Management System for the Identification Risk, Qualification and Remediation of Geo-Hazards in Rocks and Residual Soils of the Camisea NG and NGL Pipelines

Author(s):  
Fernando A. Vela´squez Marti´nez ◽  
Dimas Y. Robles Robles

An early identification of geo-hazards i.e. slides, fluvial erosion, eolic erosion, rainwater erosion among others and the subsequent mitigation and remediation of its effects on the Right of Way (ROW) and the pipelines, has prevented the occurrence of leaks in the Camisea NG and NGL Transportation System, which includes a 730 Km natural gas pipeline and a parallel 560 Km natural gas liquids pipeline, operated and maintained by Compan˜i´a de Gas del Amazonas (COGA). The Camisea Transportation System, traverse the Peruvian territory starting in Malvinas (Cusco). The NGL pipeline stops in Playa Loberi´a (Ica) and the NG pipeline stops in the City Gate, located in Luri´n (Lima). These pipelines traverse the Peruvian rainforest, the Andes Mountains and coastal areas. The intend of this paper is to describe the use of a Risk Matrix (RM) in order to calculate different risk levels for the prioritization of the geotechnical mitigation and stabilization works to be performed during the dry season of the Peruvian rainforest. The RM is a tool based on the so-called Safety Ratio, incorporating calculation parameters of the Security Factor used in the stability analysis of slopes. Once the work sites have been identified using the RM, the engineering design is performed, using geotechnical engineering techniques such as subsoil exploration, laboratory testing, mathematic modeling, designs and instrumentation. After the Geotechnical Engineering process has been completed, the Safety Ratio values estimated with the RM are replaced by Safety Factors. The paper concludes showing the benefits of the whole Risk Management System, which has been successfully applied in the first 200 Km of the ROW characterized by residual soils, slopes with more than 45° and 7000 mm in excess of rainfall per year.

Author(s):  
John Erick Malpartida Moya

The hydrocarbon transmission system that belongs to Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TGP), comprise two parallel pipelines: a natural gas (NG) pipeline, which runs from the upstream facilities at Malvinas, in the Amazonian jungle of Cusco-Peru, to a reception station at Lurín (south of Lima); and a natural gas liquid (NGL) pipeline, which transports the condensed liquids from Malvinas to Pisco, on the coast of Peru. The right-of-way (ROW) crosses the Peruvian jungle with both pipelines in its first 200 kilometers, after climbs over the Andes Mountains at an elevation of 4860 masl, and descends steeply toward the coast along the Pacific Ocean. TGP’s Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) has identified the Weather and Outside Forces such as main threat which increases the risk of the integrity of its pipelines in jungle and mountains areas. In pipelines with particular characteristics such as pipeline which crosses the Andes and the Amazonian jungle, this threat can cause even a greater number of failures than other threats such as Corrosion or TPD. This threat caused the 70% of the leaks of our NGL pipeline. The geotechnical and geologic conditions were key factors in the risk level of the system since the beginning of the operation. The PIMS of TgP has achieved an important development in the use and suitable handling of the information provided by diverse techniques of pipeline mechanical and the geotechnical inspection and monitoring of the ROW. Different alternative techniques of monitoring have to be taken into account. It is important also to take into account alternative assessment methodologies in order to determine the pipeline exposure, resistance and mitigation to this threat. By integrating these inspections, monitoring and particular assessments as part of PIMS, we have been able get accurate risk assessments in order to mitigate and/or minimize the occurrence of failures. In this way we are able to optimize efforts to preserve the integrity of our system and in addition minimize personal, environmental and business impact. Risk Assessment is an essential part of the Integrity Management System. Our company developed a very comprehensive and detailed Risk Assessment Model based on the guidelines of API 1160 and ASME B31.8S. The probability model is based on logic trees instead indexing models (the most commonly used), that is because we want to reflect in the result all the variables and factors: Exposition, Resistance and Mitigation Factors. By means of the pipeline Integrity Management System developed by TGP, we are able to mitigate risks due to outside forces. We have been able to act before any event becomes critical: TGP NGL pipeline’s failure rate due to WOF (number of failures per 1000 kilometers-years) decreases substantially from 5.39 to 1.26 in ten years of operation. For the whole system that rate decreases from 2.33 to 0.46.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 845 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Marinos ◽  
G. Stoumpos ◽  
G. Papathanassiou ◽  
N. Grendas ◽  
D. Papouli ◽  
...  

