirical testing and to substantial theoretical evaluation and criticism. Against this background, we look again at the cartel party thesis in order to clarify ambiguities in and misinterpretations of the original argument. We also suggest further refinements, specifications and extensions of the argument. Following a background review of the original thesis, we break it down into its core components, and then clarify the terms in which it makes sense to speak of cartelization and collusion. We then go on to explore some of the implications of the thesis for our understanding of contemporary democracies and patterns of party organization and party competition and we identify a possible agenda for future research in party scholarship.


1970 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-124
Author(s):  
Else Suhaimi

Political recruitment is a process of selecting and selecting a person or several members of the community to occupy and exercise certain political roles as cadres of political parties, legislators, as president and vice president and as regional head. In the Indonesian state system, this political recruitment is left to political parties. The rise of political parties as a result of freedom of association and assembly on the one hand is a reflection of democracy but on the other hand the large number of political parties will give rise to increasingly tight competition between political parties. The increasing competition makes political actors easily trapped in political pragmatism. Political pragmatism as a short-term orientation of political actors to win political competition is power. Power as the ultimate goal of the political competition. Political pragmatism has had a significant impact on the formation of pragmatic recruitment patterns. The pattern of pragmatic recruitment has spawned many problems, especially issues related to the quality of recruitment results. One of them is that many of the political elites are facing legal problems such as corruption and so on. Under these conditions emerged initiatives to present a systematic and structured pattern of political recruitment. One of the indications is that political recruitment is based on the ideology of political parties. The ideology of a political party is broadly divided into recruitment based on Islamic ideology (religion) and other ideologies such as nationalism. the closer the party ideology to the party recruitment pattern will result in quality recruitment and visionary cadres. on the contrary, the further distance the party ideology with the party recruitment pattern will result in a pragmatic recruitment. The results of recruitment have a close relationship with the quality of products produced, especially product legislation.   Kata Kunci : pola rekrutmen, partai politik, sistem ketatanegaraan


Author(s):  
Thomas Poguntke ◽  
Susan E. Scarrow ◽  
Paul D. Webb

How political parties organize directly affects who is represented and which policies are prioritized. Political parties structure political choice, which is one of the main functions generally ascribed to them. Their roles as gatekeepers for policies and political careers are closely linked to their nature as membership-based organizations, and to the extent to which they empower members to directly or indirectly influence these crucial choices. Parties also play a crucial role as campaign organizations, whose organizational strength influences their electoral success. The literature often summarizes differences in how parties organize and campaign by identifying major party types, which can be regarded as “classic models” of party organization. Yet, actual parties must adapt to changing environments or risk being supplanted by newer parties or by other political actors. For instance, in recent years one popular adaptation has involved parties opening their decision-making processes by introducing party-wide ballots to settle important questions. Changes like these alter how parties act as intermediaries in representation and political participation. Thanks to the increasing availability of comparable data on party organizations in established and new democracies, and in parliamentary and presidential systems, today’s scholars are better equipped to study the origins and impacts of parties’ organizational differences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-40
Author(s):  
Maciej Falski

The present paper analyzes the media representation of the idea of the “third force” in politics. The research focuses on how the notion is being staged and visualized in order to create the impression of a new and fresh agent in the race for power. The case of MOST, a political coalition which gained importance in the 2015 Croatian parliamentary election, seems particularly important and adequate for the purpose. I do not discuss programs, political aims or visions of the main political parties. Rather, I propose a semiotic analysis of public communication. Attention will be paid to performative aspects of television broadcasts, organization of the space where negotiations were held, visual relations between political actors. The broadcasts, and the broadly taken space of public contact, will be treated as a stage, and actions taking place on such a stage as a political drama, with a screenplay which may be, but is not necessarily, conscious and planned. When seen from this perspective, the focus of interest does not lie on the purposeful layout of seating in a meeting or a public communique, but on unconscious cultural patterns which have a great impact on our decisions, choices, and perceptions. Ultimately, the electoral success of MOST was related not only to its program, but also–or maybe mostly – to its performative policy and its consistent positioning as a new actor in the political field.


