scholarly journals Dynamic Strategies on Firm Production and Platform Advertisement in Crowdfunding considering Investor’s Perception

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Ji ◽  
Ju Wei ◽  
Zhong Wu ◽  
Shaojian Qu ◽  
Baojun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Simulation Experiment ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Online Information ◽  
Data Simulation ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dynamic Decision Model

Taking investor’s perception into account, the optimal decisions about the product quality and platform advertisement are investigated in a dynamic model in the context of crowdfunding. Researches in the literature, however, usually set investor’s perception as a fixed value and rarely consider the important phenomenon that the online information has some influences on investor’s perception. Considering the effects of information about product quality and platform advertisement on the investor’s perception, a dynamic decision model is proposed. Firstly, investment desire and reference price of the investor are introduced in two dynamic settings to describe investor’s perception. Then, the optimal decisions about the product quality and platform advertisement are formulated under two circumstances: the sponsor and the platform make decisions independently and they cooperate as a system. Finally, the influences of reference price and cost-sharing ratio on the optimal results are compared and the data simulation experiment verifies the necessity of the study. Some new insights can be drawn for the operations management of the firm in crowdfunding as follows: (i) it is more profitable for the firm to cooperate with the platform when investors pay more attention to their reference price; (ii) it is optimal for the firm to share a larger proportion of platform cost when the profit-sharing ratio is low.

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

scholarly journals A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Huimin Xiao ◽  
Youlei Xu ◽  
Shiwei Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Building Material ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Sustainable Operations ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Fairness Concerns

This paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this supply chain. The four game models are a Nash noncooperative game, Stackelberg game with cost sharing, Stackelberg game with fairness concerns and cost sharing, and centralized decision model. By using dynamic models and optimal control theory, we obtain the two members’ optimal equilibrium strategies in the supply chain. Analytical results show that the consumer reference price effect has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s effort level, retailer’s publicity level, and product brand goodwill, which can improve the supply chain performance. The retailer’s partial commitment to cost sharing can enhance the production enthusiasm of the manufacturer, improve the brand reputation of the product, and enhance the two members’ individual profitability. The distributional fairness concerns of the manufacturer not only prevent the manufacturer and retailer from achieving Pareto improvement but also lead to the decline of the manufacturer’s effort level and profitability. The research conclusions of this paper can provide some insights into the cooperation and sustainable development of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Peningkatan Kuantitas dan Kualitas Produksi Kerupuk Basa di Desa Jegu, Kabupaten Tabanan

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Made Agus Putra Subali ◽  
I Gusti Rai Agung Sugiartha ◽  
Arya Faisal Akbar
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Production Equipment ◽  
Production Time ◽  
Product Packaging ◽  
Single Production ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Product Marketing

The partner in this program is the home industry of “basa” crackers or seasoning crackers. There are several partner problems, 1) Long production time, 2) Simple and conventional product packaging, 3) Profit sharing from product marketing. The solutions to overcome these problems are, 1) Providing production equipment, 2) Installing packaging label, 3) Promotion through facebook. The results are, 1) The partner is able to accelerate and increase production quantity where in single production, the partner can produce more than 105 packs of basa crackers. 2) Product quality is better with packaging label. 3) Promotion through facebook can expand market share.

Investment Strategies for Sourcing a New Technology in the Presence of a Mature Technology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Hsiao-Hui Lee
Keyword(s):  
Operations Management ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Development Effort ◽  
Investment Strategies ◽  
Cost Shifting ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cost

