scholarly journals Playing Fair and Following the Rules

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 134-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The One

In his paper “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap” (published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy), Jiafeng Zhu argues that the principle of fair play cannot require submission to the rules of a cooperative scheme, and that when such submission is required, the requirement is grounded in consent. I propose a better argument for the claim that fair play requires submission to the rules than the one Zhu considers. I also argue that Zhu’s attribution of consent to people commonly thought to be bound to follow the rules by a duty of fair play is implausible.

scholarly journals A FAIR PLAY ACCOUNT OF LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Legal Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi
Keyword(s):  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
State Legitimacy ◽  
Cooperative Scheme

ABSTRACTThere is an emerging consensus among political philosophers that state legitimacy involves something more than—or perhaps other than—political obligation. Yet the principle of fair play, which many take to be a promising basis for political obligation, has been largely absent from discussions of the revised conception of legitimacy. This paper shows how the principle of fair play can generate legitimate political authority by drawing on a neglected feature of the principle—its stipulation that members of a cooperative scheme must reciprocate specifically by submitting to the scheme's rules.

Political Obligation, Punishment, and the Polity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Legal Punishment ◽  
Practical Guidance ◽  
The One ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter completes the argument for the fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment by taking up two final tasks. The first is to explain how the two aspects of this theory—that is, the one concerned with political obligation and the one that justifies legal punishment—stand in relation to each other. The claim is that this relationship is interlocking and mutually reinforcing. The second task is to fill out and sharpen the conception of the polity as a cooperative meta-practice that is central to the fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment. In doing so, I hope to show how the fair-play account provides practical guidance even in conditions that fall short of the ideal of a polity so conceived.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Play Theory ◽  
Justification Of Punishment ◽  
Sustained Effort

This book aims to develop a unified theory of political obligation and the justification of punishment that takes its bearings from the principle of fair play. Much has been written on each of these subjects, of course, including numerous essays in recent years that approach one or the other topic in fair-play terms. However, there has been no sustained effort to link the two in a fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment. This book undertakes such an effort. This introduction explains why such a theory is an attractive possibility and how the argument for it unfolds in the succeeding chapters.

scholarly journals Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection

Philosophy ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Knowledge ◽  
Ethical Point ◽  
The One

The author begins with an outline of Bernard William's moral philosophy, within which he locates William's notorious doctrine that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. He then gives a partial defence of this doctrine, exploiting an analogy between ethical judgements and tensed judgements. The basic idea is that what the passage of time does for the latter, reflection can do for the former: namely, prevent the re-adoption of an abandoned point of view (an ethical point of view in the one case, a temporal point of view in the other). In the final section the author says a little about how reflection might do this.

scholarly journals Between Kantian Rationalism and Moral Mysticism: The Search for the Grounding of Morality in the Philosophy of A. Jokubaitis

Politologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Aistė Noreikaitė
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Moral Subject ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
The One ◽  
Implicit Normativity

Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant’s influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O’Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.

Reciprocity in Morality and Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Thought

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.

Punishment and the physiology of the Timaeus

1996 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. F. Stalley
Keyword(s):  
Physical Health ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
The One ◽  
Mental And Physical Health ◽  
Health And Sickness ◽  
Made In

It hardly needs to be said that the parallel between mental and physical health plays an important part in Plato's moral philosophy. One of the central claims of the Republicis that justice is to the soul what health is to the body (443b–444e).1 Similar points are made in other dialogues.2 This analogy between health and sickness on the one hand and virtue and vice on the other is closely connected to the so–called Socratic paradoxes. Throughout his life Plato seems to have clung in some sense to the ideas that justice is our greatest good, that the unjust man is correspondingly miserable and that no one is therefore willingly unjust. It follows from these ideas that the unjust man, like the sick man, is in a wretched state which is not of his own choosing.

The Principle of Fairness and States’ Duty to Obey International Law

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
International Context ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
Technical Sense ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

I employ the principle of fairness to argue that many existing states have a moral duty to obey international law simply in virtue of its status as law. On this voluntarist interpretation of the principle of fairness, agents must accept (in a technical sense) the benefits of a cooperative scheme in order to acquire an obligation to contribute to that scheme’s operation. I contend that states can accept the benefits international law provides, and that only if they do so do states have a fair-play duty to obey international law. In addition, I demonstrate that A. John Simmons’ criticisms of the attempt to use the principle of fairness to establish a duty to obey domestic law – both with respect to understanding the legal order as a cooperative scheme, and to agents’ acceptance of benefits – do not apply in the international context.

The Principle of Fairness, Political Duties, and the Benefits Proviso Mistake

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Koltonski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Voluntary Action ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Law

Recent debate in the literature on political obligation about the principle of fairness rests on a mistake. Despite the widespread assumption to the contrary, a person can have a duty of fairness to share in the burdens of sustaining some cooperative scheme even though that scheme does not represent a net benefit to her. Recognizing this mistake allows for a resolution of the stalemate between those who argue that the mere receipt of some public good from a scheme can generate a duty of fairness and those who argue that only some voluntary action of consent or acceptance of the good can generate such a duty. I defend a version of the principle of fairness that holds that it is the person’s reliance on a scheme for the provision of some product or service that generates duties of fairness to share in the burdens of sustaining the scheme. And, on this version, the principle of fairness is politically significant: regardless of whether the citizen has a duty to obey the law, she will still have important political duties of fairness generated by her reliance on the various public goods provided by those society-wide cooperative schemes sustained by the sacrifices of her fellow citizens.

scholarly journals The Soul, the Virtues, and the Human Good: Comments on Aristotle's Moral Psychology

Labyrinth ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Kathi Beier
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Ethical Inquiry ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The One ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

In modern moral philosophy, virtue ethics has developed into one of the major approaches to ethical inquiry. As it seems, however, it is faced with a kind of perplexity similar to the one that Elisabeth Anscombe has described in Modern moral philosophy with regard to ethics in general. For if we assume that Anscombe is right in claiming that virtue ethics ought to be grounded in a sound philosophy of psychology, modern virtue ethics seems to be baseless since it lacks or even avoids reflections on the human soul. To overcome this difficulty, the paper explores the conceptual connections between virtue and soul in Aristotle's ethics. It claims that the human soul is the principle of virtue since reflections on the soul help us to define the nature of virtue, to understand the different kinds of virtues, and to answer the question why human beings need the virtues at all. 

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