Update on Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management Inspections for US Operators

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Skip Brown ◽  
David Kuhtenia
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Require Time ◽  
The Us ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments

The US Department of Transportation’s Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) started the second round of integrity management inspections on hazardous liquid pipeline operators in mid-2005. Since then PHMSA has used the information gained from all of the Hazardous Liquid Integrity Management (HL IM) inspections to continue the development of the HL IM inspection process. In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. The fundamental objectives for HL IM have not changed: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. The IM rule is based on a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the previously existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the inspection of management and analytical processes - aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard PHMSA compliance inspections. PHMSA has gained significant experience with the fundamentally different approach to oversight needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the inspections themselves and from basic changes in the management of the HL IM inspection program. PHMSA completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in 2004 and has continued inspecting both small system IM operators and re-inspecting large operators. As of December 2005 PHMSA has completed the inspection of 175 first round interstate hazardous liquid pipeline operators of which 101 are interstate systems and 74 are programs of intrastate hazardous liquid operators. Additionally, 14 second round inspections of hazardous liquid operators have been performed. Since the initial pilot hazardous liquid integrity management (HL IM) inspections in 2002 PHMSA has found that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and have made significant progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas (Figure 1). However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes still requires considerable attention from some operators. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time and management commitment. PHMSA recognizes this situation and continues to develop and implement an inspection and enforcement approach that seeks to assure compliance with the rule requirements and continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. Finally, after several years of integrity management development and associated inspections PHMSA gained additional experience about how to perform this new type of inspection. An important change in the program took place in late 2004 when the PHMSA regions took over the scheduling, inspection program, and other aspects of managing the IM inspections. This paper also addresses what PHMSA learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned by the regions to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.

Early Experience With Integrity Management Inspections for US Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Robert Brown
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Require Time ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Level ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments

In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. At the core of this new rule is a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the examination of management and analytical processes-aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard OPS compliance inspections. OPS realized a fundamentally different approach to oversight was needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the comprehensive changes to the OPS inspection program that were developed to perform integrity management inspections. OPS completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in early 2004, and is making progress in reviewing the programs of smaller liquid operators. During this initial year OPS gained substantial knowledge about the state of hazardous liquid pipeline operator integrity management programs. At a high level, OPS learned that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and are making the appropriate plans and progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas. However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes takes time. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time. OPS recognizes this situation and has developed an inspection and enforcement approach that not only assures compliance with the rule requirements, but also fosters continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the initial inspections, and OPS expectations for future integrity management program development. Finally, the intial year of integrity management inspections provided some valuable insights about how to perform these new type of inspections and improve external communication. This paper also addresses what OPS learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.

Regulation of the Integrity of Gas Transmission Pipelines by the Office of Pipeline Safety

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zach Barrett ◽  
Mike Israni ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Paul Wood
Keyword(s):  
Basic Structure ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Government Oversight ◽  
Current Thinking ◽  
The Us ◽  
Final Rule ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments ◽  
Transmission Pipelines

In December of 2003 the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published a final rule for integrity management of gas transmission pipelines. As in the earlier rule for integrity management of hazardous liquid pipeline, OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection, pressure testing or direct assessment) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. This paper describes the process leading to the rule, the primary features of the rule, and the current thinking regarding OPS expectations for inspecting against provisions of the rule. While the basic structure of the IM rule for gas transmission pipelines is very similar to that of the hazardous liquid rule, the gas rule has several distinctions that are discussed in this paper.

IMP 2.0: The Evolution of PHMSA’s Approach for Improving Pipeline Integrity

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Wiese ◽  
Linda Daugherty
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Hazardous Material ◽  
The Future ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Future Direction ◽  
Pipeline Safety

This paper discusses the original motivations and objectives of the Integrity Management Program (IMP), the lessons learned from the first decade of implementing IMP, the drivers for improving and expanding IMP (“IMP 2.0”), actions that the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) is already taking under the IMP 2.0 umbrella, as well as the future direction the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) expects IMP 2.0 to take in the next few years.