To stay competitive, high-technology manufacturers not only frequently source new technologies from their suppliers, but also financially support the development of these new technologies into component products or production tools. We consider a manufacturer that can either source a new but immature technology from a financially constrained supplier, or source a mature technology from an existing supplier if and only if the development of the new technology fails. To support the new technology, the manufacturer can choose to inject capital in the form of an equity or loan. The investment strategy not only affects the new supplier’s development effort and the probability of technical success (PTS), but also affects the existing supplier’s effort to improve the mature technology, which presents the manufacturer with a trade-off. Following the debt financing literature, we find that a loan contract is associated with a cost-shifting effect and often leads to a higher PTS. However, because the manufacturer not only maintains an investment but also a procurement relationship with the new supplier, we find a profit-sharing effect associated with an equity investment, which does not exist in the traditional equity issuance literature. In particular, we show that the profit-sharing effect can dominate the cost-shifting effect and lead to a higher PTS when the new supplier’s technological capability is sufficiently high. Nonetheless, we also show that the strategy that derives a higher PTS does not necessarily generate a higher payoff for the manufacturer. On the one hand, a loan can be preferred even when it leads to a lower PTS because the cost-shifting effect allows the manufacturer to offer a sufficiently low procurement payment while maintaining a sufficiently high PTS. On the other hand, when the existing supplier is very capable of reducing its costs, a loan can over-incentivize the new supplier to exert excessive effort and backfire. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

The Behavioral Promise and Pitfalls in Compensating Store Managers

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (10) ◽  
pp. 4899-4919
Author(s):  
Shan Li ◽  
Kay-Yut Chen ◽  
Ying Rong
Keyword(s):  
Operations Management ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Store Manager ◽  
Compensation Systems ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fixed Wage ◽  
Performance Based Compensation ◽  
New Formulation

Compensation systems have rapidly been shifting away from a fixed wage contractual payment basis. Many companies today are creating incentive compensation contracts to reward hard-working employees for jobs done well. Profit sharing (“sharing compensation contract”) and target with bonus (“target compensation contract”) are two common performance-based compensation contracts prevalent in business. We theoretically and behaviorally study the sharing and target compensation contracts in an operational context where a firm sets the parameters of the compensation contracts and a store manager, after observing the compensation contract offered to him, chooses his effort level (unobservable by the firm) and makes ordering decisions for the store. Our experimental data suggest systematic deviations from the theoretical benchmark and reveal behavioral promise and pitfalls under the two compensation contracts. In particular, the store manager is more willing to exert high effort under the target contract all else being equal. However, the store manager is also more likely to punish the firm for perceived “unfair” offers by submitting an extremely low order quantity. We find that bounded rationality plays an important role in driving a higher effort rate under the target contract than the sharing contract. We introduce a new formulation of the fairness concerns, which is referred to as by-state fairness, where individuals, rather than considering whether the expected profits received are fair, consider the fairness in the potential realized outcomes. This new formulation explains why managers are more likely to order very little to punish the firm under the target contract. In addition, we conduct validation experiments to verify our behavioral explanation. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.

Optimal decisions for operations management of BDAR: A military industrial logistics data analytics perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 137 ◽  
pp. 106100
Author(s):  
Xiong Li ◽  
Xiaodong Zhao ◽  
Wei Pu ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Fang Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Operations Management ◽  
Data Analytics ◽  
Optimal Decisions

scholarly journals A Two-Echelon Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Freshness and Greenness Concerns: A Cost-Sharing Contract Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals Pricing strategy and product quality design with platform-investment

2022 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Xiujing Dang ◽  
Yang Xu ◽  
Gongbing Bi ◽  
Lei Qin
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Optimal Investment ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Investment Strategies ◽  
Contract Term ◽  
Optimal Investment Strategy ◽  
Sustainable Value ◽  
Quality Design

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>With the development of business, more consumers are quality sensitive and improving the product quality becomes particularly important. We mainly discuss two investment strategies: retailer-investment and platform-investment. Compared with non-investment case, only if consumer sensitivity is not too high, it is profitable for the retailer to select retailer-investment. When both retailer-investment and platform-investment are viable, the choice of investment mechanism depends on the profit-sharing ratio. Particularly, if the ratio is within a certain range, the optimal investment strategy is platform-investment, achieving a triple-win outcome. Besides, to effectively alleviate the contradiction between the retailer's moral hazard problem and the sustainable value-added effect of platform-investment, we further research the contract term. These results give us some meaningful management inspirations in investment mechanism.</p>

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