scholarly journals Research on Cost Information Sharing and Channel Choice in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huihui Liu ◽  
Shuguang Sun ◽  
Ming Lei ◽  
G. Keong Leong ◽  
Honghui Deng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
General Distribution ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Channel Choice ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Many studies examine information sharing in an uncertain demand environment in a supply chain. However there is little literature on cost information sharing in a dual-channel structure consisting of a retail channel and a direct sales channel. Assuming that the retail sale cost and direct sale cost are random variables with a general distribution, the paper investigates the retailer’s choice on cost information sharing in a Bertrand competition model. Based on the equilibrium outcome of information sharing, the manufacturer’s channel choice is discussed in detail. Our paper provides several interesting conclusions. In both single- and dual-channel structures, the retailer has little motivation to share its private cost information which is verified to be valuable for the manufacturer. When the cost correlation between the two channels increases, our analyses show that the manufacturer’s profit improves. However, when channel choice is involved, the value of information could play a different role. The paper finds that a dual-channel structure can benefit the manufacturer only when the cost correlation is sufficiently low. In addition, if the cost correlation is weak, the cost fluctuation will bring out the advantage of a dual-channel structure and adding a new direct channel will help in risk pooling.

Competition and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain With Asymmetric Retailers

2020 ◽  
pp. 1311-1328
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Different Characteristics ◽  
Linear Quantity

This article studies competition and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain where one supplier supplies homogeneous products to multiple asymmetric retailers, meanwhile, selling products to the end consumers acting as retailers, through a two-level Stackelberg game. This article first studies the asymmetry among the retailers in terms of the different characteristics of the cost, price, quantity. This article finds that a supplier's profits increase when the number of retailers are high enough in the retail market, even though the retail price of the retailers is lower than that of the supplier, or the wholesale price is cut down when there are many retailers competing in the retail market. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the efficiency of supply chain goes to 1. In this article, the authors show that some traditional contracts that can perfectly coordinate the single-channel supply chain, while failing to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. Therefore, this article puts forth a linear quantity discount contract and first proves it can be applicable to the dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric retailers under a certain special condition where the lead retailer exits the retail market. The authors examine contracts which can reduce the loss of the efficiency, though they cannot completely coordinate a dual-channel supply chain.

Equilibrium Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Retailer's Greening Cost Information Asymmetry

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Rofin T. M. ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of information asymmetry of retailer's greening cost on the performance of both the manufacturer and the retailer. The study considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising of a manufacturer and a retailer committed to green operations. The authors have employed sequential game theoretic model to derive the closed form expressions corresponding to the two cases under consideration, that is: (1) complete information and (2) asymmetric information. They have found that the sharing of greening cost information by the retailer can make both the manufacturer and the retailer better off in terms of profit. They have also found that the greening cost information sharing is all the more important when the greening cost efficiency is weak. The study helps retail managers to make a decision on whether to conceal or reveal the greening cost information with the upstream manufacturer.

scholarly journals Price and Service Competition in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Product Customization

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Jian Wang ◽  
Huijuan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Service Cost ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Service Competition ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Product Customization ◽  
Customized Products ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain with product customization. One manufacturer and one retailer are involved. The online direct sales channel sells standard and customized products, and the offline retail channel sells standard products. The prices and service levels of products sold via different channels are differentiated, and the customization level which influences the customization cost and choices of customers is decided by the manufacturer. Three game models are proposed: the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, the retailer Stackelberg (RS) model, and the Nash game model. The price and service decisions of the players are derived. Meanwhile, a service-cost-sharing contract is designed for the MS model. The impacts of price and service competition, service cost, and customers sensitivity to the customization level on the optimal decisions are investigated. Through the numerical analysis, we find that, among the three models, the manufacturer Stackelberg model is the most beneficial game structure for the overall supply chain but has the largest revenue gap between the two members. Second, under price competition and service competition, the manufacturer should differentiate the prices and services for direct sales standard products and customized products according to his market status. Third, the manufacturer should increase customization expenditures to construct his customization production line and provide more diversified products when consumers are more sensitive to product customization.

scholarly journals The Impact of Different Government Subsidy Methods on Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Zhihong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon Emission

With the implementation of national carbon emission reduction policies and the development of online shopping, manufacturers are making low-carbon efforts and selling products through dual channels. This paper constructs a dual-channel supply chain decision-making model composed of low-carbon emission reduction manufacturers and retailers and studies the optimal decision-making problem of the supply chain under subsidies by the government based on emission reduction R&D and per unit product emission reduction. The research results show the following: (1) when the government subsidizes emission reduction R&D, the emission reduction will have an impact on retailers’ optimal prices, manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices, and optimal direct sales channel sales prices. The profit of the manufacturer increases with the increase in carbon emissions, and the profit of the manufacturer increases to a certain level and then appears to decline. (2) When the government adopts a subsidy method based on the emission reduction per unit product, the manufacturer’s wholesale price and the selling price of direct sales channels, as well as the retailer’s own optimal price, will increase with the increase in emission reductions. Retailers’ profits will increase linearly with the increase in carbon emissions. Manufacturers’ profits will first increase in a straight line and then increase in a curve.

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