scholarly journals Cooperative Advertising in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi He ◽  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Chunxu Wu ◽  
Xiaohang Yue
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Channel Member ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Horizontal Competition ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Strategies

Cooperative advertising programs are usually provided by manufacturers to stimulate retailers investing more in local advertising to increase the sales of their products or services. While previous literature on cooperative advertising mainly focuses on a “single-manufacturer single-retailer” framework, the decision-making framework with “multiple-manufacturer single-retailer” becomes more realistic because of the increasing power of retailers as well as the increased competition among the manufacturers. In view of this, in this paper we investigate the cooperative advertising program in a “two-manufacturer single-retailer” supply chain in three different scenarios; that is, (i) each channel member makes decisions independently; (ii) the retailer is vertically integrated with one manufacturer; (iii) two manufacturers are horizontally integrated. Utilizing differential game theory, the open-loop equilibrium-advertising strategies of each channel member are obtained and compared. Also, we investigate the effects of competitive intensity on the firm’s profit in three different scenarios by using the numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Modelling cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain using game theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Peter Ezimadu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
Advertising Strategies ◽  
Channel Structures ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

This work considers cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain, where the manufacturer is taken as the Stackelberg leader, using differential game theory. The distributor and retailer are the first and the second followers, respectively. We introduce the distributor into the traditional manufacturer-retailer channel through his direct involvement in advertising as being incorporated into the non-stochastic Sethi's sales-advertising dynamics. This is used to model the awareness share dynamics in which the distributor and the retailer directly engage in advertising, while the manufacturer bypasses the distributor to subsidise only the retail advertising effort. We consider a subsidised and unsubsidised channel structures, where each structure results in a system of three nonlinear equations, which cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. However, we show that the unique solution to each of the systems exists, provided certain conditions are satisfied. The distributor and the retailer's advertising strategies are developed for both when subsidy is provided and when it is not provided. We also obtain the manufacturer's subsidy rate and the market awareness share for both when retail advertising is subsidised and when it is not subsidised. We observe that with the provision of subsidy, the distributor reduces his advertising effort. However, the resulting increase in the retail advertising effort is larger than the reduction in the distributor's advertising commitment, thus making the channel advertising effort larger with subsidy. It further shows that to avoid being shortchanged, each player should adopt only his optimal strategy or strategies as the case may be.

scholarly journals Coordination of Cooperative Advertising in a Two-Period Fashion and Textiles Supply Chain

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi He ◽  
Zhiying Liu ◽  
Khalid Usman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Channel Member ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Cooperative Program ◽  
Advertising Strategies ◽  
Decision Making Framework ◽  
The One ◽  
Over Time

Previous studies related to cooperative advertising mainly focus on the one-period supply chain. In the fashion and textiles (FT) supply chain, the demand of most FT products (fashion clothing, vogue handbags, fashion shoes, and so on) varies over time due to the trends of fashion. In these conditions, a decision-making framework with a multiple-period supply chain becomes more realistic. In view of this, we investigate the optimal cooperative advertising strategies in a two-period FT supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in two different scenarios: (i) each channel member makes decisions within a cooperative program; (ii) the retailer is vertically integrated with a manufacturer. Also, we introduce a two-way subsidy contract to coordinate the supply chain.

scholarly journals Evasion-Pursuit Strategy against Defended Aircraft Based on Differential Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Qilong Sun ◽  
Minghui Shen ◽  
Xiaolong Gu ◽  
Kang Hou ◽  
Naiming Qi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Active Defense ◽  
Guidance Law ◽  
Optimal Guidance ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
One To One ◽  
The One

The active defense scenario in which the attacker evades from the defender and pursues the target is investigated. In this scenario, the target evades from the attacker, and the defender intercepts the attacker by using the optimal strategies. The evasion and the pursuit boundaries are investigated for the attacker when the three players use the one-to-one optimal guidance laws, which are derived based on differential game theory. It is difficult for the attacker to accomplish the task by using the one-to-one optimal guidance law; thus, a new guidance law is derived. Unlike other papers, in this paper, the accelerations of the target and the defender are unknown to the attacker. The new strategy is derived by linearizing the model along the initial line of sight, and it is obtained based on the open-loop solution form as the closed-loop problem is hard to solve. The results of the guidance performance for the derived guidance law are presented by numerical simulations, and it shows that the attacker can evade the defender and intercept the target successfully by using the proposed strategy.

