Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 91-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene Gerzhoy
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Security Model ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Do So

When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.

The future unlike the past: nuclear proliferation and American security policy

1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Future ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control

An examination of the past relationships between nuclear proliferation and American security policy substantiates several propositions. First, the political relationship between the United States and each new nuclear weapon state was not fundamentally transformed as a result of nuclear proliferation. Second, with the exception of the Soviet Union, no new nuclear state significantly affected U.S. defense programs or policies. Third, American interest in bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations has been confined to the Soviet Union. Fourth, a conventional conflict involving a nonnuclear ally prompted the United States to intervene in ways it otherwise might not have in order to forestall the use of nuclear weapons.In all respects, however, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and American security policy is changing. The intensification of the superpower rivalry and specific developments in their nuclear weapons and doctrines, the decline of American power more generally, and the characteristics of nuclear threshold states all serve to stimulate nuclear proliferation. It will be increasingly difficult in the future for American security policy to be as insulated from this process as it has been in the past.

South Korea, 1968–1980

2018 ◽  
pp. 110-131
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Korea ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Its Region ◽  
The United States ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Considerable Pressure

The chapter analyzes South Korea’s aborted efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1970s. It shows that South Korea inferred the strength of its security guarantees on the basis of American forward deployed conventional forces in its region. Yet this chapter also scrutinises the conventional wisdom that the United States successfully applied considerable pressure on South Korea to extract non-proliferation commitments. Although the United States did apply non-military levers of coercion against South Korea, whether the significant use of these levers was definitive in curbing South Korea’s nuclear weapons interest remains unclear.

Japan, 1952–1980

2018 ◽  
pp. 79-109
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The Military

Many scholars would hold that a robust military alliance as well as strong anti-nuclear norms in domestic society would make any nuclear proliferation-related behaviour unlikely on the part of Japan. This chapter challenges such arguments, showing that the alliance with the United States did not fully inhibit Japan’s nuclear ambitions since Japan ratcheted up its interest in enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the late 1960. Indeed, Japan’s nuclear interest piqued amid concerns that the military alliance was weakening. Moreover, although the alliance did discourage some level of interest in nuclear weapons, the United States was reluctant to coerce Japan directly on this issue. Domestic politics and—to a lesser extent—prestige considerations were arguably a greater influence on Japan’s nuclear decision-making in the 1970s than alliance-related ones.

British Scientists and the Bomb: The Decisions of 1980

1981 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-292
Author(s):  
Roger Williams
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Dimension ◽  
Conservative Government ◽  
Technical Community ◽  
Low Profile ◽  
Civil Defence ◽  
Do So

THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT ELECTED IN MAY 1979 had, by August 1980, taken three decisions in respect of nuclear weapons and civil defence which in portent had had few peacetime parallels. These decisions naturally had a technical as well as a political dimension yet, until at least the spring of 1981, the involvement of the British scientific community in public discussion of the underlying issues remained negligible. No similar decisions could be taken, or even contemplated, in the United States without provoking a response both substantial and professional from American scientists. How does one explain the attitude, or lack of it, in this context of their British counterparts? Why, when these decisions were announced, did British scientists behave, or appear to behave, as political eunuchs? Are there no matters which rouse them to political involvement? Or are they perhaps more politically effective precisely because they pursue a low-profile course? These questions are important and it is worth trying to answer them. Before attempting to do so, however, it will be helpful both to identify the British decisions of 1979–80 referred to above, and also to outline such reaction to them on the part of the British technical community as had, in fact, occurred by the spring of 1981.

Theorizing the Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Credible Threat ◽  
Over Time

This chapter reviews existing theories of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policy and proposes two theories to explain how US nonproliferation policy has evolved over time and how effective it has been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It argues that tests by new nuclear states can spur stronger nonproliferation policies by increasing expectations of nuclear domino effects, causing greater government attention to nonproliferation, and providing a political opening for nonproliferation advocates. In terms of the effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy, it emphasizes the importance of a credible threat of sanctions, which can deter states from seeking or acquiring nuclear weapons if they are highly dependent on the United States. For states with low dependence on the United States, multilateral sanctions are crucial to ending ongoing nuclear weapons programs.

