Channel coordination through quality improvement with brand halo effect

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1407-1425
Author(s):  
Qingyun Xu ◽  
Bing Xu ◽  
Yi He
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Quality Management ◽  
Halo Effect ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Payment Policy ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Subsidy Program

Product quality depends on the quality investment of the manufacturer and quality decisions of the supplier. Therefore, many firms and researchers pay considerable attention to supply quality management. Considering a supply chain that includes two competing suppliers and one manufacturer, this paper investigates the influences of competition and the “brand halo” effect on the quality strategies of channel members, and explores the potential coordinating power of the bilateral participation contract. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper compares and analyzes the quality strategies of all channel members under three different scenarios: (i) decentralized scenario within a subsidy program, (ii) integrated scenario, and (iii) bilateral participation contract. Our results confirm the following results. (1) The manufacturer may not grant a subsidy to the supplier if two final products are highly competitive. (2) Supply chain members are more likely to join the bilateral participation contract if the “brand halo” effect is large. (3) The bilateral participation contract can achieve perfect coordination if the competition is weak or if a transfer payment policy exists.

scholarly journals Cooperative Advertising in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi He ◽  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Chunxu Wu ◽  
Xiaohang Yue
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Channel Member ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Horizontal Competition ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Strategies

Cooperative advertising programs are usually provided by manufacturers to stimulate retailers investing more in local advertising to increase the sales of their products or services. While previous literature on cooperative advertising mainly focuses on a “single-manufacturer single-retailer” framework, the decision-making framework with “multiple-manufacturer single-retailer” becomes more realistic because of the increasing power of retailers as well as the increased competition among the manufacturers. In view of this, in this paper we investigate the cooperative advertising program in a “two-manufacturer single-retailer” supply chain in three different scenarios; that is, (i) each channel member makes decisions independently; (ii) the retailer is vertically integrated with one manufacturer; (iii) two manufacturers are horizontally integrated. Utilizing differential game theory, the open-loop equilibrium-advertising strategies of each channel member are obtained and compared. Also, we investigate the effects of competitive intensity on the firm’s profit in three different scenarios by using the numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Modelling cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain using game theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Peter Ezimadu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Differential Game Theory ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
Advertising Strategies ◽  
Channel Structures ◽  
Stackelberg Leader

This work considers cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain, where the manufacturer is taken as the Stackelberg leader, using differential game theory. The distributor and retailer are the first and the second followers, respectively. We introduce the distributor into the traditional manufacturer-retailer channel through his direct involvement in advertising as being incorporated into the non-stochastic Sethi's sales-advertising dynamics. This is used to model the awareness share dynamics in which the distributor and the retailer directly engage in advertising, while the manufacturer bypasses the distributor to subsidise only the retail advertising effort. We consider a subsidised and unsubsidised channel structures, where each structure results in a system of three nonlinear equations, which cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. However, we show that the unique solution to each of the systems exists, provided certain conditions are satisfied. The distributor and the retailer's advertising strategies are developed for both when subsidy is provided and when it is not provided. We also obtain the manufacturer's subsidy rate and the market awareness share for both when retail advertising is subsidised and when it is not subsidised. We observe that with the provision of subsidy, the distributor reduces his advertising effort. However, the resulting increase in the retail advertising effort is larger than the reduction in the distributor's advertising commitment, thus making the channel advertising effort larger with subsidy. It further shows that to avoid being shortchanged, each player should adopt only his optimal strategy or strategies as the case may be.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

scholarly journals Quality management systems in Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services: a review of the literature

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. e001091
Author(s):  
Jenifer Olive Darr ◽  
Richard C Franklin ◽  
Kristin Emma McBain-Rigg ◽  
Sarah Larkins ◽  
Yvette Roe ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Quality Management ◽  
Health Service ◽  
First Nations ◽  
Quality Management System ◽  
Grey Literature ◽  
Models Of Care ◽  
Clinical Governance ◽  
Aboriginal Community ◽  
Continuous Quality

BackgroundA national accreditation policy for the Australian primary healthcare (PHC) system was initiated in 2008. While certification standards are mandatory, little is known about their effects on the efficiency and sustainability of organisations, particularly in the Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Service (ACCHS) sector.AimThe literature review aims to answer the following: to what extent does the implementation of the International Organisation for Standardization 9001:2008 quality management system (QMS) facilitate efficiency and sustainability in the ACCHS sector?MethodsThematic analysis of peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken from Australia and New Zealand PHC sector with a focus on First Nations people. The databases searched included Medline, Scopus and three Informit sites (AHB-ATSIS, AEI-ATSIS and AGIS-ATSIS). The initial search strategy included quality improvement, continuous quality improvement, efficiency and sustainability.ResultsSixteen included studies were assessed for quality using the McMaster criteria. The studies were ranked against the criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. Three central themes emerged: accreditation (n=4), quality improvement (n=9) and systems strengthening (n=3). The accreditation theme included effects on health service expenditure and clinical outcomes, consistency and validity of accreditation standards and linkages to clinical governance frameworks. The quality improvement theme included audit effectiveness and value for specific population health. The theme of systems strengthening included prerequisite systems and embedded clinical governance measures for innovative models of care.ConclusionThe ACCHS sector warrants reliable evidence to understand the value of QMSs and enhancement tools, particularly given ACCHS (client-centric) services and their specialist status. Limited evidence exists for the value of standards on health system sustainability and efficiency in Australia. Despite a mandatory second certification standard, no studies reported on sustainability and efficiency of a QMS in PHC.

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