scholarly journals Infants' performance in the indirect false belief tasks: A second‐person interpretation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Barone ◽  
Antoni Gomila
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
Second Person ◽  
False Belief Tasks

Predictions of Actions and Their Justifications in False-Belief Tasks: The Role of Executive Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Executive Function ◽  
Language Development ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Working Memory Capacity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Current Location ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Development Of Language

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.

False-Belief Tasks

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Rakoczy
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Tasks

Being Deceived: Information Asymmetry in Second‐Order False Belief Tasks

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 504-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torben Braüner ◽  
Patrick Blackburn ◽  
Irina Polyanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Tasks

Assessment of Theory of Mind in Adults: Beyond False Belief Tasks

2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 142-146
Author(s):  
Asmita Karmakar ◽  
Atanu Kumar Dogra
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Tasks

Theory of Mind

2019 ◽  
pp. 523-536
Author(s):  
Paula Rubio-Fernández
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Referential Communication ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Infants And Children ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Experimental Pragmatics ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Belief Reasoning

Current accounts of Theory of Mind development have tried to explain the results of false-belief tasks with infants and children, but failed to account for the evidence of early belief reasoning reported in the experimental pragmatics literature. This chapter reviews a number of studies on the acquisition of the mental state verb know; toddlers’ understanding of factivity (or the difference between knowing and thinking); early referential communication and toddlers’ reliance on others’ engagement as a proxy for their knowledge, and the emergence of preschoolers’ understanding of the seeing-knowing relation. The results of these studies reveal a more nuanced picture than those of false-belief tasks, with some Theory of Mind abilities emerging earlier in conversation than in laboratory tasks, while children’s epistemic theories continue to develop beyond their passing of standard Theory of Mind tasks.

Executive functions and performance on false belief tasks

1997 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Tager‐Flusberg ◽  
Kate Sullivan ◽  
Jenea Boshart
Keyword(s):  
Executive Functions ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
And Performance
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