Why Do Previous Choices Matter for Hospital Demand? Decomposing Switching Costs from Unobserved Preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (5) ◽  
pp. 906-915 ◽  
Author(s):  
Devesh Raval ◽  
Ted Rosenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Switching Costs ◽  
Unobserved Preferences

Reduction in Switching Costs for Difficult Tasks With Task Priming

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Padmanabhan Sudevan ◽  
John Holmes ◽  
Amber Corry ◽  
Jeffrey Willems ◽  
Marisa Hoffman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Switching Costs

The influenced factors of bilinguals' language switching costs

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 1469
Author(s):  
Xin CHANG ◽  
He BAI ◽  
Pei WANG
Keyword(s):  
Switching Costs ◽  
Language Switching

Switching costs and benefits affect user resistance in project implementation: Roles of positive emotions and user traditionality

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (7) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Shan Liu ◽  
Yajun Zhang ◽  
Kaili Li ◽  
Jing Tan
Keyword(s):  
Structural Equation ◽  
Positive Emotions ◽  
Switching Costs ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Hierarchical Regression ◽  
Project Implementation ◽  
Traditional Values ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
User Resistance ◽  
Mediating Role

In this study we investigated how perceived switching costs and benefits influence user resistance as a major cause of information systems project implementation failure, from the perspectives of individual emotions and traditional values. We used structural equation modeling and hierarchical regression analysis to analyze data from 256 potential users of a new information system. Participants were employed by a telecom operator in China. Results indicated that positive emotions played a partial mediating role in the relationship between perceived switching costs and benefits and user resistance. Further, user traditionality moderated the influence of perceived switching costs and benefits on user resistance. These findings have theoretical implications and we suggest practical ways in which managers can alleviate user resistance.

scholarly journals Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillem Roig
Keyword(s):  
Switching Costs ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Hand Preference ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Opposing Effects ◽  
Lock In

Abstract When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.

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