scholarly journals Sequential Divestiture and Firm Asymmetry

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Wen Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Infinite Number ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Break Up ◽  
Firm Asymmetry

Simple Cournot models of divestiture tend to generate incentives to divest which are too strong, predicting that firms will break up into an infinite number of divisions resulting in perfect competition. This paper shows that if the order of divestitures is endogenized, firms will always choose sequential, and hence very limited, divestitures. Divestitures favor the larger firm and the follower in a sequential game. Divestitures in which the larger firm is the follower generate greater industry profit and social welfare, but a smaller consumer surplus.

Endogenous Timing in Vertically-Related Markets

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Ren Din ◽  
Chia-Hung Sun
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
The Other ◽  
Endogenous Timing ◽  
Price Strategy ◽  
Quantity Competition ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Product Substitutability

Abstract This paper investigates the theory of endogenous timing by taking into account a vertically-related market where an integrated firm competes with a downstream firm. Contrary to the standard results in the literature, we find that both firms play a sequential game in quantity competition and play a simultaneous game in price competition. Under mixed quantity-price competition, the firm choosing a price strategy moves first and the other firm choosing a quantity strategy moves later in equilibrium. Given that the timing of choosing actions is determined endogenously, aggregate profit (consumer surplus) is higher (lower) under price competition than under quantity competition. Lastly, social welfare is higher under quantity competition than under price competition when the degree of product substitutability is relatively low.

scholarly journals Externalities and Regulation in Card Payment Systems

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Charles Rochet ◽  
Jean Tirole
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Welfare Analysis ◽  
Payment Systems ◽  
Interchange Fees ◽  
Regulatory Approach ◽  
Innovative Thinking ◽  
Card Payment ◽  
Economic Thinking

The paper offers a roadmap to the current economic thinking concerning interchange fees. After describing the fundamental externalities inherent in payment systems and analysing merchant resistance to interchange fee increases and the associations' determination of this fee, it derives the externalities' implications for welfare analysis. It then discusses whether consumer surplus or social welfare is the proper benchmark for regulatory purposes. Finally, it offers a critique of the current regulatory approach, and concludes with a call for more novel and innovative thinking about how to reconcile regulators' concerns and the industry legitimate desire to perform its balancing act.

A Model of Queue Scalping

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luyi Yang ◽  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Shiliang Cui
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Service Provider ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
System Throughput ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Material Interest ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Primary Service

Recent years have witnessed the rise of queue scalping in congestion-prone service systems. A queue scalper has no material interest in the primary service but proactively enters the queue in hopes of selling his spot later. This paper develops a queueing-game-theoretic model of queue scalping and generates the following insights. First, we find that queues with either a very small or very large demand volume may be immune to scalping, whereas queues with a nonextreme demand volume may attract the most scalpers. Second, in the short run, when capacity is fixed, the presence of queue scalping often increases social welfare and can increase or reduce system throughput, but it tends to reduce consumer surplus. Third, in the long run, the presence of queue scalping motivates a welfare-maximizing service provider to adjust capacity using a “pull-to-center” rule, increasing (respectively, reducing) capacity if the original capacity level is low (respectively, high). When the service provider responds by expanding capacity, the presence of queue scalping can increase social welfare, system throughput, and even consumer surplus in the long run, reversing its short-run detrimental effect on customers. Despite these potential benefits, such capacity expansion does little to mitigate scalping and may only generate more scalpers in the queue. Finally, we compare and contrast queue scalping with other common mechanisms in practice—namely, (centralized) pay-for-priority, line sitting, and callbacks. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez de Albéniz, operations management.

STORE PROMOTION, MANUFACTURER COMPETITION AND WELFARE

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
HAO WANG ◽  
XUNDONG YIN ◽  
ALICE Y. OUYANG
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Preferences ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Weighted Average ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Price Distortion ◽  
Online Platforms ◽  
Brand Competition ◽  
The Social ◽  
Partial Exclusion

This study evaluates the partial exclusion effects of store promotion. We find that a manufacturer with a better brand name has a higher willingness-to-pay for promotion services offered by retail stores or online platforms. The promotion results in higher sales-weighted average prices (wholesale and retail) and a larger inter-brand price gap. The stores or platforms extract more profits from manufacturers and consumers through the promotion services. The effects on consumer surplus and social welfare depend on whether the promotion alters consumer preferences. If it does, more consumers would be choosing their less-preferred brands because of the larger inter-brand price gap, which would be socially inefficient. If it does not, the promotion may help to correct the price distortion, but the social welfare effect is positive only when the promotion effect is small enough. In both cases, the promotion services reduce the total consumer surplus by softening inter-brand competition.

