scholarly journals Angular declination as an exocentric distance cue: some hints for dissociation between perception and action systems

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (9) ◽  
pp. 495-495
Author(s):  
N. P. Ribeiro-Filho ◽  
E. H. Matsushima ◽  
J. A. Da Silva
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert L. Goldstone ◽  
Tyler Marghetis ◽  
Erik Weitnauer ◽  
Erin R. Ottmar ◽  
David Landy

Formal mathematical reasoning provides an illuminating test case for understanding how humans can think about things that they did not evolve to comprehend. People engage in algebraic reasoning by (1) creating new assemblies of perception and action routines that evolved originally for other purposes (reuse), (2) adapting those routines to better fit the formal requirements of mathematics (adaptation), and (3) designing cultural tools that mesh well with our perception-action routines to create cognitive systems capable of mathematical reasoning (invention). We describe evidence that a major component of proficiency at algebraic reasoning is Rigged Up Perception-Action Systems (RUPAS), via which originally demanding, strategically controlled cognitive tasks are converted into learned, automatically executed perception and action routines. Informed by RUPAS, we have designed, implemented, and partially assessed a computer-based algebra tutoring system called Graspable Math with an aim toward training learners to develop perception-action routines that are intuitive, efficient, and mathematically valid.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1649 ◽  
pp. 79-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Şükrü Barış Demiral ◽  
Chiara Gambi ◽  
Mante S. Nieuwland ◽  
Martin J. Pickering

1989 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reinoud J. Bootsma

The accuracy of perceptual processes subserving different perception–action systems was evaluated by presenting subjects (N = 17) with similar optic flow patterns, while requiring different actions from them. Squash balls were dropped along a fixed trajectory, and subjects were asked to (a) hit the ball using their own arm, (b) release an artificial arm to hit the ball, and (c) indicate when the ball was at the point of contact of conditions (a) and (b). The variability of the temporal initiation point of the actions, which served as an operationalization of perceptual accuracy, was compared under all three conditions. The results indicated that the variability of the temporal initiation point was smallest under the natural arm condition, even though movement time was more variable here than under the artificial arm condition. It is argued that, because perception and action are intimately interwoven components of a perceiving/acting system, it is not an extrinsically (experimenter-) determined simplicity of perceptual and/or motor aspects of the task, but the intrinsic make-up of this overarching system that determines which couplings lead to a more accurate performance.


2007 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-265
Author(s):  
István Fekete ◽  
Mária Gósy ◽  
Rozália Eszter Ivády ◽  
Péter Kardos

DianePecherés RolfA. Zwaan(szerk.): Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, and thinking (Fekete István)     253 CsépeValéria: Az olvasó agy (Gósy Mária) 256 Kormos, Judit: Speech production and second language acquisition (Ivády Rozália Eszter)      260 MarosánGyörgy: Hogyan készül a történelem? (Kardos Péter) 263


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew D Wilson

Ever since Gibson proposed the concept of ‘affordances’ in 1979, we have been arguing about the best way to formalize the idea in a way that can allow us to successfully explain behavior. The first approach was to consider them as dispositional properties of task environment which can support skillful perception and action. A more recent approach considers them more broadly as relations between properties of organisms and their environments. This expands the spatial and temporal scope of affordances; we stand in many kinds of relations to our physical but also social and cultural environments. Relational affordances are therefore offered as an ecological way to explain behaviors in these domains. However, these relational affordances do not, as a rule, interact with perceptual media and therefore do not create perceptual information about themselves. This means they cannot be perceived, which in turn means they cannot play any role in an ecological explanation of a behavior. This paper briefly reviews the dispositional vs relational accounts of affordances, explains the problem, and proposes an information-based alternative (building on Golonka, 2015). Affordances are not relational, but fortunately information is, and this is where we should focus our attention.


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