Did Gainful Employment Regulations Result in College and Program Closures?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-51
Author(s):  
Robert Kelchen ◽  
Zhuoyao Liu

For decades, the federal government has expected vocationally-focused programs in higher education, especially among for-profit colleges, to lead to gainful employment in a profession. In the mid-2010s, the U.S. Department of Education developed gainful employment (GE) regulations that sought to tie a program's federal financial aid eligibility to graduates’ debt-to-earnings ratios. We use a regression discontinuity design to examine whether for-profit programs’ performance on GE was associated with the likelihood of closing the program or college. Although the regulations were repealed before any program lost federal funding, we find that passing GE was associated with a lower likelihood of program and college closures.

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 239-252
Author(s):  
James Ottavio Castagnera

The fortunes of the for-profit higher education industry rise and fall with the political tides in the United States. During the 8 years of the George W Bush Administration (Republican), the for-profit sector of US higher education prospered. The following two terms of the Obama Administration (Democrat) resulted in the loss of all the ground gained during Mr Bush’s two terms in office. Indeed, the US Department of Education, led by Secretary Arne Duncan, aggressively attacked the for-profit higher education providers. This attack took two very effective forms: the wielding of ‘gainful employment’ regulations to sever the eligibility of for-profit corporations to receive federal financial aid funding for admitted students, and the withdrawal of authority from the for-profit sector’s accrediting agency. This article argues that, if the past is predictive, the prospects for the for-profit higher education providers are bright under Mr Trump.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW B. HALL

This article studies the interplay of U.S. primary and general elections. I examine how the nomination of an extremist changes general-election outcomes and legislative behavior in the U.S. House, 1980–2010, using a regression discontinuity design in primary elections. When an extremist—as measured by primary-election campaign receipt patterns—wins a “coin-flip” election over a more moderate candidate, the party’s general-election vote share decreases on average by approximately 9–13 percentage points, and the probability that the party wins the seat decreases by 35–54 percentage points. This electoral penalty is so large that nominating the more extreme primary candidate causes the district’s subsequent roll-call representation to reverse, on average, becoming more liberal when an extreme Republican is nominated and more conservative when an extreme Democrat is nominated. Overall, the findings show how general-election voters act as a moderating filter in response to primary nominations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Manasi Deshpande ◽  
Itzik Fadlon ◽  
Colin Gray

Abstract We study how increases in the U.S. Social Security full retirement age (FRA) affect benefit claiming behavior and retirement behavior separately. Using long panels of Social Security administrative data, we implement complementary research designs of a traditional cohort analysis and a regression-discontinuity design. We find that while claiming ages strongly and immediately shift in response to increases in the FRA, retirement ages exhibit persistent “stickiness” at the old FRA of 65. We use several strategies to explore the likely mechanisms behind the stickiness in retirement and find suggestive evidence that employers play a role in workers' responses to the FRA.


Author(s):  
Junko Yamamoto

The Federal Government passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965 to enable the federal government to finance public schools (Paige, 2004). This law was signed by President Johnson and has been revised every 5 years since then (Wisconsin Education Association Council, n.d.). ESEA started the provision of Title I funding, the federal money given to a school district to assist students who are falling behind academically (Public Schools of North Carolina, n.d.). President George W. Bush signed the ESEA, No Child Left Behind Act of 2001(NCLB) (P.L.107-110), on January 8, 2002 (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.). This provision designated that total federal funding of $116,250 million was to be dispensed between 2002 and 2007. The Act was strongly supported by both parties: the final vote was 87 to 10 in the Senate and 381 to 41 in the House (Paige, 2004). This article will address the necessity for teacher training caused by the educational institution’s accountability imposed by No Child Left Behind, and the stronger need to assist disabled learners affirmed by the law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-416
Author(s):  
Dominique J. Baker

Due to concerns about college affordability, in 2011, the Department of Education began producing two annual public lists of institutions with the highest change in tuition and fees and average net price within sector (top 5% and at least US$600 increase). This study investigates the effect of this low-stakes federal accountability tool on institutional behavior. I use a frontier regression discontinuity design that investigates the effect of being included on either the tuition or net price list at the 95th percentile cutoff (restricting the sample to only include institutions with at least a US$600 increase). I find no consistent effect of list inclusion on affordability or enrollment. I also present several robustness checks that also find little consistent effect.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 742-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
FERNANDA BROLLO ◽  
TOMMASO NANNICINI

This article uses a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to disclose purely political reasons in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil, and find that—in preelection years—municipalities in which the mayor is affiliated with the coalition (and especially with the political party) of the Brazilian president receive approximately one-third larger discretionary transfers for infrastructures. This effect is primarily driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 886-893 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Button

I replicate Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti, and Matthew J. Butler. 2004. “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House,” using new advances in regression discontinuity design methodology and data extended to the 2012 election. For the methodology, I use nonparametric methods with optimal bandwidths and bias correction, and I investigate the sensitivity of results to parametric methods, bandwidth, and the inclusion of covariates. My results with this more thorough and modern analysis are the same.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias D. Cattaneo ◽  
Brigham R. Frandsen ◽  
Rocío Titiunik

AbstractIn the Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, units are assigned a treatment based on whether their value of an observed covariate is above or below a fixed cutoff. Under the assumption that the distribution of potential confounders changes continuously around the cutoff, the discontinuous jump in the probability of treatment assignment can be used to identify the treatment effect. Although a recent strand of the RD literature advocates interpreting this design as a local randomized experiment, the standard approach to estimation and inference is based solely on continuity assumptions that do not justify this interpretation. In this article, we provide precise conditions in a randomization inference context under which this interpretation is directly justified and develop exact finite-sample inference procedures based on them. Our randomization inference framework is motivated by the observation that only a few observations might be available close enough to the threshold where local randomization is plausible, and hence standard large-sample procedures may be suspect. Our proposed methodology is intended as a complement and a robustness check to standard RD inference approaches. We illustrate our framework with a study of two measures of party-level advantage in U.S. Senate elections, where the number of close races is small and our framework is well suited for the empirical analysis.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document