API RP 1173 Pipeline SMS Third-Party Assessment Program: A Key Industry Tool for Evaluating and Supporting Implementation of Pipeline Safety Management Systems

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexa S. Burr ◽  
S. David Toth ◽  
Colin M. Frazier
Keyword(s):  
Safety Management ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Safety Performance ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Maturity Model ◽  
Safety Management Systems ◽  
Assessment Program ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Third Party Assessment

Abstract Since the publication of API Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline Safety Management Systems, in July 2015, the energy pipeline trade groups in North America (American Petroleum Institute, Association of Oil Pipelines, American Gas Association, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, and the American Public Gas Association) have worked collaboratively to develop tools and programs to assist energy pipeline operators with the development and implementation of Pipeline Safety Management System (Pipeline SMS) programs and processes. These resources include a Planning Tool, Implementation Tool and Evaluation Tool, as well as an industry-developed Maturity Model that describes a continuum of implementation levels, based on conformance to RP 1173 as well as implementation effectiveness. These resources can be found online and are supplemented by the Pipeline SMS Third-Party Assessment Program developed by API. Applying API’s experiences with successful safety programs in other segments and with significant contributions from the Pipeline SMS Implementation Team (aforementioned trade groups and various industry operators), the Pipeline SMS Third-Party Assessment Program is designed to be a key tool to facilitate Pipeline SMS implementation and to share and benchmark information to drive improvements in safety performance. The assessments also provide the pipeline industry with an objective, third-party option to test their systems and address the conformity auditing (API RP 1173, Section 10.2.2) and performance and maturity evaluation (API RP 1173, Section 10.2.3 to 10.2.5) requirements of the recommended practice. In 2019, pilot assessments were conducted and in 2020 the Assessment Program is being implemented. Through the piloting process, significant insights were gained into the practical application of the industry Maturity Model and how the assessments can contribute to an operator’s journey improving safety performance. Aligning with the flexibility and scalability goals of RP 1173, the pilot experiences included liquids transmission and gas distribution operators with varying approaches to pipeline SMS implementation. We will discuss the lessons learned through the piloting process and how the plan-do-check-act cycle was applied to improve the processes for planning, staffing and conducting the assessments to ensure that value is being provided to the pipeline industry. An independent assessment through the API Pipeline SMS Third-Party Assessment Program can validate internal efforts to increase maturity of programs, as well as provide operators with benchmarking data so that they can understand where other operators are in their maturity journey.

Regulatory Process Changes at the Office of Pipeline Safety

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
James von Herrmann ◽  
Paul Wood
Keyword(s):  
Management Practices ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
New Approach ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Us ◽  
Special Programs ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Improved Performance ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Measures Of Performance

Over the past several years the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Research and Special Programs Administration of the US Department of Transportation has begun to develop and implement a different approach to structuring its regulations and to carrying out the inspections it uses to evaluate operator conformance with the provisions of these regulations. Several new Rules have been promulgated incorporating provisions that are a combination of prescriptive, performance-based, and management-based. These rules include the hazardous liquid integrity management rules for large and small operators, the operator qualification rule, and the gas integrity management rule. The new rules have been designed to allow operators flexibility in their approach to addressing the objectives of the regulations. Such flexibility is needed because of the significant differences in the pipeline infrastructure operated by each company, and the corresponding need to acknowledge these differences to assure the objectives of regulation are achieved without imposing a needless and costly burden on the operators. Promulgation of highly prescriptive “one-size-fits-all” regulations is inconsistent with the variations present in the infrastructure operated by the US pipeline industry. One ingredient in the approach OPS has chosen is the imposition of “management-based” requirements. These requirements are so-called because they prescribe implementation of a program that includes the need for several management practices. The new rules allow some flexibility in which management practices are selected and exactly how they are implemented. Inspection against management-based provisions is different from inspection of purely prescriptive requirements. Management-based requirements provide flexibility in how operators evaluate, justify and change their practices to satisfy the intent of the rule within their unique operating environment. While such changes are designed to lead to improved performance, they will not immediately manifest themselves in recognizable changes in performance, so finely tuned measures of performance are needed to help evaluate the effectiveness of the new requirements. OPS has adopted several mechanisms to aid in the consistent inspection of the management-based provisions of the new rules. These mechanisms are discussed in the paper, as is the OPS approach to answering the question of how it will know if the new approach is working.

Management of Pre-Regulation Pipe

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad J. Zamarin ◽  
Mark L. Hereth
Keyword(s):  
Customer Service ◽  
Time Frame ◽  
American Petroleum Institute ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Metal Loss ◽  
Require Time ◽  
American Society ◽  
The Right ◽  
Future Work ◽  
Operating History

