Being Deceived: Information Asymmetry in Second‐Order False Belief Tasks

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 504-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torben Braüner ◽  
Patrick Blackburn ◽  
Irina Polyanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Tasks

scholarly journals Worse Theory of Mind in Only-Children Compared to Children With Siblings and Its Intervention

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhuo Zhang ◽  
Haoxue Yu ◽  
Muyun Long ◽  
Hui Li
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Only Children ◽  
First Order ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Children First ◽  
Experimental Group

The purpose of this study was to explore theory of mind (ToM) differences in children with different birth orders (only-children, first-born children, and second-born children), and further explore the effect of cognitive verb training for only-children’s ToM. Adopting the paradigm of false belief, Study 1 was conducted in which a sample of 120 children aged 3–6, including first-born children, second-born children (siblings aged 1–13 years), and only-children were tested. The results showed that (1) children aged 3–6 had significantly higher scores on first-order false-belief than second-order false-belief. (2) Controlling for age, the only-children scored significantly lower than the first-born children. In Study 2, 28 only-children aged 4–5 (13 in the experimental group and 15 in the control group) who initially failed in false-belief tasks were trained with the cognitive verb animations. Significant post-training improvements were observed for only-children who received training of animations embedded with cognitive verb. Those findings indicated that ToM of only-children was significantly worse than first-born children of two-child families, and linguistic training could facilitate ToM of only-children whose ToM were at a disadvantage.

Predictions of Actions and Their Justifications in False-Belief Tasks: The Role of Executive Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Executive Function ◽  
Language Development ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Working Memory Capacity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Current Location ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Development Of Language

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.

scholarly journals Late, but not early, arriving younger siblings foster firstborns’ understanding of second-order false belief

2018 ◽  
Vol 166 ◽  
pp. 251-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy L. Paine ◽  
Holly Pearce ◽  
Stephanie H.M. van Goozen ◽  
Leo M.J. de Sonneville ◽  
Dale F. Hay
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief

scholarly journals Children’s first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task

Synthese ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 191 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Hollebrandse ◽  
Angeliek van Hout ◽  
Petra Hendriks
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Verbal Task ◽  
False Belief Reasoning ◽  
Belief Reasoning
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