This New American

2019 ◽  
pp. 35-71
Author(s):  
Jean H. Baker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Water Supply ◽  
The United States ◽  
Supply System ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
George Washington ◽  
Mount Vernon ◽  
System A ◽  
Artistic Vision ◽  
The Common

Chapter 2 begins with Latrobe’s emigration to the United States in 1796 and includes his exciting journey on the Eliza. He spent three and a half years in Virginia. After only a few months in Norfolk he moved to Richmond, the capital. There, he met Bushrod Washington, the president’s nephew, who introduced him to George Washington and arranged a visit to Mount Vernon. Socially, Latrobe benefited from his membership in the Freemasons, a connection that helped him in business as well. However, he continued to chafe against the common belief that an architect was an unnecessary expense, with most buildings requiring only skilled carpenters. Seeking more opportunities as an architect, Latrobe moved to Philadelphia. Here he built the Bank of Pennsylvania, a structure that brought him recognition, and the Philadelphia water supply system, a project that was hampered by his inability to match his artistic vision with financial reality. In Philadelphia, Latrobe met and married Mary Elizabeth Hazlehurst: a wife whom he adored, a woman who treated her stepchildren as if they were hers, a physical and intellectual partner who created the nurturing and intimate family he had never known.

How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation

2018 ◽  
pp. 10-28
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Argument

This chapter develops the main theoretical argument of the book—specifically, that alliances can be most useful for preventing potential nuclear proliferation but much less useful for curbing actual nuclear proliferation. It begins by defining treaty allies and nuclear proliferation-related behavior before assessing existing understandings regarding how alliances affect nuclear proliferation incentives. It proceeds to elaborate a theory that argues that in-theater conventional forces are crucial for making American extended nuclear guarantees; that the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than assumed; and that the economic or technological reliance of a security-dependent ally on the United States, if utilized, works better to reverse or to halt any ally’s nuclear bid than anything else. This chapter also outlines the research strategy and alternative arguments.

Concern over Pakistan’s nuclear programme will grow

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Short Range ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Content Type

Subject Pakistan's nuclear programme and links to North Korea. Significance Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj on September 18 implied that Pakistan had a role in North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, calling for an investigation into countries with links to Pyongyang’s programme. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi on September 20 revealed that his country had developed short-range nuclear weapons. Impacts Washington will raise the pressure on Islamabad to curb the militants it believes are active on Pakistani soil. India would reject any further calls from the United States to withdraw its embassy from North Korea. North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear programme.

Arms Control and the Developing Countries

1965 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lincoln P. Bloomfield ◽  
Amelia C. Leiss
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Chemical Separation ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Separation Plant ◽  
High Level

The detonation of Peking's first atomic devices in recent months has X provoked renewed widespread discussion of the dangers of the further spread of nuclear weaponry. Speculation has flourished about who would be next—Sweden? Japan? Israel? Or perhaps India, which has become the first nonnuclear country to build a chemical separation plant? Cost estimates put nuclear weapons within reach of the poorest nations within a few years. Governments have issued solemn pronouncements about the need to design further international agreements to prevent nuclear proliferation. The President of the United States made use of a high-level committee to advise him how to deal with the problem.

Rousing a Response: When the United States Changes Policy toward Mass Killing

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda J. Rothschild
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mass Killing ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Change Policy ◽  
The Holocaust ◽  
Mass Killings ◽  
War Refugee Board ◽  
Policy Shifts ◽  
Do So

When do U.S. presidents change policy to respond with increased intensity to mass killings of civilians in other countries? The twentieth century witnessed a series of state-sponsored mass killings in a variety of regions around the world. Conventional arguments suggest that although the United States has the capability of responding to such atrocities, it often fails to do so because of a lack of political will for action. Historical evidence suggests, however, that although the modal response of the United States is inaction, at times U.S. presidents reverse course to respond more forcefully to mass killings. Three factors explain when and why these policy shifts happen: the level at which dissent occurs within the U.S. government, the degree of congressional pressure for policy change, and the extent to which the case of mass killing poses a political liability for the president. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's creation of the War Refugee Board in 1944 during the Holocaust supports this theory.

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