This paper establishes a broad approach including a process to verify and where necessary achieve integrity of pre-regulation pipelines based on fitness for service (FFS) analysis. FFS is an accepted set of processes to demonstrate the mechanical integrity of in-service equipment, including pipelines. FFS analysis is specifically designed and has been demonstrated to support decisions on future disposition of equipment. The analysis for pre-regulation pipe rigorously focuses on material and construction threats, the primary threats to pre-regulation pipelines. All other threats to these pipelines are otherwise addressed through B31.8S and CSA Z662. The FFS analysis for pre-regulation pipe includes consideration of material properties, testing history, and operating history and provides guidance for achieving integrity where the FFS deems either insufficient data or actual pipeline characteristics warrant action. The methods currently used in FFS evaluations have been applied in the petroleum refining, petrochemical, nuclear, paper and steam electric power industries as well as the pipeline industry since the 1980s. One of the first acknowledged threat specific applications was actually in the pipeline industry with the development of B31G, a method for calculating the remaining strength of pipelines in areas with metal loss, first published in 1984. In the late 1990’s, subject matter experts across a number of these industries created a compendium of methods to address a breadth of flaw types. The document was first published in 2000, as American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 579. It was updated in 2007 through a joint effort between API and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and published as API RP 579-1/ASME FFS 1. Implementing the FFS process will require time to evaluate pipelines in a prioritized manner, manage customer service impacts and implement necessary actions. The paper addresses how to start applying the process and extend it over time. The FFS process prioritizes the right place to start as pipelines within high consequence areas (HCAs) that have incomplete strength test records. The testing, repair, remediation or replacement of these pipelines within HCAs will be accomplished over a defined time frame, and during that period findings will be continually evaluated to derive lessons learned for future work. In parallel, consistent with NTSB’s goal of making systems capable of accommodating in-line inspection tools and advancing research, industry and in-line inspection (ILI) providers will work to commercialize ILI technology that can more rigorously demonstrate FFS, from the standpoint of construction and material threats, for pre-regulation pipe. Innovative ILI technologies will be incorporated into the FFS protocol on a risk-prioritized basis.

Analysis of Experience in Building Operation Management Systems for the Foreign and Russian Oil and Gas Companies

2021 ◽  
pp. 69-74
Author(s):  
D.A. Nikitina ◽  
◽  
S.N. Petryaev ◽  
I.S. Sivokon ◽  
E.E. Fomina ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Occupational Safety ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Operation Management ◽  
Industrial Safety ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Production Operation ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Level

The performed analysis showed that integrity management is required for ensuring stable and reliable operation. Along with many other processes in the field of industrial safety, integrity management is an important process for the prevention of cases of equipment depressurization, and, therefore, for preventing people by storing hydrocarbons inside the pipelines and vessels. High quality integrity management leads to high production operations efficiency and has a positive effect on the entire business. The article presents the results of the implementation of operation management systems (OMS) in various companies. It shows how deeply integrity management, being part of OMS, is integrated into all the areas of production operation activity. To achieve the high level of production operations reliability, all the industrial and occupational safety processes must be interconnected and form a single system. The conducted analysis shows that OMS of different companies have both similarities and differences. OMS is often developed based on the existing industrial and occupational safety management systems, which explains the focus of such systems on safety. The latest statistics show that this is the right approach, however, OMS of different companies differ from each other due to different experiences, the size of the company, the specifics of the country of operation and the presence of current problems. It is fair to note that there is no single correct OMS structure since each company must consider its own needs and its own specifics when developing its system. However, in general, the development and implementation of such systems contribute to improving the reliability, safety and efficiency of production operation activities. However, in general, the development and implementation of such systems facilitate the improvement of the reliability, safety and efficiency of production operation activities.

WITHWomen: User Centered Approach to the Design and Development of a suite of Intimate Partner Violence Screening and Safety Planning Web-Applications (Preprint)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia O'Campo ◽  
Alisa Velonis ◽  
Pearl Buhariwala ◽  
Janisha Kamalanathan ◽  
Maha Awaiz Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Partner Violence ◽  
Web Applications ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Safety Planning ◽  
Future Design ◽  
Mhealth Technology ◽  
The Right ◽  
Safe Access ◽  
Health Applications

BACKGROUND The popularity of mHealth technology has resulted in the development of numerous applications for almost every type of self-improvement or disease management. M- and e-health solutions for increasing awareness about and safety around partner violence is no exception. OBJECTIVE These applications allow women to control access to these resources and provide unlimited, and with the right design features, safe access when these resources are needed. Few applications, however, have been designed in close collaboration with intended users to ensure relevance and effectiveness. METHODS We report here on the design of a pair of evidence-based m- and e-health applications to facilitate early identification of unsafe relationship behaviors and tailored safety planning to reduce harm from violence including the methods by which we collaborated with and sought input from population of intended users. RESULTS The demographic characteristics of those who participated in the various surveys and interviews to inform the development of our screening and safety-decision support app are presented in (Table 2). CONCLUSIONS Finally, we share challenges we faced and lessons learned that might inform future design efforts of m- and e-health evidence-based applications.

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