scholarly journals The Long-Run Behavior of Consumption and Wealth Dynamics in Complete Financial Market with Heterogeneous Investors

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Darong Dai

A type of complete financial market with finite and countable heterogeneous investors, that is, investors equipped with heterogeneous elasticities of intertemporal substitution, heterogeneous time discount rates, and also heterogeneous beliefs, is constructed and two main results are established. First, long-run behaviors, specifically golden rules or modified golden rules, about consumption path and wealth accumulation are investigated under uncertainty and in the sense of uniform topology. Second, inefficacy of temporary taxation policies, which are chosen to be consumption tax and wealth tax, is confirmed in the current financial market.

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 864-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Klenert ◽  
Linus Mattauch ◽  
Ottmar Edenhofer ◽  
Kai Lessmann

We study the impacts of investment in public capital on equity and efficiency. Taking into account stylized facts on wealth accumulation, we model agent heterogeneity through differences in saving behavior, income source and time preference. We find that in the long run, public investment is Pareto-improving and that it reduces inequality in wealth, welfare, and income at the same time, if it is financed by a capital tax. Consumption tax financing is also Pareto-improving but distribution-neutral. Only for labor tax financing, a trade-off between equity and efficiency occurs. Additionally, we find that agents differ in their preferred tax rates.The results for capital and labor tax financing are valid for both, the case of decreasing and constant returns to accumulable factors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 135 (1) ◽  
pp. 329-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrine Jakobsen ◽  
Kristian Jakobsen ◽  
Henrik Kleven ◽  
Gabriel Zucman

Abstract Using administrative wealth records from Denmark, we study the effects of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Denmark used to impose one of the world’s highest marginal tax rates on wealth, but this tax was greatly reduced starting in 1989 and later abolished. Due to the specific design of the wealth tax, the 1989 reform provides a compelling quasi-experiment for understanding behavioral responses among the wealthiest segments of the population. We find clear reduced-form effects of wealth taxes in the short and medium run, with larger effects on the very wealthy than on the moderately wealthy. We develop a simple life cycle model with utility of residual wealth (bequests) allowing us to interpret the evidence in terms of structural primitives. We calibrate the model to the quasi-experimental moments and simulate the model forward to estimate the long-run effect of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. Our simulations show that the long-run elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax return is sizable at the top of the distribution.


2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 625-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophre Georges ◽  
John C. Wallace

In this paper, we explore the consequence of learning to forecast in a very simple environment. Agents have bounded memory and incorrectly believe that there is nonlinear structure underlying the aggregate time series dynamics. Under social learning with finite memory, agents may be unable to learn the true structure of the economy and rather may chase spurious trends, destabilizing the actual aggregate dynamics. We explore the degree to which agents' forecasts are drawn toward a minimal state variable learning equilibrium as well as a weaker long-run consistency condition.


2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Boyer

Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners' bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-185
Author(s):  
SMA Islam

There is a debate on economic efficiency and the improvement of economic welfare. In this research, I have fixed the value of rich and poor with equal weight with an assumption that the consumption tax is the source of government expenditure for public goods. This paper optimized improvement of equality and private consumption share of public goods with the prime revenue of consumption tax. This optimization process has also been analyzed in accordance with the theoretical assumption of Roy`s identity and Marshallian ordinary market demand function for justification of equity and welfare. Finally, this process compared implicitly to the process of Kuznets pattern economic development with taking assumption of distortionary consumption tax to penetrate the relationship between long term economic growth and economic welfare. The empirical evidence found in my earlier publication that consumption tax is welfare augmented in long run if the source of government expenditure is consumption tax to produce public goods. This welfare maximized general equilibrium evidences have potential opportunity of welfare augmented resource mobilization in a developing country where consumption tax is the source of prime revenue.Progressive Agriculture 29 (2): 178-185, 2018


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-137
Author(s):  
Shankha Chakraborty

This article proposes a tractable model of the evolution of financial structure. Firms invest out of internal assets and by borrowing from banks and the financial market. In the presence of moral hazard, whereby owner–managers may intentionally reduce profitability of investment to appropriate resources, banks can monitor firms and partially alleviate agency problems. Under the optimal financial contract, banks monitor and outside investors lend to firms only if they borrow from banks too. The model is broadly consistent with financial development facts. Capital accumulation is facilitated by an increasing reliance on both types of external finance. Initially firms rely more heavily on expensive bank finance. With further development, banks eliminate much of the agency problem and firms substitute in favour of cheaper market finance. The short- and long-run effects of financial sector reforms are considered. JEL: E44, G20, O16


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-57
Author(s):  
Scott S. Condie ◽  
Richard W. Evans ◽  
Kerk L. Phillips

This article examines Thomas Piketty’s thesis that there are no natural limits on the accumulation of wealth. We undertake our examination in the context of a simple general equilibrium model with infinitely lived dynasties. We show that extreme wealth accumulation does not happen in general equilibrium unless capital and labor are substitutes, an assumption which also leads to unbalanced growth. We also show that even with unbalanced growth, differences in rates of return and effective labor are not sufficient to cause unbounded inequality. Only permanent savings rate differences can lead to extreme wealth concentration. Finally, we show that while a flat wealth tax will not eliminate extreme wealth concentration, both a graduated wealth tax and a flat income tax will.


2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (56) ◽  
pp. 757-795 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Gollier ◽  
Phoebe Koundouri ◽  
Theologos Pantelidis
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