Competitive Effects of Purchase-Based Targeted Advertising

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 71-84
Author(s):  
Jianqiang Zhang ◽  
Weijun Zhong ◽  
Shue Mei
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Consumer Information ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Targeted Advertising ◽  
Consumer Valuation ◽  
Competitive Environments ◽  
Second Period

This paper develops a two-period sales model to investigate the competitive effects of purchase-based targeted advertising. In the model, two competing firms gain consumer information during the first period sales, which allows them to target advertising based on consumer purchase history. Advertising is assumed to be persuasive in terms of consumer valuation enhancing and product differentiation increasing. The authors find that the firm’s ability to target can damage industry profits, consumer surplus, and even social welfare. The conditions under which targeted advertising is positive or negative are derived, showing that price competition is softened in the second period but intensified in the first. It is suggested that firms under competitive environments cautiously sponsor targeted advertising with appropriate contents.

Asymmetric Networks and Access Charges

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950005
Author(s):  
Alexander Correa
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Market Entry ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Marginal Costs ◽  
Asymmetric Networks ◽  
Access Charges ◽  
Firm Asymmetry ◽  
Asymmetric Regulation

In order to suggest an appropriate regulatory regime in the context of firm asymmetry, this study has developed a mathematical model that allows to elucidate comparisons of three different regulatory scenarios. In the unregulated market, the low-cost firm is more likely to become dominant in the market. Symmetric regulation has an immediate effect on off-net prices, which fall to the level of its marginal costs. Finally, asymmetric regulation is a highly effective way of promoting market entry. Asymmetric regulation can generate higher social welfare.

scholarly journals Transparency of Behavior-Based Pricing

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Li ◽  
Krista J. Li ◽  
Xin (Shane) Wang
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
History Data ◽  
Consumer Data ◽  
Behavior Based ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Firm Profit ◽  
Commitment Device

Behavior-based pricing (BBP) refers to the practice in which firms collect consumers’ purchase history data, recognize repeat and new consumers from the data, and offer them different prices. This is a prevalent practice for firms and a worldwide concern for consumers. Extant research has examined BBP under the assumption that consumers observe firms’ practice of BBP. However, consumers do not know that specific firms are doing this and are often unaware of how firms collect and use their data. In this article, the authors examine (1) how firms make BBP decisions when consumers do not observe whether firms perform BBP and (2) how the transparency of firms’ BBP practice affects firms and consumers. They find that when consumers do not observe firms’ practice of BBP and the cost of implementing BBP is low, a firm indeed practices BBP, even though BBP is a dominated strategy when consumers observe it. When the cost is moderate, the firm does not use BBP; however, it must distort its first-period price downward to signal and convince consumers of its choice. A high cost of implementing BBP serves as a commitment device that the firm will forfeit BBP, thereby improving firm profit. By comparing regimes in which consumers do and do not observe a firm’s practice of BBP, the authors find that transparency of BBP increases firm profit but decreases consumer surplus and social welfare. Therefore, requiring firms to disclose collection and usage of consumer data could hurt consumers and lead to unintended consequences.

scholarly journals Effects of corporate social responsibility on food safety

2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (No. 12) ◽  
pp. 539-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen You-Hua ◽  
Nie Pu-Yan ◽  
Yang Yong-Cong
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Food Safety ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Food Industry ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Price Regulation ◽  
Quality Regulation ◽  
Corporate Social

This paper develops the theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the food industry. The effects of CSR on the food industry are captured. First, we argue that CSR reduces the profits of a CSR firm under monopoly. Second, under complete information, regulation does not improve social welfare. We find that both active price regulation and active quality regulation reduce a monopolist’s profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. Finally, under incomplete information, the monopolist exaggerates quality as much as possible. With quality regulation, CSR reduces exaggerated quality in the food industry.

Quality Disclosure Under Consumer Loss Aversion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianqiang Zhang ◽  
Krista J. Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Quality Disclosure ◽  
Disclosure Decisions ◽  
Future Outcomes ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Firm Profit ◽  
First Mover

Consumers experience a sense of loss when a product’s quality does not match their expectations. To alleviate consumer loss aversion (CLA), firms can disclose information to reduce consumers’ uncertainty about product quality and the resulting psychological loss. In this paper, we investigate the implications of CLA on firm profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare when firms endogenously make quality disclosure decisions. We find that CLA leads symmetric firms to disclose quality more often. Given that CLA weakly reduces consumers’ utility from buying a product and quality disclosure is costly, intuition suggests that CLA is detrimental to firms. We find that this intuition is true only in a monopoly. Surprisingly, CLA makes both firms in a competition better off. Moreover, CLA increases firms’ profit when they invest in quality disclosure instead of money-back guarantees to respond to CLA. We also find that CLA decreases consumer surplus and social welfare. Therefore, educating consumers to improve decision-making skills by deliberating on future outcomes and emotions can benefit firms at the cost of consumers and society. When firms disclose quality sequentially, CLA can discourage the follower from disclosing quality. A strong level of CLA increases the leader’s profit over the follower’s, thereby encouraging firms to be the first mover in quality disclosure. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

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