scholarly journals Carbon Emission Reduction and Coordination Strategies for New Energy Vehicle Closed-Loop Supply Chain under the Carbon Trading Policy

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yan Yin ◽  
Fengcai Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Cost

Due to the increasingly serious energy crisis and environmental pollution, new energy vehicle (NEV) as a environmentally-friendly travel tool has been vigorously developed by various countries. However, in 2020, China officially enters the “postsubsidy era” in which the carbon trading scheme will replace the current fiscal and taxation system, affecting the implementation of NEV. Under the carbon trading policy, it has gradually become a major issue how NEV companies achieve production revenue coordination and carbon emission optimization decisions. This study focuses on building a multilevel supply chain for NEV production, sales, and component recycling. In addition, this study establishes a Stackelberg game model dominated by NEV manufacturers and uses contracts to coordinate the model. Results are as follows: (1) With the increasing maturity and perfection of enterprises’ carbon emission reduction technology, consumers’ demand for new energy vehicles will increase, and the effect will be more obvious when the system centralized decision-making. (2) Since the centralized decision is aimed at the total profit of the system and has the advantage of optimal order quantity, the total benefit of the supply chain is higher than that of the decentralized decision. Moreover, if the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction is small, the total benefit of the supply chain under the centralized decision will be more obvious. (3) From the perspective of each member of the supply chain, the profit change of the manufacturer is more sensitive to the change of order quantity compared with the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction. When the cost of carbon emission reduction technology is too high, manufacturers may not have much incentive to carry out technological research and development and innovation, resulting in failure to achieve system optimization. (4) This study designed a revenue-cost-sharing contract coordination mechanism; that is, the retailer will provide part of the revenue to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer will provide recovery compensation to the recycler.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Wenfei Lu ◽  
Qianwen Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
General Contractor ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Pure Competition

Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

scholarly journals Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy for Energy Users in China

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (16) ◽  
pp. 6498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuquan Zhao ◽  
Feiqi Liu ◽  
Han Hao ◽  
Zongwei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Levelized Cost Of Electricity ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
The Cost

The Chinese government has made a commitment to control carbon emissions, and the deployment of renewable energy power generation is considered as an effective solution. In recent years, great effort has been exerted to support the development of renewable energy in China. While, due to fiscal pressures and changes in management policies, related subsidies are diminishing now and energy users are asked to pay for the cost. Regulations about carbon cap and renewable energy consumptions are issued to transfer the responsibility of consuming renewable energy and reducing carbon emissions to energy consumers. A national carbon trading system is set up in China and is under its growth stage. Therefore, this study lists the factors that should be considered by the energy users, analyzes the levelized cost of electricity generated by renewable energy in four cities in China, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, and compares the results with current carbon prices. Based on the research, under the current status, it is still more cost-efficient for enterprises to buy carbon credits than introduce renewable energies, and great differences among cities are shown due to different natural conditions. Besides, with diminishing subsidies and development of the carbon trading market, the carbon price will gradually reflect the actual value and carbon emission reduction costs will become an important part of enterprise expenditure. In the long term, enterprises should link more factors to carbon emissions, like social responsibility and brand image, instead of only the cost.

Cost-Sharing Contract in Low Carbonization Supply Chain Based on Improving Demand for Low-Carbon Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 1073-1076 ◽  
pp. 2539-2544
Author(s):  
Yan Ju Zhou ◽  
Yu Qing Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Reduction Cost

For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, we establish Stackelberg models based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. And we analyze the changes of the order quantity, the profits of each member and the whole supply chain before and after the implementation of the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads to a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. Then we derivate the necessary conditions that the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer could both increase.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Investment in Carbon Emission-Reducing Technology Based on Stochasticity and Low-Carbon Preferences

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Shan Yu ◽  
Qiang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Dynamic Perspective ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Due to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emission-reducing measures are urgently needed. Important emission-reduction measures mainly include carbon trading and low-carbon cost subsidies. Comprehensive consideration of these two policies is a research hotspot in the field of low-carbon technology investment. Based on this background, this paper considers the impact of consumer low-carbon preferences on market demand and the impact of uncertainty in carbon emission-reduction behaviour. We construct a stochastic differential game model with upstream and downstream enterprises based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy. From a dynamic perspective, this paper researches the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics of the joint emission-reduction mechanism in a supply chain. This paper discusses the sensitivity of the parameters and uses numerical simulation to verify the impact of each parameter on the emission-reduction decision-making activities of stakeholders after introducing the cost subsidy. The results show that a cost subsidy policy can promote carbon emission-reduction investment and supply chain profit. Thus, it is important to strengthen technical cooperation and exchange among enterprises.

