scholarly journals Impact of Patent Infringement Compensation Rules on Patent Quality Problems

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liang Dong ◽  
Helin Pan
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Patent Infringement ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Optimal Sequence ◽  
Patent Quality ◽  
D Investment ◽  
Sequence Rule

Compensation rules for patent infringement greatly affect patent quality, which is closely related to R & D investments. In this study, A duopoly game model was developed to analyze innovative factories’ R&D investment and patent licensing behavior, as well as the strategic choices of potential infringers under different compensation rules for patent infringement. Furthermore, a comparative analysis was conducted to analyze the patent quality under different scenarios, ultimately finalizing an optimal sequence rule for patent infringement compensation. The results show that patent quality is influenced by the invention height of patent and R&D efficiency, while the amount of patent infringement compensation has a great effect on potential infringement behavior. Patent quality can be effectively improved if the court adopts a proper sequence rule for patent infringement compensation according to the market circumstances.

scholarly journals Effective Boundary of Innovation Subsidy: Searching by Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 1531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Jingyi Yi ◽  
Yingmei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Random Disturbance ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Effective Boundary ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
Value Range ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Multiple Variables

Relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate strategic choices has been extensively studied. Public innovation subsidies are by no means a certain value, existing in the form of an effective range instead. This means that the public innovation subsidies existing within the reasonable range can achieve the same incentive effect. So, what is the reasonable range or the effective boundaries of public innovation subsidies to promote enterprises that adopt cooperation strategies? There is no definite answer. Based on classical game theory, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed in this paper, which takes into account the influence of random disturbance on the strategy evolution process. An effective boundary of public innovation subsidy is provided as the main contribution based on a mature game scenario. A set of experimental data is subsequently selected as the sample for numerical simulation and result verification. The results showed that the probability of noncooperation within the effective value range will successfully converge to zero, which also means that the agents will adopt a collaborative cooperation strategy. The regulation effect of the combination of multiple variables is also discussed.

What does a start-up need to grow? An empirical approach for Italian innovative start-ups

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 376-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niccolò Innocenti ◽  
Vincenzo Zampi
Keyword(s):  
Early Stage ◽  
Empirical Approach ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Investments ◽  
Start Up ◽  
Italian Provinces ◽  
Start Ups ◽  
D Investment ◽  
External Characteristics

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to capture the role of internal and external characteristics in favouring the growth of innovative start-ups at an early stage of their life.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical approach of this paper is based on an econometric analysis applied to all Italian innovative start-ups with four and five years of life. Growth is analysed after four and five years from the constitution, depending on internal investments in research and development (R&D), in tangible assets and on characteristics external to the firm (110 Italian provinces) related to industrial variety, specialisation, public investments in R&D, etc.FindingsThe results achieved in this study reveal the importance of internal R&D investment even though there is missing evidence on the relevance of general and government specific R&D investment in the area. Other interesting results concern the importance of the firm’s involvement in the technological specialisation of the area and the need for general variety in technological diversification in the area to favour the growth of start-ups.Practical implicationsThe results imply that entrepreneurs should evaluate carefully their strategic choices in terms of the location of the start-up and the investment in R&D as these could be important factors for the firm’s growth.Originality/valueThis paper is an original attempt to measure the importance of both internal and external characteristics for the growth of start-ups. Moreover, the analysis covers the overall population of a new interesting category of firm, the innovative start-up.

Determinants of patent infringement awards in the US, Japan, and China: A comparative analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 101947
Author(s):  
Wei Hu ◽  
Tohru Yoshioka-Kobayashi ◽  
Toshiya Watanabe
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Patent Infringement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Japan And China

scholarly journals Process R&D investment and social dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Ramsza ◽  
Adam Karbowski ◽  
Tadeusz Platkowski
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Entry Cost ◽  
Chicken Game ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
D Investment

AbstractWe consider a coopetitive game model of firms’ behavior in process R&D with entry cost. We compare the competitive behavior of firms in R&D with the R&D coopetition scenario. In R&D coopetition, firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. We find that R&D competition can lead to a prisoner’s dilemma or a chicken game between market rivals. The possibility of entering a binding R&D agreement resolves the above social dilemmas associated with the firms’ competitive behavior. In turn, under R&D coopetition, for a medium level of R&D entry cost, firms may enter a trust dilemma, but it is a beneficial scenario in comparison with the corresponding R&D competition outcome.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firms’ Technological Strategic Choices: A Perspective of the Behavioral Biases

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yingqing Zhang ◽  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Ming Luo ◽  
Mingman Chen ◽  
Jiaqin Sun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Intellectual Property Protection ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Behavioral Biases

To reveal the mechanisms of firms’ technological strategic choices between innovation and imitation, an evolutionary game model is proposed from the perspective of the behavioral biases. First, behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting can be defined and modeled based on the prospect theory. Second, according to the firm theory, a Cournot or Stackelberg game modeled with a technology spillover effect and intellectual property protection is applied to portray the interaction between firms. Third, an improved evolutionary game model is provided by incorporating behavioral biases into the framework of the decision-making process. Finally, the simulation analysis of some important factors, such as intellectual property protection, patent fees, innovation risks, decision-making attitudes, and consumers’ price preference on firms’ technological strategic choices, is presented. The corresponding results show that (1) innovation risk is an important factor affecting the technological strategic choices of firms, (2) increasing the intellectual property protection and the patent fee for technology transfer can effectively control the spillover effect of technology, (3) there is a partial U-shaped relationship between the consumers’ price preference and innovation, and (4) the behavioral biases such as reference point dependence, loss aversion, and probability weighting will change the perception of payoff and risk and will eventually induce firms to adopt the innovation strategy.

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