2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (04) ◽  
pp. 747-805 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Zukerman Daly

AbstractWhy do citizens elect political actors who have perpetrated violence against the civilian population? Despite their use of atrocities, political parties with deep roots in the belligerent organizations of the past win postwar democratic elections in countries around the world. This article uses new, cross-national data on postwar elections globally between 1970 and 2010, as well as voting, survey, archival, and interview data from El Salvador. It finds that belligerents’ varied electoral success after wars can be explained not by their wartime levels of violence or use of electoral coercion, but by the distribution of military power at the end of conflict. It argues that militarily stronger belligerents are able to claim credit for peace, which translates into a reputation for competence on the provision of security. This enables them to own the security valence issue, which tends to crosscut cleavages, and to appeal to swing voters. The stronger belligerents’ provision of security serves to offset and justify their use of atrocities, rendering their election rational. This article sheds light on political life after episodes of violence. It also contributes to understanding security voting and offers insights into why people vote in seemingly counterintuitive ways.


2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-338
Author(s):  
Justice Richard Kwabena Owusu Kyei ◽  
Lidewyde H. Berckmoes

Literature on political vigilante groups has centred on the violence and conflict that emanate from their activities. This article approaches political vigilante groups as political actors who engage in political mobilisation and participation and therewith also contribute to nation state building. It explores how such groups participate in Ghana’s democratic governance and asks whether violence is an inevitable characteristic. The article builds on individual in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with political vigilante group members in Kumasi and Tamale in 2019. Findings show that political vigilante “youth” appeared to refer primarily to the social position attributed to non-elite groups in the political field. Political vigilante groups are multi-faceted in their organisational structures, membership, and activities both during electoral campaigns and during governing periods. While some groups revert to violence occasionally, the study concludes that political vigilante groups, in enabling different voices to be heard, are also contributing to democratic governance.


2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881986362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergiu Gherghina ◽  
Adam Fagan

Much of the literature on fringe political parties in post-communist Europe focused on the relationship with mainstream parties. Little is known about what happens at the fringes, what are the features of politics at the fringes and when this type of politics becomes mainstream. This special issue moves beyond the notion of the fringe versus mainstream dichotomy: it is more ‘granular’ in its approach and seeks to differentiate between different forms of ‘fringe’ parties. The contributions aim to explore how and whether the fringe in post-communist countries changes in an age of populism and illiberalism. They represent an important attempt to take the fringe as a feature of politics that is not necessarily transient or a manifestation of the ‘growing pains’ of post-communism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 458-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Zerback ◽  
Carsten Reinemann ◽  
Angela Nienierza

This study analyzes how perceptions of the popularity of political parties (i.e., the current opinion climate) and expectations about parties’ future electoral performance (i.e., the future opinion climate) are formed. Theoretically, the paper integrates research on the sources of public opinion perception and empirically draws on a representative survey carried out before the 2013 German federal election. We show that the perceived media slant and opinions perceived in one’s personal surroundings are closely related to perceptions of party popularity, whereas individual recall of poll results and personal opinions about the parties are not. However, poll results are shown to be the single most important predictor of expectations about the parties’ future electoral success.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-179
Author(s):  
Andrey Vershinin

The article examines the issue of exercising the freedom of association in political parties in Russia in a comparative analysis with the leading democratic countries of the world. Modern democracies cannot be imagined without political parties, which are the representors of the interests of their voters in legislative bodies and local government bodies. The development of civil society and the entire political system in the country depends on how the freedom of association in political parties and the access of parties to participate in elections is realized. The development of legislation on political parties in the Russian Federation proceeded unevenly. In the first years after the adoption of the Constitution the legislative body did not introduce strict requirements for parties. The adoption of a special federal law on political parties in 2001 became a turning point in the development of the party system. The author identifies two large blocks of restrictions on the creation of parties. The first is legislative restrictions, the second is the restrictions that arise from the unfair activities of legislative and law enforcement agencies. In this work, legislative restrictions are compared with restrictions in other democracies, as well as based on legal positions developed by the European Court of Human Rights. The author comes to the opinion that some restrictions on the creation of parties are not necessary now, in the meantime they significantly narrow the possibilities of party creation and political competition. First, we are talking about a ban on the creation of regional parties. The Constitutional Court in its legal positions indicated that this restriction is temporary and will be lifted over time. Within the framework of this work, the author will give suggestions on changing the approach to the creation of political parties in Russia, which should affect the emergence of new strong parties at different levels of public authority. The author believes that a system of “controlled multiparty system” has developed in Russia, which is implemented both in changing the legislation on political parties based on the interests of the “party in power” and the practice of the registration body, which prevents the formation of new parties claiming to redistribute the existing distribution of forces. Based on the analysis of the legislation on political parties, law enforcement practice, decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the ECHR and the legislation of foreign countries, the author proposes approaches to reforming the existing party system, which include small cosmetic changes and large-scale changes in approaches to the creation of parties.


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