Crowd-Out, Education, and Employer Contributions to Workplace Pensions: Evidence from Canadian Tax Records

2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 648-663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Messacar
Keyword(s):  
Crowd Out ◽  
Workplace Pensions

Human Capital Accumulation and Resource Abundance

2011 ◽  
pp. 66-77
Author(s):  
O. Vasilieva
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Capital Accumulation ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Harmful Effect ◽  
Human Capital Accumulation ◽  
Resource Abundance ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Crowd Out

Does resource abundance positively affect human capital accumulation? Or, alternatively, does it «crowd out» the human capital leading to the deterioration of economic growth? The paper gives an overview of the relevant literature and discusses both theoretical and empirical results obtained regarding the connection between human capital accumulation and resource abundance. It shows that despite some theoretical predictions about the harmful effect of resource abundance on human capital accumulation, unambiguous evidence of such impact that would be robust with respect to the change of resource abundance parameter has not been obtained yet.

Can Investment Incentives Crowd Out Innovation? Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaowei Ke ◽  
Yao Lu ◽  
Xinzheng Shi ◽  
Yeqing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Investment Incentives ◽  
Crowd Out

The Propaganda Feedback Loop

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yochai Benkler ◽  
Robert Faris ◽  
Hal Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Feedback Loop ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hillary Clinton ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
The Public ◽  
False Reporting ◽  
Media Ecosystem ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter presents a model of the interaction of media outlets, politicians, and the public with an emphasis on the tension between truth-seeking and narratives that confirm partisan identities. This model is used to describe the emergence and mechanics of an insular media ecosystem and how two fundamentally different media ecosystems can coexist. In one, false narratives that reinforce partisan identity not only flourish, but crowd-out true narratives even when these are presented by leading insiders. In the other, false narratives are tested, confronted, and contained by diverse outlets and actors operating in a truth-oriented norms dynamic. Two case studies are analyzed: the first focuses on false reporting on a selection of television networks; the second looks at parallel but politically divergent false rumors—an allegation that Donald Trump raped a 13-yearold and allegations tying Hillary Clinton to pedophilia—and tracks the amplification and resistance these stories faced.

scholarly journals Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark *

2014 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 1141-1219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Chetty ◽  
John N. Friedman ◽  
Søren Leth-Petersen ◽  
Torben Heien Nielsen ◽  
Tore Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Wealth Accumulation ◽  
Retirement Savings ◽  
Total Saving ◽  
Savings Accounts ◽  
Retirement Accounts ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
Savings Rates

Abstract Using 41 million observations on savings for the population of Denmark, we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice. Subsidies for retirement accounts, which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings, primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts. We estimate that each $1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent. In contrast, policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action—such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts—increase wealth accumulation substantially. We estimate that approximately 15% of individuals are “active savers” who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts; 85% of individuals are “passive savers” who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. We conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons: (i) subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (ii) they generate substantial crowd-out conditional on response, and (iii) they do not increase the savings of passive individuals, who are least prepared for retirement.

Parent Engagement Interventions Are Not Costless: Opportunity Cost and Crowd Out of Parental Investment

2021 ◽  
pp. 016237372110304
Author(s):  
Carly D. Robinson ◽  
Raj Chande ◽  
Simon Burgess ◽  
Todd Rogers
Keyword(s):  
High School Students ◽  
Parent Engagement ◽  
Science Curriculum ◽  
Educational Interventions ◽  
Text Messages ◽  
School Students ◽  
Parental Time ◽  
Engagement Interventions ◽  
Crowd Out ◽  
The Impact

Many educational interventions encourage parents to engage in their child’s education as if parental time and attention is limitless. Sadly, though, it is not. Successfully encouraging certain parental investments may crowd out other productive behaviors. A randomized field experiment (N = 2,212) assessed the impact of an intervention in which parents of middle and high school students received multiple text messages per week encouraging them to ask their children specific questions tied to their science curriculum. The intervention increased parent–child at-home conversations about science but did not detectably impact science test scores. However, the intervention decreased parent engagement in other, potentially productive, parent behaviors. These findings illustrate that parent engagement interventions are not costless: There are opportunity costs to shifting parental effort.

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