Landslides represent a significant hazard for pipelines because they can generate permanent ground displacement and tend to result in complete failure or significant leaks, major environmental impacts and long periods of service disruption. Hence, landslide-related incidents are regarded as a significant operational risk. The paper mainly focuses on the assessment of landslide hazard along or across a natural gas pipeline project and on the identification of these hazards, mostly in the field. Whether the “expected” landslide event reaches the Right of Way (RoW) and impacts the pipeline, is influenced by the nature and size of the expected landslide event, controlled by the site geology and geomorphology, the proximity of the existing landslide feature to the pipeline and the position of the pipeline relative to the landslide. Landslide hazard assessment is used to identify “hot spots” along the pipeline route where re-routing or risk reduction measures must be prioritised. When landslides that can threat the pipeline integrity cannot be avoided, more detailed site evaluation is required to support the design and construction of mitigation measures.


Author(s):  
Francisco Oliveros ◽  
John Malpartida ◽  
Alberto Melo ◽  
Christian Rosario ◽  
Marcos Mecatti

Abstract Camisea Pipeline Transportation System (PTS) in Peru, owned by Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TGP) and operated by Compañía Operadora de Gas (COGA), begins in the Amazon rainforest, crosses the Andes Mountains (4850msnm) and finally descends towards the Pacific coast. The PTS has been operating for more than 10 years and it has Natural Gas (NG) and Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) transportation pipelines. The NG pipeline is 888km long which includes two Loops (105km and 18km in the coast and mountain sectors, respectively). NGL pipeline is 557km long. From the beginning (0 km) to 210 km, the Right of Way (RoW) is located in the geotechnical context of the Amazon rainforest. Then, between km 210 and km 420, the PTS crosses the mountain chain of the Andes. Finally, between km 420 and Km 730 the RoW is located on the Peruvian Pacific coast. TGP’s operation of the PTS identifies, analyzes and controls the different types of threats that can affect the integrity of the pipelines. The operation is developed according to international standards defined in the Pipeline Integrity Management (PIM) of the operation. Consequently, hazards such as Third Party Damage (TPD), geohazard, external and internal corrosion, among others, are analyzed. However, associated to the economic growth and development of Peru, there have been some cases where the intervention of a person, community or industrial activity in the surroundings of the RoW has resulted in the level of geohazards are spontaneously modified and activated. Consequently, the degree of stability of the RoW is necessary to analyze the integrity of the NG and NGL pipelines. This article describes the occurrence of some practical cases where there was a change in the stability of the RoW of the TGP’s PTS triggered by activities related to TPD. It is highlighted that the identification, analysis, definition and execution of mitigation actions are carried out in a transversal way which involves the participation of different operational areas such as: Integral Maintenance, Geotechnics, Integrity, Social Management, among others. All the activities are done with the approach of keeping the balance between community, environment and infrastructure. Some of the cases considered are: Flood and scour of the RoW triggered by the failure of a water tank in an industrial area, scour of channels due the obstructions and an unstable slope process generated by constructions near the RoW. Today, the operation develops activities in order to mitigate geohazards generated by TPD. Some of these activities are, among others: Social awareness, technical talks, agreements with industrial and local administration entities, geotechnical maintenance and monitoring. In addition, it is highlighted that all the mentioned mitigation actions are carried out in a transversal manner between different operational areas. Afterward, the collected information is properly saved in the Geographic Information System database.


Author(s):  
Francisco Oliveros ◽  
Emilio Hernández ◽  
Guillermo Soto

The Camisea’s Pipeline Transportation System (PTS) in Peru, owned by Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TgP) and operated by Compañía Operadora de Gas del Amazonas (COGA), stars in the Amazon rainforest, crosses the Andes Mountain (4850masl) and descends finally towards the coast of the Pacific. The PTS has more than 10 years of operation and it has two pipelines: one transports Natural Gas (NG) and the other Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) pipelines. The NG pipeline has a length of 864km including a Loop pipeline of 135km. The NGL pipeline has a length of 557km. Because of particular physiographic conditions of each geographic sector that cross the right-of-way (ROW), the integrity of the PTS acquires a level of significant susceptibility to the occurrence of geohazard, which are the product of natural erosive processes and mass movements. In the coast sector, one of the most representative processes of geotechnical instability is the soil or debris flow (mass movements of soils). The occurrence of this type of flow has a greater incidence in the torrential creek, which generate transport of large volumes of sediments during rainy seasons. The flow has destructive effects and therefore, it is necessary to analyze the geomorphological, geological and hydrological aspects of the main creek and rivers that crosses the ROW with the objective of maintaining the integrity of the pipelines. In Peru, the flows are associated and known as Huayco or Huaico. As an additional component, it is highlight that the Peruvian coast is located within the area of interaction between the South American Continental Plate and the Nazca Plate, where there is evidence of seismic activity with different magnitude that influence on the occurrence of geo-dynamic processes with certain periods of frequency that could change the terrane’s morphology. The current article describes technical aspects of identification, intervention, monitoring, and geotechnical control in sub-fluvial crossings with levels of potential damage to the geohazard defined as huayco in the integrity management program of PTS. This activity include 63 main sub-fluvial crosses, approximately 30% are of the seasonal flow regime, located in the coast zone; at the same time, these are tributary to main rivers of constant flow as is the case of the Pisco, Cañete and Mala rivers. In this paper, it is place a special emphasis on the fourth crossing of the Huáncano creek, because it is a place of potential impact in the occurrence of soil flows. Within the annual geotechnical maintenance of the sub-fluvial crosses, in the part of the Peruvian coast, for the operation of the PTS of TgP, bed and banks protection some works are implemented, such as: Check dams, re-channeling, levees and stone riprap (Stone armour). Likewise, a program of evaluation and technical inspection is develop: it includes the analysis of the expected levels of undermining and performance condition of the existing works, which allow defining the geotechnical intervention in a term according to the identified risk level. All in all framed within a process of permanent geotechnical monitoring of the right of way. Finally, it is highlighted that to date the application of the process described above has been continued, which has facilitated the development and continuous assessment of the risk condition by huaycos in the PTS of TgP. This program has maintained an operation with an acceptable level of risk in the areas of interest and avoiding problems and consequences of great impact to communities, the environment and the operation of the system.


