scholarly journals Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Y. Halpern ◽  
Rafael Pass
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Equilibrium

scholarly journals How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?

1997 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
George J Mailath ◽  
Larry Samuelson ◽  
Jeroen M Swinkels
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Equilibrium

Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium

1999 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebbe Groes ◽  
Hans Jørgen Jacobsen ◽  
Birgitte Sloth
Keyword(s):  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Extensive Form Games

A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

Econometrica ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 1367 ◽  
Author(s):  
In-Koo Cho
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Equilibrium

scholarly journals Achieving fairness by sequential equilibrium in rational two-party computation under incomplete information

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (18) ◽  
pp. 3690-3700
Author(s):  
Yilei Wang ◽  
Duncan S. Wong ◽  
Willy Susilo ◽  
Xiaofeng Chen ◽  
Qiuliang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium

Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 495-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B. Myerson ◽  
Philip J. Reny
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Positive Probability ◽  
Infinite Games ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Open Set ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Conditional Expected Utility ◽  
Equilibrium Distributions ◽  
Infinite Sets

We extend Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibrium to games with infinite sets of signals and actions. A strategy profile is a conditional ε‐equilibrium if, for any of a player's positive probability signal events, his conditional expected utility is within ε of the best that he can achieve by deviating. With topologies on action sets, a conditional ε‐equilibrium is full if strategies give every open set of actions positive probability. Such full conditional ε‐equilibria need not be subgame perfect, so we consider a non‐topological approach. Perfect conditional ε‐equilibria are defined by testing conditional ε‐rationality along nets of small perturbations of the players' strategies and of nature's probability function that, for any action and for almost any state, make this action and state eventually (in the net) always have positive probability. Every perfect conditional ε‐equilibrium is a subgame perfect ε‐equilibrium, and, in finite games, limits of perfect conditional ε‐equilibria as ε → 0 are sequential equilibrium strategy profiles. But limit strategies need not exist in infinite games so we consider instead the limit distributions over outcomes. We call such outcome distributions perfect conditional equilibrium distributions and establish their existence for a large class of regular projective games. Nature's perturbations can produce equilibria that seem unintuitive and so we augment the game with a net of permissible perturbations.

Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World

1991 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Nalebuff
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
The Cost

This paper considers the role of reputation and signaling in establishing deterrence. The cost-benefit calculations of rational deterrence are extended to allow for incomplete or imperfect information. The author uses requirements of a sequential equilibrium (and its refinements) to impose consistency restrictions on how strategic players signal a reputation for strength. This provides a way to interpret potentially misleading reputations and offers a resolution to the reputation paradox of Jervis.

scholarly journals A sequential equilibrium for the army's targeted selective reenlistment bonus program

2007 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Scott E. Carrell ◽  
James E. West
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Equilibrium

scholarly journals Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model

Econometrica ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Camerer ◽  
Keith Weigelt
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Tests ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Reputation Model
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