scholarly journals The Revival of Nuclear Competition in an Altered Geopolitical Context: A Chinese Perspective

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-68
Author(s):  
Li Bin

The U.S. government considers “power competition” to be the nature of the relations among big powers, and that it will have an impact on the evolving nuclear order in the near future. When big powers worry about power challenges from their rivals, they may use the influence of nuclear weapons to defend their own power and therefore intensify the danger of nuclear confrontation. We need to manage the nuclear relations among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation. The fact is that big powers including the United States have neither the interest nor the capability to expand their power, and understanding this might cause big powers to lose their interest in power competition. If we promote dialogue among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states on their strategic objectives, it is possible to reduce the power competition that results from misperceptions and overreactions. Some other factors, for example, non- nuclear technologies and multinuclear players, could complicate the future nuclear order. We therefore need to manage these factors as well and develop international cooperation to mitigate nuclear competition.

2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.


Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher

This book is an invitation to readers interested in the future of international cooperation to master the 12 basic dichotomies of international criminal law. The book foresees a growing interest in international order and cooperation following the current preoccupation, in Europe as well as the United States, with national self-interest. By emphasizing basic dichotomies, for example, acts vs. omissions and causation vs. background conditions, the book reinforces the jurisprudential foundations of international criminal law and also provides an easy way to master the details of the field.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 59-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Wang

One of the key questions for understanding the future trajectory of regional order is whether or not China is trying to push the United States out of East Asia and build a China-dominated regional order. Some Western analysts accuse China of pursuing the Monroe Doctrine and excluding the United States from the region. This article argues that the Western discourse of China practicing the Monroe Doctrine is a misplaced characterization of China's behavior. Rather than having intention of pushing the United States out of East Asia and build a China-dominated regional order, China is pursuing a hedging strategy that aims at minimizing strategic risks, increasing freedom of action, diversifying strategic options, and shaping the U.S.' preferences and choices. This can be exemplified in five issue areas: China's ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China's foreign policy activism, China-Russia relations, the Conference on Interactions and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the New Asian Security Concept, as well as China-U.S. relations. Beijing has explicitly acknowledged the U.S. predominance in the international system and reiterated its willingness to participate in and reform the existing system. It concludes by suggesting that, for a more peaceful future to emerge in East Asia, the United States and China, as an incumbent power and a rising power, will have to accommodate each other, and negotiate and renegotiate the boundaries of their relative power, as well as their respective roles in the future regional order where Beijing and Washington would learn to share responsibilities and leadership.


2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-166
Author(s):  
Maxim A. Suchkov

The North Caucasus is a most significant but a least understood problem in contemporary U.S.-Russia relations. The United States as one of the prime pace-setters in the region shaped its own attitude towards Russia’s most volatile region. Over more than twenty years, Washington experienced at least three major stages in its “Caucasus strategy”, and each stage had its impact on the North Caucasus. Since the beginning, the two states stuck to conflicting narratives of developments in the region. With time, some of the assessments were re-evaluated, but some continue to impede cooperation on key security issues. The present article explores these phenomena and examines what implications major events like the 9/11 attacks, the Caucasus Emirate enlistment among top terrorist organisations, the Boston marathon bombings, etc. had for the U.S.-Russia joint efforts in fighting terrorism. It also assesses areas of potential disagreement in the North Caucasus between the two countries.


2022 ◽  
pp. 63-76

This chapter examines the work of Samuel Huntington and his theory regarding waves of democratization. The chapter notes that the international community is witnessing a move away from the globalized world order that the era has facilitated (or de-globalization) and that de-democratization is seemingly occurring simultaneously. The chapter pays particular attention to the United States and actions that have been viewed as anti-democratic by the previous presidential administration, which has accelerated the global community's leeriness when it comes to international cooperation led by the U.S.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-83
Author(s):  
Brad Roberts

Since the end of the Cold War, changes to the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States have been pursued as part of a comprehensive approach aimed at reducing nuclear risks. These changes have included steps to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and deterrence strategies. Looking to the future, the United States can do more, but only if the conditions are right. Policy-makers must avoid steps that have superficial appeal but would actually result in a net increase in nuclear risk. These include steps that make U.S. nuclear deterrence unreliable for the problems for which it remains relevant.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong Hee Park ◽  
Kentaro Hirose

The argument that reputational concerns promote compliance is at the center of the literature of international cooperation. In this paper, we study how reputational sanctions affect compliance when domestic parties carry their own reputations in international negotiations. We showed that the prospect of international cooperation varies a lot depending on who sits at the negotiation table, how partisan preferences for compliance are different, and how much international audiences discriminate between different types of noncompliance. We illustrate implications of our model using episodes from the negotiations between the United States and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.


1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 643-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxane D. V. Slsmanidis

1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht

An examination of the past relationships between nuclear proliferation and American security policy substantiates several propositions. First, the political relationship between the United States and each new nuclear weapon state was not fundamentally transformed as a result of nuclear proliferation. Second, with the exception of the Soviet Union, no new nuclear state significantly affected U.S. defense programs or policies. Third, American interest in bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations has been confined to the Soviet Union. Fourth, a conventional conflict involving a nonnuclear ally prompted the United States to intervene in ways it otherwise might not have in order to forestall the use of nuclear weapons.In all respects, however, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and American security policy is changing. The intensification of the superpower rivalry and specific developments in their nuclear weapons and doctrines, the decline of American power more generally, and the characteristics of nuclear threshold states all serve to stimulate nuclear proliferation. It will be increasingly difficult in the future for American security policy to be as insulated from this process as it has been in the past.


Author(s):  
Sergey Rogov

In his presentation, the speaker focuses on the problems in relations between the United States and its European NATO allies. Firstly, he talks about the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, that Sergey M. Rogov considers the first serious defeat of the Western countries since the foundation of NATO. At the same time, he notes the significant military and economic contribution of the U.S. allies to the operation in Afghanistan, and the fact that the US did not take into account the opinion of its allies as well as the issues that may await European countries and the alliance as a whole in this regard. Second, the speaker notes the huge difference in military spending and military capabilities between the United States and the European allies, and concludes that NATO countries will continue to be militarily dependent on the United States. In nuclear sphere, despite the approval of the START III extension by the Biden administration, European countries did not actively resist the collapse of the INF Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. The forthcoming deployment of American missiles in Poland and the Baltic states will further exacerbate of the NATO-Russia crisis. J. Biden's support for the sole purpose concept, which to certain extent implies no first use of nuclear weapons, jeopardizes the U.S. security obligations towards its European allies. Fourth, there is the problem of "new" NATO members, which make minimal contribution to common security, but require economic support and protection from possible Russian aggression. In conclusion, the problem of the U.S.-China confrontation is considered, where the US is actively seeking to involve European countries.


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