Channel coordination through quality improvement with brand halo effect

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1407-1425
Author(s):  
Qingyun Xu ◽  
Bing Xu ◽  
Yi He
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Quality Management ◽  
Halo Effect ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Payment Policy ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Subsidy Program

Product quality depends on the quality investment of the manufacturer and quality decisions of the supplier. Therefore, many firms and researchers pay considerable attention to supply quality management. Considering a supply chain that includes two competing suppliers and one manufacturer, this paper investigates the influences of competition and the “brand halo” effect on the quality strategies of channel members, and explores the potential coordinating power of the bilateral participation contract. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper compares and analyzes the quality strategies of all channel members under three different scenarios: (i) decentralized scenario within a subsidy program, (ii) integrated scenario, and (iii) bilateral participation contract. Our results confirm the following results. (1) The manufacturer may not grant a subsidy to the supplier if two final products are highly competitive. (2) Supply chain members are more likely to join the bilateral participation contract if the “brand halo” effect is large. (3) The bilateral participation contract can achieve perfect coordination if the competition is weak or if a transfer payment policy exists.

scholarly journals A Green Supply-Chain Decision Model for Energy-Saving Products That Accounts for Government Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Xue ◽  
Ruifeng Gong ◽  
Laijun Zhao ◽  
Xiaoqing Ji ◽  
Yan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Government Subsidies

Government subsidies are a common policy adopted to promote energy conservation and emission reduction. The decision-making that occurs within the green supply chain for energy-saving products under government subsidies is an area of great academic interest and game theory is becoming a popular tool in such research. In this paper, we examined centralized and decentralized decision-making models for the green supply chain and a coordinated decision-making model for revenue-sharing contracts based on game theory. We studied the effects of government subsidies on retail prices, energy conservation levels, market demand, supply chain profits, and social welfare for energy-saving products. We then compared the effectiveness of the three models using a numerical example. Our results revealed the range of contract parameters for which manufacturer and retailer profits increase. Our results show that government subsidies can significantly improve social welfare and promote the improvement of energy-saving products. Centralized decision-making generates higher profits than decentralized decisions and government subsidies were positively correlated with the level of energy conservation, product prices, and market demand. Revenue sharing contract coordination decisions can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the same effect as centralized decisions.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategy in a Green Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liyan Wang ◽  
Minghai Ye ◽  
Shanshan Ma ◽  
Yipeng Sha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Optimal Decisions

This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product’s demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members’ decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain’s expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer’s expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient’s effects on the retailer’s expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.

Coordination Concepts in Multilevel Hierarchical Differential Games

1977 ◽  
Vol 99 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Jumarie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Control Problem ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Coordination Mode ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Optimum Control ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Self Learning ◽  
Optimum Control Problem

This paper presents possible extensions of the usual differential game theory to the case where the players, say the supremal players do not completely govern the plant, but control it only via infimal players who have their own pay-off functions. One assumes that the internal structure of the game is given in the sense that the supremal players cannot define arbitrary decompositions for the system. One further assumes that these supremal players have given programming terminal objectives which they desire to attain. In this framework, the supremal players can only select suitable functions, which are the coordination controls, to coordinate the system for the best. It follows that the problem so defined is simultaneously an optimum control problem and a programming one. The direct coordination mode, the open-loop indirect coordination mode and the closed-loop indirect coordination mode are defined and are mainly based upon a direct reference to the overall system, together with a two-level optimization process. The explicit equations are given in the important case where the comparison criterion is defined in the form of an Euclidean norm, and an illustrative example is solved. This approach would be interesting to apply to the problem of learning and self-learning in optimum control systems for instance, via gradient techniques.

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