scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Inventory Inaccuracy with RFID Technology

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quansheng Lei ◽  
Yin Zhang ◽  
Lingyu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Economic Viability ◽  
Rfid Technology ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Dependent Demand

In this paper we consider a two-echelon supply chain under price-dependent demand market and we use RFID to eliminate the effect of inventory inaccuracy. Models are built to evaluate the economic viability and coordination conditions. We analyze two scenarios in which the supply chain is defined, the integrated one and the decentralized one, respectively. For the integrated, we compare the different supply chain revenue with and without RFID technology and then determine the optimal inventory decisions. For the decentralized, we mainly focus on the coordination mechanism by revenue sharing contract under Stackelberg game. By seeking appropriate contract parameters, the supply chain can finally be coordinated while all partners are better off. Furthermore, numerical examples are given to verify our proposition.

Supply Chain Coordination Under Ramp-Type Price and Effort Induced Demand Considering Revenue Sharing Contract

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (02) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
S. P. Sarmah
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Programming Technique ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Induced Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Fuzzy Goal

In this paper, a revenue sharing contract is designed to coordinate a distribution channel where the demand of the product is ramp-type price and effort sensitive. It is shown that traditional revenue sharing contract does not coordinate the system. As an alternative, two new mechanisms are proposed (i) revenue sharing with coordinated effort of the retailer alone and (ii) both revenue and effort sharing contract. In addition, a crucial modification of revenue sharing fraction is also proposed. To enhance the applicability of revenue sharing contract, the contract parameters are determined by using bi-level multi-objective fuzzy goal programming technique where manufacturer sets the wholesale price greater than the marginal cost. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate all the models.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (9) ◽  
pp. 1842-1865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Xiao-hua Wu ◽  
Bing Ye ◽  
Yong-wang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Internet Of Things

Purpose The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road. Design/methodology/approach A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Findings The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain. Practical implications Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis. Originality/value This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

scholarly journals Coordinating Three-Level Supply Chain under Disruptions Using Revenue-Sharing Contract with Effort Dependent Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Yanli Hou ◽  
Yifei Lv
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Additive Form ◽  
Dependent Demand

Considering that the market demand is stochastic and dependent on effort, this essay shows that the benchmark revenue-sharing contract could not coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer. By assuming that the retailer himself bears the effort cost, coordination is achieved by implementing revenue-sharing contract based on rebate and penalty policy in one transaction or two transactions of three-level supply chain, and the former is a special case of the latter. When the disruptions induce the changes of the market demand, the revenue-sharing contract could not coordinate the supply chain. To deal with the problem, this essay introduces two forms of improved revenue-sharing contracts which have antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form with effort dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples.

scholarly journals Three-Level Supply Chain Coordination under Disruptions Based on Revenue-Sharing Contract with Price Dependent Demand

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinghua Pang ◽  
Yuer Chen ◽  
Yulu Hu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Normal Environment ◽  
Contract Form ◽  
Additive Form ◽  
Dependent Demand

Considering the market demand is stochastic and dependent on price, this paper shows that the revenue-sharing contract could coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer under normal environment. However, the original revenue-sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain under disruptions in circumstances of certain incidents leading to significant changes in market demand and causing additional deviation costs. To solve the problem, this essay introduces two improved forms of revenue-sharing contract: a mixed contract form based on a quantity discount policy and a pure form, which are characterized by antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form or in the multiplicative form with price dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Stage Fashion Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Retailer and Price-Dependent Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minli Xu ◽  
Qiao Wang ◽  
Linhan Ouyang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Mean Variance ◽  
Variance Approach ◽  
Dependent Demand

When the demand is sensitive to retail price, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract have been shown to be able to coordinate supply chains with risk neutral agents. We extend the previous studies to consider a risk-averse retailer in a two-echelon fashion supply chain. Based on the classic mean-variance approach in finance, the issue of channel coordination in a fashion supply chain with risk-averse retailer and price-dependent demand is investigated. We propose both single contracts and joint contracts to achieve supply chain coordination. We find that the coordinating revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract in the supply chain with risk neutral agents are still useful to coordinate the supply chain taking into account the degree of risk aversion of fashion retailer, whereas a more complex sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract fails to do so. When using combined contracts to coordinate the supply chain, we demonstrate that only revenue sharing with two-part tariff contract can coordinate the fashion supply chain. The optimal conditions for contract parameters to achieve channel coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to supplement the results and more insights are gained.

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