scholarly journals Cost Sharing in the Prevention of Supply Chain Disruption

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wen Wang ◽  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Xiaochen Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Supply Chain Disruption ◽  
Manufacturing Company ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Disruption Risks ◽  
Considerable Loss

We examine the influence of cost-sharing mechanism on the disruption prevention investment in a supply chain with unreliable suppliers. When a supply chain faces considerable loss following a disruption, supply chain members are motivated toward investing in manners that reduce their disruption probability. In improving supply chain reliability, the cost-sharing mechanism must be set appropriately to realize the efficiency of the disruption prevention investment. In a supply chain where the focal manufacturing company has its own subsidiary supplier and an outsourcing supplier, we analyze different forms of cost-sharing mechanisms when both suppliers confront disruption risks. Through the cost-sharing mechanisms presented in this study, supply chain members can improve their reliability via disruption prevention investments without considerably increasing the total supply chain cost. We present two concepts, the cost-sharing structure and the cost-sharing ratio, in this study. As the two key components of cost-sharing mechanism, these two elements constitute a practicable cost allocation mechanism to facilitate disruption prevention.

scholarly journals Cost Allocation Mechanism Design for Urban Utility Tunnel Construction Based on Cooperative Game and Resource Dependence Theory

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 3309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi Zhang ◽  
Jiaorong Ren ◽  
Kaichao Xiao ◽  
Zhenzhi Lin ◽  
Jiayu Xu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Resource Dependence Theory ◽  
Tunnel Construction ◽  
Power Cables ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Dependence Theory ◽  
Utility Tunnel ◽  
The Cost

The urban utility tunnel presents solutions for the sustainable development of urban underground space, and is an important carrier of power distribution network and integrated energy systems. Considering the high investment cost of utility tunnels and the limitations of traditional cost sharing methods (i.e., spatial proportional method, direct-laying cost method and benefit-based proportional method), it is of great significance to establish a fair and practical cost sharing mechanism. First, an improved Shapley value-based spatial proportional method is proposed. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism for utility tunnel construction cost allocation is established by using the improved spatial proportion, the life-cycle direct-laying cost proportion, and the benefit proportion of pipeline companies as the cost allocation indexes. The resource dependence theory is introduced to quantify the bargaining power of each pipeline company in the negotiation of the cost allocation. The weights of the cost allocation indexes in the comprehensive decision-making model are optimized with the objective of maximizing the overall satisfaction of the pipeline companies. Simulations based on the data of utility tunnel pilots in China illustrate that the proposed cost allocation mechanism has the highest overall satisfaction and is more acceptable and more feasible than the traditional cost allocation methods. For power companies, the cost of laying power cables can be significantly reduced by utility tunnels, and laying 10 kV power cables has been shown to have higher economic benefits.

Analysis of the Supply Chain Disruption Risks in the Malaysian Automotive Remanufacturing Industry-a Case Study

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (05) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuramilawahida Mat Ropi ◽  
◽  
Hawa Hishamuddin ◽  
Dzuraidah Abd Wahab ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Disruption ◽  
Disruption Risks

scholarly journals Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Knowledge Stock ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Cost

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

scholarly journals A Two-Echelon Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Freshness and Greenness Concerns: A Cost-Sharing Contract Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.

scholarly journals Study on Benefit Coordination of Supply Chain Network Based on Green Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. 1458
Author(s):  
Gao ◽  
Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Logistics Network ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Green Development ◽  
Green Index ◽  
The Cost

Based on Stackelberg's master–slave game theory and green index decision-making conditions, this paper studies the benefit coordination of a supply chain network composed of a business flow network and logistics network, discusses the decision-making behavior of the main body of the supply chain network under the performance of green contracts or speculative behavior, respectively, and further constructs the supply chain network collaborative benefit coordination model under the guidance of a manufacturer considering a green development index. The supply chain network interest coordination model analyzes the relationship between the dominant manufacturer behavior and the supply chain network green index and network profit. The results show that fulfilling green contracts helps improve the profitability and sustainability of supply chain networks. A counter-intuitive but interesting result is that the dominant manufacturers increase the cost-sharing ratio or penalties of the logistics network, which will reduce the profit level and green index of the logistics network, and increase the cost-sharing ratio or punishment of the suppliers. Strength will increase the profitability and green index of the logistics network. Finally, we validate the relevant conclusions of the model through numerical simulation analysis.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haifeng Zhao ◽  
Bin Lin ◽  
Wanqing Mao ◽  
Yang Ye
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Relationship Of

Cooperation of all the members in a supply chain plays an important role in logistics service. The service integrator can encourage cooperation from service suppliers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the supply chain. A differential game model is established with the logistics service supply chain that consists of one service integrator and one supplier. And we derive the optimal solutions of the Nash equilibrium without cost sharing contract and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the integrator as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the supplier. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole supply chain explicit, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in a logistics service supply chain.

scholarly journals The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

scholarly journals An examination of the effect of supply chain disruption risk drivers on organizational performance: evidence from Chinese supply chains

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahour Mellat Parast ◽  
Nachiappan Subramanian
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Supply Chain Disruption ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Disruption Risk ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Disruption Risks ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This paper aims to examine the relationship of supply chain disruption risk drivers to supply chain performance and firm performance outcomes. Design/methodology/approach Four disruption risk drivers for a supply chain are identified, namely, demand disruption risk, supply disruption risk, process disruption risk and environment disruption risk. A cross-sectional survey was developed and data was collected from 315 Chinese firms to determine the relationship of supply chain disruption risks to supply chain performance and firm performance. Findings The empirical findings show that supply disruption risks and process disruption risks have a significant impact on supply chain performance. In addition, this paper shows that supply disruptions, demand disruptions and process disruptions are significantly related to firm performance. This paper shows that supply chain disruption risks have different effects on supply chain performance and firm performance. Managers should be aware that disruption risk drivers can have an impact on firm performance that is different from their impact on supply chain performance. An important finding of the study is that the magnitude of the impact of disruption risks on supply chain performance is greater on the upstream side of the supply chain than on the downstream side of the supply chain. Originality/value This is one of the early studies to examine the effect of supply chain disruption risk drivers on both firm performance and supply chain performance. An important finding of the study is that the magnitude of the impact of disruption risks on supply chain performance is greater on the upstream side of the supply chain than on the downstream side of the supply chain.

A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertrand Crettez ◽  
Régis Deloche
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Sharing Rule ◽  
Sharing Rules ◽  
The Cost

Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules.

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