Endogenous differentiation of information goods under uncertainty

We present a model that suggests possible explanations for the observed proliferation of “pay-per-use” (PPU) business models over the last two decades. Delivering “fractions” of a product as a service offers a cost advantage to customers with lower usage but requires extra delivery costs. Previous research focused on information goods (with negligible production costs) and predicted that PPU, when arising as a differentiation to selling in equilibrium, would fundamentally achieve lower profits than selling. We extend the theory by covering goods with any production cost in duopolistic competition. We show that PPU business models can be more profitable than selling (especially at midrange production costs), as long as their delivery costs are not too high, a requirement that is more easily fulfilled as new technologies reduce these costs. Moreover, if firms are imperfectly informed about their customers’ usage profiles, PPU’s effective pricing of customers’ varying usage offers an additional advantage over selling. This requires companies to employ accounting methods that do not inappropriately allocate production costs over stochastic usage levels. If PPU service provision suffers from queueing inefficiencies, this does not fundamentally change the relative profitability of the PPU and selling models, provided that PPU providers can attract sufficiently high demand to benefit from pooling economies. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

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Competitive Entry of Information Goods Under Quality Uncertainty

Management Science ◽

10.1287/mnsc.2021.3978 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-20

Author(s):

Zan Zhang ◽

Guofang Nan ◽

Minqiang Li ◽

Yong Tan

Keyword(s):

Product Quality ◽

New Product ◽

High Price ◽

Quality Uncertainty ◽

Information Goods ◽

Consumer Uncertainty ◽

Willingness To Adopt ◽

Marketing Activities ◽

Very High

When confronted with a new product, consumers often find it difficult to predict how it will perform, and such uncertainty reduces consumers’ willingness to adopt the product. In this paper, we consider a market whereby consumers decide when and which product to buy, given that they know the product quality of the incumbent but are uncertain about that of the entrant. We investigate how consumer uncertainty about product quality affects firms’ behavior-based pricing and customer acquisition and retention dynamics. Using a two-period vertical model, we find that, under high-end encroachment, an increase in consumer uncertainty reduces the entrant’s profit and hurts the incumbent’s profit when the quality differential between the products is relatively small, whereas, under low-end encroachment, increasing uncertainty not only benefits the incumbent but also can favor the entrant. An important implication for entrants is that the marketing activities, which aim to reduce consumer uncertainty about product functionalities, may fail to improve profitability. We also find that the entrant lowers the price for uninformed customers and raises the price for repeat buyers under high-end encroachment but lowers the price for all customers under low-end encroachment. We further examine the subsidy strategy and show that, when the entrant’s product has a significant quality advantage and consumer uncertainty is high but not very high, the optimal strategy for the entrant is to acquire all consumers who do not buy from the incumbent by providing subsidies and to drop the low-valuation customers by means of a high price after their uncertainty is resolved.

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