scholarly journals Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Pan ◽  
Ying Guo ◽  
Shujie Liao
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Response ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Nonprofit Organization ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
The One

We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.

scholarly journals Risk-Averse Multi-Stage Stochastic Programming to Optimizing Vaccine Allocation and Treatment Logistics for Effective Epidemic Response

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuecheng Yin ◽  
Esra Buyuktahtakin
Keyword(s):  
Value At Risk ◽  
Virus Disease ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Adverse Outcomes ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Expected Number ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Stochastic Mixed Integer Programming

Existing compartmental-logistics models in epidemics control are limited in terms of optimizing the allocation of vaccines and treatment resources under a risk-averse objective. In this paper, we present a data-driven, mean-risk, multi-stage, stochastic epidemics-vaccination-logistics model that evaluates various disease growth scenarios under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) risk measure to optimize the distribution of treatment centers, resources, and vaccines, while minimizing the total expected number of infections, deaths, and close contacts of infected people under a limited budget. We integrate a new ring vaccination compartment into a Susceptible-Infected-Treated-Recovered-Funeral-Burial epidemics-logistics model. Our formulation involves uncertainty both in the vaccine supply and the disease transmission rate. Here, we also consider the risk of experiencing scenarios that lead to adverse outcomes in terms of the number of infected and dead people due to the epidemic. Combining the risk-neutral objective with a risk measure allows for a trade-off between the weighted expected impact of the outbreak and the expected risks associated with experiencing extremely disastrous scenarios. We incorporate human mobility into the model and develop a new method to estimate the migration rate between each region when data on migration rates is not available. We apply our multi-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming model to the case of controlling the 2018-2020 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) using real data. Our results show that increasing the risk-aversion by emphasizing potentially disastrous outbreak scenarios reduces the expected risk related to adverse scenarios at the price of the increased expected number of infections and deaths over all possible scenarios. We also find that isolating and treating infected individuals are the most efficient ways to slow the transmission of the disease, while vaccination is supplementary to primary interventions on reducing the number of infections. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that vaccine acceptance rates affect the optimal vaccine allocation only at the initial stages of the vaccine rollout under a tight vaccine supply.

Coordinating Supply Chain with Buy-Back Contracts in the Presence of Risk Aversion

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 1840008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunlin Luo ◽  
Xin Tian ◽  
Xiaobing Mao ◽  
Qiang Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Allocation Rule ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Buy Back ◽  
The Impact

This paper addresses the operational decisions and coordination of the supply chain in the presence of risk aversion, where the risk averse retailer’s performance is measured by a combination of the expected profit and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). Such performance measure reflects the desire of the retailer to maximize the expected profit on one hand and to control the downside risk of the profit on the other hand. The impact of risk aversion on the supply chain’s decision and performance is also explored. To overcome the inefficiency due to the double marginalization and the aggravation resulting from risk aversion, we investigate the buy-back contract to coordinate the supply chain. Such contract can largely increase the supply chain’s profit, especially when the retailer is more risk averse. Lastly, we extend such risk measure to the widely-used business model nowadays — platform selling model, and explore the impact of the allocation rule on the manufacturer’s decision.

scholarly journals Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunpeng Yang ◽  
Weixin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials

During China’s air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents’ behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Model of Stock Price Synchronicity from Investor Behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yue Dong ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Jinnan Pan ◽  
Tingqiang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
The Cost

Institutional and individual investors are the two important players in the stock market. Together, they determine the price of the stock market. In this paper, an evolutionary game model that contains the two groups of players is proposed to analyze the stock price synchronicity considering the impacts of investors’ decisions on stock investment. Factors affecting investors’ decisions include the potential revenue or loss, the probability of gain or loss, and the cost of corresponding behavior. The proposed game model is analyzed by replicator dynamics equations and simulation of the evolutionary equilibrium strategy under different circumstances. The analysis shows that the operating cost of institutional investors, the cost of information collection before trading, and the expected loss that may be punished by regulators are the key factors that affect the evolutionary game system between institutional investors and individual investors. In addition, reducing the speculation in the market and increasing the information access of investors through the serious operation mode of institutional investors and the strengthening of the market information disclosure mechanism are beneficial to alleviate price synchronicity in stock market.

scholarly journals Packet Forwarding Strategies in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yuanjie Li ◽  
Xiaojun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Packet Forwarding ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Average Probability ◽  
Save Energy ◽  
Stable Points

In multiagent systems (MASs), agents need to forward packets to each other to accomplish a target task. In this paper, we study packet forwarding among agents using evolutionary game theory under the mechanisms of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). Packet forwarding among agents plays a key role to stabilize the whole MAS. We study the transfer probability of packet forwarding of agents at the idle state or the busy state and computer the probability of the packet forwarding for a MAS. When agents make their decisions to select Forward or No-Forward strategy, a packet forwarding evolutionary game model is built to reflect the utilities of different packet forwarding strategies. Two incentive mechanisms are introduced into the game model. One is to motivate agents to strengthen cooperation; the other is to encourage agents to select the No-Forward strategy to save energy while they are in the busy state. The parameter value that encourages an agent to select the No-Forward strategy is inversely proportional to the average probability of the packet forwarding. The replicator dynamics of agent packet forwarding strategy evolution are given. We propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) can be attained. The results of simulation experiments verify the correctness of the proposed theorems and the effects of the two incentive mechanisms and the probability of packet forwarding, which assures the robustness of evolutionary stable points among agents in MASs.

Optimal Option Purchasing Decisions for the Risk-Averse Retailer with Shortage Cost

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin-Sheng Xu ◽  
Felix T. S. Chan
Keyword(s):  
Confidence Level ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Purchasing Decisions ◽  
Shortage Cost ◽  
High Return ◽  
Potential Risks ◽  
Purchase Quantity

To hedge against potential risks, this paper introduces the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) measure into the option purchasing for the risk-averse retailer with shortage cost. We introduce two models for the risk-averse retailer to select the optimal option purchase quantity. It is found that both two optimal option purchase quantities to two models can be decreasing in the retail price and increasing in the option executing price under certain conditions. This is different from the optimal option purchase quantity for a risk-neutral retailer to maximize the expected profit. It is found that both two optimal option purchase quantities may be increasing or decreasing in the confidence level, which implies a retailer who becomes more risk-averse may purchase more or fewer options to hedge against potential risks. Under both two optimal option purchase quantities, it is proven that the retailer’s expected profit is decreasing in the confidence level. This confirms the fact that high return implies high risk while low risk comes with low return.

SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH CVaR CRITERION

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEI YANG ◽  
MINGHUI XU ◽  
GANG YU ◽  
HANQIN ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Mild Conditions ◽  
Quantity Flexibility ◽  
Buy Back

We study the coordination of supply chains with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. Different from the downside risk setting, in a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated with the revenue-sharing, buy-back, two-part tariff and quantity flexibility contracts. Furthermore the revenue-sharing contracts are still equivalent to the buy-back contracts when the retail price is fixed. At the same time, it is shown that the risk-averse retailer of the coordinated supply chain can increase its profit by raising its risk-averse degree under mild conditions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document