Derivation of Diagnostic Requirements for a Distributed UAV Turbofan Engine Control System

Author(s):  
Olof Hannius ◽  
Dan Ring ◽  
Johan Karlsson

This paper presents a method for deriving requirements for the efficiency of diagnostic functions in distributed electronic turbofan engine control systems. Distributed engine control systems consist of sensor, actuator, and control unit nodes that exchange data over a communication network. The method is applicable to engine control systems that are partially redundant. Traditionally, turbofan engine control systems use dual channel solutions in which all units are duplicated. Our method is intended for analyzing the diagnostic requirements for systems in which a subset of the sensors and the actuators is nonredundant. Such systems rely on intelligent monitoring and analytical redundancy to detect and tolerate failures in the nonredundant units. These techniques cannot provide perfect diagnostic coverage and, hence, our method focuses on analyzing the impact of nonperfect diagnostic coverage on the reliability and safety of distributed engine control systems. The method is based on a probabilistic analysis that combines fault trees and Markov chains. The input parameters for these models include failure rates as well as several coverage factors that characterize the performance of the diagnostic functions. Since the use of intelligent monitoring can cause false alarms, i.e., an error is falsely indicated by a diagnostic function, the parameters also include a false alarm rate. The method was used to derive the diagnostic requirements for a hypothetical unmanned aerial vehicle engine control system. Given the requirement that an engine failure due to the control system is not allowed to occur more than ten times per million hours, the diagnostic functions in a node must achieve 99% error coverage for transient faults and 90–99% error coverage for permanent faults. The system-level diagnosis must achieve 90–95% detection coverage for node failures, which are not detected by the nodes themselves. These results are based on the assumption that transient faults are 100 times more frequent than permanent faults. It is important to have a method for deriving probabilistic requirements on diagnostic functions for engine control systems that rely on analytical redundancy as a means to reduce the hardware redundancy. The proposed method allows us to do this using an existing tool (FAULTTREE+) for safety and reliability analysis.

1987 ◽  
Vol 109 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Davies ◽  
R. W. Vizzini

The integration of aircraft control systems for future weapon systems will require the engine control system to meet the mission reliability of the flight control system. This will be accomplished through system redundancy and verified by accelerated environmental testing. Combined environment reliability testing (CERT) will assure control system structural integrity and reliability growth of engine-mounted digital electronic controls. Pratt & Whitney, under contract to the U.S. Navy, has recently completed a 10,000-hr CERT program. Dual full authority digital electronic controls (FADEC), connected by a fiber optic data link, were subjected to environmental tests simulating a composite F-14 mission profile. The FADEC units were also exposed to periodic high vibration levels which would be experienced after foreign object damage and salt spray testing to simulate aircraft carrier environment. The test results are reported herein providing insight not only into the reliability and durability of digital electronic controls but also into the equipment and procedures required for testing of future military and commercial engine control systems.


1988 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-32
Author(s):  
W. J. Davies ◽  
R. A. Baumbick ◽  
R. W. Vizzini

Advanced integrated flight and propulsion control systems may require the use of optic technology to provide enhanced electromagnetic immunity and reduced weight. Immunity to electromagnetic interference and pulses is required for integrated systems where flight and propulsion control systems communicate with each other and diverse systems located throughout a composite aircraft. Weight reduction is crucial to the complex engine control systems required for advanced engines incorporating diagnostics, variable geometry and vectoring/reversing exhaust nozzles. A team of Pratt & Whitney, McDonnell Aircraft, Hamilton Standard, and United Technologies Research Center have developed the conceptual design of an optic engine control system, under a contract from NASA Lewis, entitled Fiber Optic Control System Integration (FOCSI). FOCSI is a triservice/NASA joint program designed to provide the optic technology requirements for advanced fighter/attack aircraft.


Author(s):  
Wu Chi Hua ◽  
Fan Ding

In this paper, following viewes are expressed: (1). Introduction of partly physical simulation test about aero-engine control systems. (2). Several plans carried out for this test. (3). A real example of digital analogue hybrid partly physical simulation test.


Author(s):  
A. H. White ◽  
D. F. Wills

This paper summarizes the results of a 30-month program of design, fabrication, and test of an advanced electronic engine control system for small (2 to 5-lb/sec airflow) turboshaft engines. The objective of the program was to develop engine control system technology which would be implemented in future systems to meet advanced engine requirements and to alleviate many of the problems experienced with past and present control systems.


Author(s):  
Olof Hannius ◽  
Dan Ring ◽  
Johan Karlsson

This paper presents a method to derive the efficiency of diagnostic functions so that consistency with safety requirements is met. The method is applied to a distributed UAV engine control system, but could as well be applicable to any other mechatronic system. A control system architecture is proposed with a minimum of hardware redundancy for lowest cost and simple design. Efficient diagnostic functions (executable assertions in software) are used to detect and isolate errors. The goal is to completely recover from any transient error and reconfigure the system after a permanent error so that engine thrust remains unaffected. Given the requirement that an engine failure due to the control system is not allowed to occur more than 10 times per million hours, any permanent or transient error must be correctly handled with 99% certainty on node level and 90–95% on system level. The high error coverage figures are much driven by the assumption that a transient error occurs 1 time per 1000 hours in any control system node. The high number used for transient errors are due to the concern about Single Event Upsets (SEUs) that have become a dominating cause of errors in electronic equipment in flight applications.


2019 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 99-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morteza Montazeri-Gh ◽  
Ali Rasti ◽  
Ali Jafari ◽  
Milad Ehteshami

2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (16) ◽  
pp. 261-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai Pedersen ◽  
Jan Madsen ◽  
Morten Vejlgaard-Laursen

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