scholarly journals Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangjie Xia ◽  
Longfei He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Sales Promotion ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized without or with side-payment. We compare measures of supply chain performances, such as profitabilities, emission reduction efficiencies, and effectiveness, in these scenarios. To improve chain-wide performances, a new side-payment contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and numerical experiments are also conducted. We find the following. (1) In decentralized setting, the retailer will provide emission cutting allowance to the manufacturer only if their unit product profit margin is higher enough than the manufacturer’s, and the emission reduction level of per unit product is a monotonically increasing function with respect to the cost pooling proportion provided by the retailer; (2) the new side-payment contract can coordinate the dyadic supply chain successfully due to its integrating sales promotion effort and emission reduction input, which results in system pareto optimality under decentralized individual rationality but achieves a collective rationality effect in the centralized setting; (3) when without external force’s regulation, consumers’ low-carbon awareness is to enhance consumers’ utility and decrease profits of supply chain firms.

scholarly journals The Impact of Retailers’ Low-Carbon Investment on the Supply Chain under Carbon Tax and Carbon Trading Policies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3597
Author(s):  
Fei Zou ◽  
Yanju Zhou ◽  
Caihua Yuan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Emission Permits ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Reduction Cost

In the current low-carbon economy, the government has adopted carbon taxes and carbon trading policies to control the carbon emissions of manufacturers. As consumers become increasingly aware of low-carbon, some retailers have also started investing in low-carbon to shape their public image and increase their competitiveness to attract more customers. In this paper, the Stackelberg game method is utilized to solve the model, and the graphs are used to analyze the benefits of retailers' low-carbon investment on the supply chain through numerical analysis. It is found that when the emission reduction cost coefficient of manufacturers is relatively low, manufacturers are willing to reduce carbon emissions. At this time, increasing carbon tax and the carbon emission permits price can effectively promote the emission reduction behavior of manufacturers, because it increases demand for products and the profit of manufacturers and retailers. However, when the emission reduction cost coefficient of the manufacturers is quite high, increasing carbon tax and carbon emission permits price cannot effectively promote the emission reduction behavior, because this situation of the emission reduction reduces the profit of manufacturers. The main contribution of this paper discovers that the green cost coefficient of retailers' low-carbon investment will adjust the impact of the carbon tax and the carbon trading price on the profits of retailers and manufacturers which proves that retailers’ low-carbon investment is beneficial to the supply chain. When the emission reduction cost coefficient is high and the green cost coefficient is low, increasing the carbon tax or carbon emission permits price can increase the profit of manufacturers and retailers. Finally, we design a supply chain coordination of comprehensive sharing contact for retailers and manufacturers. The result shows that this contract has economic and environmental benefits, and that it is beneficial for the environment and economy of sustainable development.

scholarly journals Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Linming Qi ◽  
Lu Liu ◽  
Liwen Jiang ◽  
Zicheng Wang ◽  
Weiliang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Reduction Effort

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing. We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing. We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain. We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state. The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed. The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously. The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer. The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer. When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price. Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer. The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal. We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort. The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain. This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint. To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions. Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.

scholarly journals Investigating the Impact of Carbon Subsidy Policy on the Decision-Making of Remanufacturing Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Zhang ◽  
Tianshan Ma ◽  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

This research is to investigate the decision making of the members of remanufacturing supply chain under the government involvement. Different scenarios are analyzed in this research, and it is found that the subsidy for carbon emission reduction can increase the WPs (waste products) reusing. When the recycler participates in remanufacturing supply chain, the cost of remanufacturer will be shared and through centralizing the decision making, the carbon emission reduction will be enhanced and the whole supply chain’s profit will decrease. So it is suggested that the government need to adjust the subsidy for carbon emission reduction in terms of the quality level of WPs and the cooperation between recycler and remanufacturer is suggested, especially in the high-value waste remanufacturing supply chain.

scholarly journals Research on evolution game of clothing enterprises’ carbon emission reduction investment considering free riding behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 01029
Author(s):  
Hangxin Guo ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Mengmeng Zhao ◽  
Huihui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Low Carbon Economy ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Evolution Game

“low carbon economy” puts forward new requirements for carbon emission reduction in all links of the supply chain. This paper takes the three-level clothing supply chain composed of government, supplier and manufacturer as the research object, considering the “free riding behavior” of clothing supplier and manufacturer, by constructing the three-party evolutionary game model, using the replication dynamic equation to analyze the evolution process of the three actors, and studies the influence of parameter change on the strategy selection of each agent. Finally, the simulation is carried out by Matlab. The results show that the strategies are affected by the government’s punishment, the “free ride” revenue of suppliers and manufacturers, and the cost of carbon emission reduction investment. Finally, based on the analysis results, some suggestions are put forward for enterprises to invest in carbon emission reduction.

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