scholarly journals Stochastic Recursive Zero-Sum Differential Game and Mixed Zero-Sum Differential Game Problem

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Lifeng Wei ◽  
Zhen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Saddle Point ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Stopping Time ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Game Problem ◽  
Existence Results ◽  
Double Barrier ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Reflected Bsdes ◽  
Theoretical Results

Under the notable Issacs's condition on the Hamiltonian, the existence results of a saddle point are obtained for the stochastic recursive zero-sum differential game and mixed differential game problem, that is, the agents can also decide the optimal stopping time. The main tools are backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) and double-barrier reflected BSDEs. As the motivation and application background, when loan interest rate is higher than the deposit one, the American game option pricing problem can be formulated to stochastic recursive mixed zero-sum differential game problem. One example with explicit optimal solution of the saddle point is also given to illustrate the theoretical results.

scholarly journals Partial Information Stochastic Differential Games for Backward Stochastic Systems Driven by Lévy Processes

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Fu Zhang ◽  
QingXin Meng ◽  
MaoNing Tang
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Stochastic Systems ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Backward Stochastic Differential Equation ◽  
Game Problem ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Independent Brownian Motion ◽  
Teugels Martingales ◽  
Zero Sum

In this paper, we consider a partial information two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game problem, where the system is governed by a backward stochastic differential equation driven by Teugels martingales and an independent Brownian motion. A sufficient condition and a necessary one for the existence of the saddle point for the game are proved. As an application, a linear quadratic stochastic differential game problem is discussed.

scholarly journals Search for a saddle point of a convex-concave stochastic game by the adaptive method of mirror descent.

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (8-2020) ◽  
pp. 182-184
Author(s):  
A.V. Nazin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Saddle Point ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Adaptive Method ◽  
Game Problem ◽  
Descent Algorithms ◽  
Mirror Descent ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Gradient Approach

A stochastic game problem of 2 persons with a zero sum is considered, leading to the search for a saddle point of the game function based on the gradient approach. We study mirror descent algorithms, both adaptive and non-adaptive. The main results are proved. An illustrative example is discussed.

scholarly journals An Analytic and Numerical Investigation of a Differential Game

Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Aviv Gibali ◽  
Oleg Kelis
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Equation Approach ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Dual Representation ◽  
Cost Functional ◽  
Variational Derivatives ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Derivatives Of

In this paper we present an appropriate singular, zero-sum, linear-quadratic differential game. One of the main features of this game is that the weight matrix of the minimizer’s control cost in the cost functional is singular. Due to this singularity, the game cannot be solved either by applying the Isaacs MinMax principle, or the Bellman–Isaacs equation approach. As an application, we introduced an interception differential game with an appropriate regularized cost functional and developed an appropriate dual representation. By developing the variational derivatives of this regularized cost functional, we apply Popov’s approximation method and show how the numerical results coincide with the dual representation.

scholarly journals Nash Equilibrium Sequence in a Singular Two-Person Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Valery Y. Glizer
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Quadratic Functional ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Feedback Controls ◽  
Cheap Control ◽  
Optimal Values ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Equilibrium Sequence

A finite-horizon two-person non-zero-sum differential game is considered. The dynamics of the game is linear. Each of the players has a quadratic functional on its own disposal, which should be minimized. The case where weight matrices in control costs of one player are singular in both functionals is studied. Hence, the game under the consideration is singular. A novel definition of the Nash equilibrium in this game (a Nash equilibrium sequence) is proposed. The game is solved by application of the regularization method. This method yields a new differential game, which is a regular Nash equilibrium game. Moreover, the new game is a partial cheap control game. An asymptotic analysis of this game is carried out. Based on this analysis, the Nash equilibrium sequence of the pairs of the players’ state-feedback controls in the singular game is constructed. The expressions for the optimal values of the functionals in the singular game are obtained. Illustrative examples are presented.

Prophet Inequalities for Independent and Identically Distributed Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Correa ◽  
Paul Dütting ◽  
Felix Fischer ◽  
Kevin Schewior
Keyword(s):  
Stopping Time ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Random Order ◽  
Secretary Problem ◽  
Maximum Value ◽  
Optimal Stopping Theory ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Object Of Study ◽  
Independent And Identically Distributed

A central object of study in optimal stopping theory is the single-choice prophet inequality for independent and identically distributed random variables: given a sequence of random variables [Formula: see text] drawn independently from the same distribution, the goal is to choose a stopping time τ such that for the maximum value of α and for all distributions, [Formula: see text]. What makes this problem challenging is that the decision whether [Formula: see text] may only depend on the values of the random variables [Formula: see text] and on the distribution F. For a long time, the best known bound for the problem had been [Formula: see text], but recently a tight bound of [Formula: see text] was obtained. The case where F is unknown, such that the decision whether [Formula: see text] may depend only on the values of the random variables [Formula: see text], is equally well motivated but has received much less attention. A straightforward guarantee for this case of [Formula: see text] can be derived from the well-known optimal solution to the secretary problem, where an arbitrary set of values arrive in random order and the goal is to maximize the probability of selecting the largest value. We show that this bound is in fact tight. We then investigate the case where the stopping time may additionally depend on a limited number of samples from F, and we show that, even with o(n) samples, [Formula: see text]. On the other hand, n samples allow for a significant improvement, whereas [Formula: see text] samples are equivalent to knowledge of the distribution: specifically, with n samples, [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text], and with [Formula: see text] samples, [Formula: see text] for any [Formula: see text].

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document