scholarly journals Optimal Showroom Service Strategy and Power Structure for Retailers considering Consumer Return

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Haoran Chen ◽  
Jiawei Hu ◽  
Chenhao Ma ◽  
Wei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Real Economy ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Service Strategy ◽  
The Real ◽  
Online Retailers ◽  
Online Consumer ◽  
Service Strategies

This paper investigates the optimal showroom service strategy and power structure for online and offline retailers considering online consumer return. Combining two service strategies and three competition power structures, six models are constructed to analyze the effects of the showrooming effect and consumer return on retailers’ decisions and consumer surplus. The results show that the SS strategy is the best choice for offline retailers, and it is also an effective way to solve consumer return. Online retailers are suggested to cooperate with offline retailers to implement SS strategy and enhance the showrooming effect. Under the SS strategy, the offline-led power structure is the best choice for online retailers, but the online-led power structure is optimal for offline retailers. We also find that the supply chain and consumers are more likely to implement SS strategy and offline-led power structure. More importantly, we pinpoint that there is no incentive for retailers to implement the Nash power structure. Therefore, it is recommended to revitalize the real economy of offline retailers and implement the strategy SS effectively.

scholarly journals A Model of Waste Price in a Symbiotic Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Algorithm

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1740
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Zhihong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Income Level ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Revenue Model

By establishing a two-level symbiotic supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, we use Stackelberg method to analyze the optimal price and revenue model of supplier and manufacturer in the symbiotic supply chain under two power structures in which the supplier and manufacturer are dominant respectively, and analyze the influence of the degree of symbiosis and power structure on the model. Through comparative analysis, we find that: There is a relationship between the income level and the degree of symbiosis in the symbiotic supply chain. The change of power structure will affect the relative benefits of suppliers and manufacturers in the symbiotic supply chain. The manufacturer’s expected unit product revenue will affect the supply chain revenue when the manufacturer is dominant. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters is carried out through an example analysis, and the validity of the conclusion is verified. This paper has a guiding significance for the behavior of enterprises in the cogeneration supply chain.

scholarly journals The role of retailer's app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musen Xue
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Quality Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

The role of retailer's ability to add app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures is investigated in this paper. Applying a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, under certain conditions, retailer's ability to add app channel can induce the manufacturer to adjust the wholesale price and product quality in the opposite direction with the manufacturer being the leader. Second, for the manufacturer and the retailer, retailer's ability to add app channel can result in two distinct profit situations regardless of the power structure of supply chain: win-win and lose-win. Moreover, in a retailer-led supply chain, adding app channel will make the whole supply chain better off when the return cost is relatively low or high, while make the whole supply chain worse off when the return cost is moderate. Third, we identify a region of the return cost under which the manufacturer, the retailer, the supply chain and consumers can gain from adding app channel, leading to a Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing, Ordering, and Coordination for Prefabricated Building Supply Chain with Power Structure and Flexible Cap-and-Trade

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (19) ◽  
pp. 2426
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Menglin Liu ◽  
Lu Gan ◽  
Chong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Under the increasing pressure of global emission reduction, prefabricated buildings are becoming more and more popular. As prefabricated building manufacturers and assemblers are emerging in the market, how do they make decisions of pricing, ordering, and emission reduction? In this paper, game theory is used to make the decisions for the prefabricated building supply chain with flexible cap-and-trade and different power structures, i.e., using prefabricated building manufacturers as the leader, using the vertical Nash equilibrium, and using prefabricated building assemblers as the leader. The two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and to improve the supply chain performance. Moreover, we discuss the influence of different power structures and the two-part tariff contract on the optimal decisions and profits. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusions. This indicates that the supply chain leaders will gain a higher profit and that the power structure has a significant influence on the two-part tariff contract, which will result in an unfair distribution of profit. High carbon trading prices benefit carbon emission reduction. Consumer low-carbon awareness has a positive effect on carbon emission reduction and supply chain performance.

scholarly journals Considering the Sales Method and Logistics Service Strategy, Which Operating Mode Is the Best under Different Power Structures?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yanan Zhao ◽  
Wei Jia
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Operating Mode ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Operating ◽  
Service Strategy ◽  
Absolute Power ◽  
Operating Modes ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Service Strategies

When merchants enter hybrid e-commerce platforms (such as JD.com and Amazon), they will face issues such as which sales methods to choose and whether to use platform logistics under different power structures. Different sales methods and logistics service strategies have resulted in three operating modes: (a) resale mode, marked as A, (b) agency + no-platform logistics, marked as B, and (c) agency + platform logistics, marked as C. This paper constructs an analysis framework composed of an e-commerce platform and a merchant to explore the optimal operating mode. The game models of the three modes are first constructed, and then, the equilibrium results are compared and analysed. Based on the results of comparative analysis and considering the dynamic game between the e-commerce platform and the merchant regarding sales methods and logistics service strategies, the optimal operating mode is determined. The results show that when the platform has absolute power, mode C is optimal for it. When the logistics service sensitivity coefficient and market size are both large, the best for the merchant with absolute power is mode B. In addition, if neither of them has absolute power, only when the merchant first decides the logistics service strategy, then the platform decides the sales method; the best for both parties is mode B; otherwise, the best is mode A. This research has generated new insights and has practical management significance, which can provide guidance for merchant and platform decision-making.

