System-Level Design to Detect Fault Injection Attacks on Embedded Real-Time Applications

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Jiang ◽  
Liang Wen ◽  
Ke Jiang ◽  
Xia Zhang ◽  
Xiong Pan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Real Time ◽  
Fault Injection ◽  
System Level ◽  
System Level Design ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Real Time Applications ◽  
Level Design ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

scholarly journals Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-336
Author(s):  
Mael Gay ◽  
Batya Karp ◽  
Osnat Keren ◽  
Ilia Polian
Keyword(s):  
Error Control ◽  
Fault Injection ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
System Level ◽  
Electronic Systems ◽  
Minimal Distance ◽  
Outer Code ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Control Scheme ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks

Abstract Today’s electronic systems must simultaneously fulfill strict requirements on security and reliability. In particular, their cryptographic modules are exposed to faults, which can be due to natural failures (e.g., radiation or electromagnetic noise) or malicious fault-injection attacks. We present an architecture based on a new class of error-detecting codes that combine robustness properties with a minimal distance. The new architecture guarantees (with some probability) the detection of faults injected by an intelligent and strategic adversary who can precisely control the disturbance. At the same time it supports automatic correction of low-multiplicity faults. To this end, we discuss an efficient technique to correct single nibble/byte errors while avoiding full syndrome analysis. We also examine a Compact Protection Code (CPC)-based system level fault manager that considers this code an inner code (and the CPC as its outer code). We report experimental results obtained by physical fault injection on the SAKURA-G FPGA board. The experimental results reconfirm the assumption that faults may cause an arbitrary number of bit flips. They indicate that a combined inner–outer coding scheme can significantly reduce the number of fault events that go undetected due to erroneous corrections of the inner code.

A new concept for system-level design of runtime reconfigurable real-time systems

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 57-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arno Luppold ◽  
Benjamin Menhorn ◽  
Heiko Falk ◽  
Frank Slomka
Keyword(s):  
Real Time ◽  
System Level ◽  
Real Time Systems ◽  
System Level Design ◽  
Level Design ◽  
Time Systems

An AOP-Based Fault Injection Environment for Cryptographic SystemC Designs

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (01) ◽  
pp. 1550008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassen Mestiri ◽  
Younes Lahbib ◽  
Mohsen Machhout ◽  
Rached Tourki
Keyword(s):  
Fault Injection ◽  
Electronic System ◽  
System Level ◽  
Standard Case ◽  
Fault Attacks ◽  
Injection Attacks ◽  
Electronic System Level ◽  
Fault Injection Attacks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Simulation Time

The increasing complexity of cryptographic devices requires fast simulation environment in order to test their security against fault attacks. SystemC is one promising candidate in Electronic System Level that allows models to reach higher simulation speed. However in order to enable both fault injection and detection inside a SystemC cryptographic models, its code modification is mandatory. Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP), which is a new programming paradigm, can be used to test the robustness of the cryptographic models without any code modifications. This may replace real cryptanalysis schemes. In this paper, we present a new methodology to simulate the security fault attacks of cryptographic systems at the Electronic System Level. A fault injection/detection environment is proposed to test the resistance of cryptographic SystemC models against fault injection attacks. The fault injection technique into cryptographic SystemC models is performed using weaving faults by AspectC++ as an AOP programming language. We validate our methodology with two scenarios applied to a SystemC Advanced Encryption Standard case study: the first is related to the impact of the AOP on fault detection capabilities, while the second refers to the impact of the AOP on simulation time and size of the executable files. Simulation results show that this methodology can evaluate perfectly the robustness of a cryptographic design against fault injection attacks. They show that the impact of AOP on simulation time is not significant.

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