scholarly journals Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunpeng Yang ◽  
Weixin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials

During China’s air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents’ behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.

Contesting Commercialization: Political Influence, Responsive Authoritarianism, and Cultural Resistance

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 435-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Qingyuan Yue ◽  
Jue Wang ◽  
Botao Yang
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Local Economy ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Cultural Resistance ◽  
The Public ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials

We develop theory on how a contentious moral market can develop, and we test it with data from a study of the commercialization of Buddhist temples in China from 2006 to 2016, as local government officials try to boost the local economy by transforming temples into tourist enterprises that charge admission fees. The practice is resisted by monks and the public such that the central government, which values public appearances of social justice, is pressured to support their resistance to local officials’ economic demands. Using a data panel of 141 temples, we show that temples’ admission fees are significantly related to the pressure that local government officials face to develop the economy. We also find that resistance to the fees exploits a factional political structure, as the monk-led movement leverages the influence of one political clique that is highly concerned with public appearances of social justice to resist the request of another. In addition, bottom-up channels such as the Internet and marketized media help the public voice its grievances, coordinate collective action, and therefore align with and mobilize the central government to override local government. The contentious view enhances our understanding of how resistance can be possible and effective, especially in an authoritarian regime.

scholarly journals Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruxin Wu ◽  
Piao Hu
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Air Quality ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Treatment Effect ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
The Media ◽  
Positive Effect

Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of “instant results” and the “miracle drug of environmental governance.” Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM10, PM2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM10 and PM2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Zhiqi Xu ◽  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Shuangliang Yao
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Health Emergency ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Negative Behaviors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Safety And Health

Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Shan Gao ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Media Use ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Media Influence ◽  
Social Media Use ◽  
The Public

Despite the expectation that social media use in the public sector contributes to enhancing government's transparency, few studies have been investigated whether social media use actually leads to more disclosure during environmental incidents in practice and how social media influence local governments and their officials' information disclosure. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local government in social media context, and examine the internal mechanism that how social media influence the progress of information disclosure during environmental incidents. The findings indicate that social media plays an active constructive role in central-local government game relations. Specific- ally, social media can provides an efficient information channels for the central government supervise regional officials in environmental incidents, and thus improves its supervision efficiency, and it also provides an important means for internet mobilization and online-offline interaction by encouraging the public exchange information and express their views, and in turn forces local governments and their officials tend to disclosure ahead.

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