Technologies Enabling Omni-Channel

2018 ◽  
pp. 78-96
Author(s):  
Rohit Das
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Scaling Up ◽  
Considerable Improvement ◽  
Retail Industry ◽  
Delivery Time ◽  
Recent Past ◽  
The Real ◽  
Online Retailers ◽  
Game Changer ◽  
Indian Scenario

The retail industry has been scaling up by better co-ordination among channel partners, improving shipment delivery time at a lower possible cost over last few years. Looking at the Indian scenario, large logistics companies such as Bluedart, FedEx, Gati, etc. have launched dedicated services for online retailers. However, entrance and elevation of e-commerce focused logistic companies such as Chhotu, Mudita, Unicommerce and Delhivery seem to be promising and can be the real game changer. These companies offer solutions that address the various pain-points pertaining to the supply chain of e-commerce companies, which traditional and big supply chain & logistic providers so far failed to do. This is a global phenomenon. Despite considerable improvement in recent past, many logistics providers still struggle to cope up with inadequate infrastructure leading to operational inefficiencies to support their services. Some of such operational concerns, but not limited to, are wrong delivery, unaccepted shipment pick-ups, product unavailability leading to promise to deliver.

scholarly journals Joint Green Marketing Decision-Making of Green Supply Chain Considering Power Structure and Corporate Social Responsibility

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 564
Author(s):  
Jialiang Huang ◽  
Xiaoxia Wang ◽  
Yuxi Luo ◽  
Liying Yu ◽  
Ziyuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
The Other ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Corporate Social

In order to explore the impact of a manufacturer’s or retailer’s undertaking corporate social responsibility (CSR) and different power structures on their joint green marketing decisions and profits in the green supply chain, this paper establishes green supply chain optimization models under six different decision-making scenarios according to two different CSR bearers and three different power structures. Based on the main assumptions of a linear product demand function and CSR measured by consumer surplus, this paper solves the equilibrium solutions of the manufacturer and the retailer through game theory. The results show that: First, the difference in the degree of CSR undertaken by manufacturers and retailers leads to a difference in the ranking of optimal strategies of both parties under the three power structures. Second, under the same power structure, compared with undertaking CSR by oneself, when the other party undertakes CSR, the level of the product’s green degree, the level of green promotion, the party’s own profit, and the profit of the other party are all higher. Third, regardless of the power structure, manufacturers and retailers undertaking CSR is conducive to improving the level of product greenness, increasing green promotion, lowering the retail price, increasing consumers’ willingness to buy green products, and ultimately helping to increase the profits of manufacturers and retailers.

scholarly journals Green Product Design and Pricing Decisions in a Risk-Averse Supply Chain under Alternative Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Tiantian Xu ◽  
Jizhou Zhan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
Green Product Design

Motivated by the prevailing green product design and the different supply chain power structures, this paper aims to analyse the role of power relationship and risk-aversion in economic and environmental performance of sustainable supply chain. Three game theory models, including the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, retailer Stackelberg (RS) model, and vertical Nash (VN) model, are developed to study the pricing and greenness level decisions in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain, where one risk-averse manufacturer sells green products through one risk-averse retailer. This paper shows that when selling through a more risk-averse retailer, the risk-averse manufacturer prefers to provide a product with a higher level of greenness and achieve a greater utility regardless of the power structure. A manufacturer as a follower may have stronger motivation to increase the product’s level of greenness than one in a more balanced supply chain when the green technology investment coefficient is sufficiently low. With regard to the power structure, the channel leadership is not necessary to for the manufacturer to achieve higher utility, which depends on the green technology investment coefficient, greenness level sensitivity, and players’ risk aversion.

scholarly journals Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhang ◽  
Zhigang Song
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Optimal Power ◽  
Total Profit

Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game.

scholarly journals Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Wang ◽  
Xiujuan Liu ◽  
Wensi Zhang ◽  
Ge Gao ◽  
Hui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Relationship ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Operational Decisions ◽  
Conduct Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
The Impact

The main objective of this research is to examine the role of power relationship in a two-level green supply chain which is made up of one shared manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We develop six game theory-based models to explore the members’ operational decisions in a supply chain taking into account three vertical power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) as well as two retailers’ horizontal power structure (Bertrand or Stackelberg competition). Then, we design a two-part tariff contract which can encourage the supply chain members to promote cooperation and eventually coordinate the decentralized green supply chain under each power structure. Lastly, to further discuss the impact of the green awareness of consumers and the greening cost on supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits, we employ some numerical examples to conduct sensitivity analysis. The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the impact of power structure on the supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits mainly depends on the substitutability of the green products, the green awareness of consumers, and the greening cost for the manufacturer. Secondly, the more power the manufacturer has, the lower product greenness will be set. Thirdly, the consumer’s environmental awareness (the greening cost) positively (negatively) influences the manufacturer’s product greenness and wholesale price, the retailers’ sales prices, and the player’s profits under each power structure. Finally, the developed two-part tariff contract is practicable and beneficial for both the manufacturer and the two retailers.

Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chain with a Store Brand

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weimin Ma ◽  
Rong Cheng ◽  
Hua Ke
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Brand Loyalty ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Noncooperative Games ◽  
Store Brand ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
National Brand ◽  
Nash Games ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma

In a framework where both power structure and consumer heterogeneity (brand loyalty and different willingness-to-pay for perceived quality) count, we study six noncooperative games (two Stackerberg and one Nash games with and without a store brand) between a national-brand manufacturer and a store-brand retailer. Our results contribute to the theoretical literature on store brand in four aspects: (a) revealing that the mechanism whereby store brands alleviate double-marginalization problem varies with supply-chain power structures; (b) finding that it is the power manufacturer with a low-loyalty national brand that suffers most from the store brand entry; (c) finding that a category follower retailer is more inclined to introduce its store brand than a power one, and should optimally position its store brand close to the low-loyalty national brand supplied by a power manufacturer; (d) showing that the store brand may lead the manufacturer and the retailer to be trapped in the prisoners’ dilemma.

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