scholarly journals The Model of Distributor Chain Financing Based on Buy Back Guarantee Contract

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian-xin Chen ◽  
Jia-yin Chen

This paper considers the strategy employed by a buy back guarantee contract with a capital-constrained distributor and a core enterprise. The distributor faces a nonnegative random demand, and the core enterprise applies buy back guarantee contract in order to interact with the capital-constrained distributor. Mathematical model is built to get the optimal ordering quantity of the distributor and the optimal wholesale price of the core enterprise. Then sensitivity analysis of optimal ordering quantity is obtained about the wholesale price, the initial funds, and the salvage of the product. On that basis, the comparison is made between two financing modes—trade credit contract and buy back guarantee contract. In the end, a numerical analysis is illustrated. The results show that the different financing modes bring the different expected profits to supply chain system with the different initial funds, finding that the financing modes, buy back guarantee contract discussed in the paper, can create more value for supply chain system than trade credit contract.

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (03) ◽  
pp. 1740012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianxin Chen ◽  
Yong-Wu Zhou

A supply chain with a supplier and a risk-averse retailer is considered in the paper under trade credit contract. The retailer as newsvendor faces a non-negative random demand and the supplier provides the trade credit for the risk-averse retailer with budget constraints. Different from the existing research, in a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, the optimal ordering quantity and wholesale price are obtained. Analytical results are obtained for the newsvendor retailer’s optimal ordering quantity and supplier’s optimal wholesale price under CVaR measure. Sensitivity analysis is also yielded. It is found that the optimal ordering quantity decreases as the degree of risk aversion increases. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of the initial budget of retailer and the wholesale price on the order quantity decision. This paper also finds that the trade credit contract could create value for a risk-averse supply chain with budget constraints. Finally, to compare with the existing results the theoretical analysis and numerical examples are illustrated.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 395-410
Author(s):  
Xin Tian ◽  
Chunlin Luo ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
Yuzhang Ding

Abstract This paper addresses the supply chain engineering and its application in China’s retailing industry. Based on the approaches of systems engineering, we propose the concept of supply chain engineering, which applies the idea of supply chain management to the engineering practices through the advanced information and management technology, to integrate the supply chain system and optimize its operations. We then illustrate the application of the supply chain engineering in China’s retailing industry. In such practices, we developed the virtual retailing enterprise mode and the FROM-SCM system, and designed the sales assistant etc. Such theory and practices are successfully applied in Meiyijia, which has transformed Meiyijia from a traditional retailer to a modern service enterprise, and the profits are resulted from the service fees rather than the traditional surplus between buying and selling prices. Now Meiyijia has built an ecosystem with the retailer in the core, the headquarter as the service platform. The success of Meiyijia in recent years shows the effectiveness of the supply chain engineering.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 1805 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weisheng Deng

Traditional wisdom claims that remanufacturing operations always benefit the manufacturer in monopolistic cases and hurt the supplier in a supply chain system. However, we show that this claim does not hold when firms face a mature market. In particular, we consider a case in which some consumers in the market possess old products before the selling season, i.e., some consumers are holders. A monopolistic manufacturer collects used products from holders and then sells the products to non-holders after furbishing and remanufacturing. In the integrated case, the manufacturer performs manufacturing and remanufacturing together. We find that remanufacturing may hurt the manufacturer when the fraction of non-holders in the market and the production cost are both low. In the separated case, in which an upstream supplier provides the core component to a downstream manufacturer, the downstream manufacturer undertakes the remanufacturing operation as well as manufacturing. We find that the supplier can benefit from the manufacturer’s remanufacturing operation under a specific condition, even if the manufacturer always receives a higher profit.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yanpeng Sun ◽  
Cheng Ma ◽  
Qi Sun

It is common for a supplier to sell products to multiple retailers. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a decentralized supply chain with multiple retailers facing a random price-dependent demand in the additive form. Here, we consider two kinds of demand functions: the distribution of the demand depends only on the retailer’s own retail price (noncompeting retailers) and not only on his own retail price but also on that of the other retailers (competing retailers). We present appropriate wholesale price, buy-back, and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the total supply chain, so that when all the retailers adopt their equilibrium response, the supply chain system coordination is also achieved. Furthermore, the coalition formation among retailers is also analyzed. We find that with buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts and linear price-dependent demand function, retailers always prefer being in the grand coalition to forming any other coalition.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaifang Fu ◽  
Zhixiang Chen ◽  
Bhaba R. Sarker

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the behavioral operations effect in production inventory decision of supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one buyer, and analyze how the unfairness concerns impact the decision of production inventory in a supply chain system. Design/methodology/approach First, a model without the buyer’s unfairness concern is established; then, advantage unfairness concern and disadvantage unfairness concern behavior of buyer are taken into account in the production inventory system. The authors analyze how advantage unfairness concern and disadvantage unfairness concern impact the optimal decisions and channel coordination. Findings The result shows several important conclusions. First, the buyer’s optimal ordering quantity and expected utility show opposing trend when the buyer has advantage unfairness concern. Second, the stronger bargaining power of the manufacturer results in an increasing buyer’s optimal ordering quantity under the advantage unfairness concern case, but decreasing under the disadvantage unfairness concern case. Third, the supply chain production-inventory can be coordinated under advantage unfairness concern case, but cannot be coordinated under disadvantage unfairness concern. Practical implications The study can provide to practitioners with important implications that when the vendor or the buyer in supply chain wants to make the decision of inventory replenishment, taking unfairness concerns into account will lead to different results. Therefore, to effectively improve the operations performance of supply chain, partners of the supply chain should not only care about their own interest, but also need to consider the fairness concern of the other partner, reflecting the cooperation consciousness of supply chain management. Originality/value This paper contributes to the new field of creative management–behavioral operations, offering managerial implications for the decision and optimization of supply chain production-inventory problem.


2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (24) ◽  
pp. 10036-10052 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun-Jen Chung ◽  
Shy-Der Lin ◽  
H.M. Srivastava

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