Author(s):  
C. R. A. Vasconcellos ◽  
H. R. Oliveira ◽  
J. C. Freitas

The Bolivia-Brazil Natural Gas Pipeline has 2.600 kilometers since Rio Grande City in Bolivia until Canoas City, in south Brazil. The pipeline crosses a lot of types of geological field and difficult topography. The south spread of the pipeline is the most interesting because of its hard topography combined with the variety of geological materials, such as, colluvium deposits and debris flow areas. Curriola River is located at kilometer 408, north part of Parana State. In this area, the pipeline crosses slopes of 40 degrees of inclination. The mounting was only possible making high cuts to assure the appropriated bendings to the pipe. The high cuts generated high volumes of soil that had no place to be deposited. The construction staff decided to put all the material above the right-of-way, in down part of the slope, near Curriola River. The construction created an artificial colluvium. As well as the most colluvium mass around the world, the Curriola material is a non-resistance material, composed with clay and little rock blocks, with a high porosity. Every year, during the raining seasons, the mass movements generate tension cracks. A superficial drainage system was built in order to prevent these movements but it’s not sufficient because the embankment is more than 5 meters high. Studies have been carried out since the start of the pipeline operation. The most difficult part of the work is the access to the area that makes the whole activity a battle. The first field investigation was conclude in January 2003, composed by SPT tests, piezometer installation and investigation wells. The second part of the story will be composed by inclinometer and strain gauges installation and monitoring, together with laboratory tests with samples of the field. The aim of this paper is to present the site characterization of the Curriola River Slope, together with all the investigation made, including state of stress field, and residual stresses assessment, in order to supply the studies with condensed information for the slope stabilization and gas pipeline integrity.


Author(s):  
Raul Algarra Mun˜oz ◽  
Jose L. Martinez Gonzalez ◽  
Daniel Morales Serratt

This paper describes the damage caused by a tropical storm to a 48” gas pipeline considered to be the main natural gas supplier within Mexico’s distribution network. Included is a detailed description of the temporary and permanent repairs and rehabilitation carried out. The pipeline section damaged during this natural event is located in a wide water crossing of the river “Tecolutla” in Veracruz, southern Mexico. The construction process to make a new crossing included horizontal drilling using state of the art technology, extensively applied and improved within the industry during the past 10 years. To accomplish the operation, a novel technique was applied, since the pipeline dimensions (48” diameter and 853 m length), required special tools and equipment. Only twice before in the world have projects similar to this one been attempted. This was the first ever application in Mexico. Therein lies the uniqueness and importance of its successful completion, despite the logistical problems and unforeseen difficulties that the contractor was presented with, such that at times it appeared that the work would not be successfully completed. The need to keep the pipeline operating during the project caused delays in most of the scheduled activities. A key factor to ensuring a successful end to this project was the contractor selection. Supervision and quality control were also important issues during the project’s development. The horizontal drilling approach allowed different arrangements for the pipeline crossing to be assessed. The arrangement chosen avoids the use of a gate valve and a bypass on the right side of the crossing, with the advantage of keeping this pipeline section 7 metres below the riverbed.


Author(s):  
Chunyong Huo ◽  
Chuanjing Zhuang ◽  
Minxu Lu ◽  
Helin Li ◽  
Guoxing Li

Quantitative risk analysis was carried out on a proposed natural gas pipeline based on preliminary data using the methods and models implemented in the PIRAMID™ software program. The high-risk areas were identified and the main causes of risk were analyzed. Measures to lower the calculated risk levels were developed, which will be taken into consideration in the design and construction of the pipeline.


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