Semantic Externalism and Knowing Our Own Minds: Ignoring Twin-Earth and Doing Naturalistic Philosophy

Theoria ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Boyd
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Naturalistic Philosophy

scholarly journals Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Haukioja ◽  
mons nyquist ◽  
Jussi Jylkkä
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Standard Samples ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Degree Of Similarity

Following the influential thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and others, philosophers of language have for the most part adopted semantic externalism concerning natural kind terms. In this paper, we present results from three experiments on the reference of natural kind terms. Our results confirm some standard externalist assumptions, but are in conflict with others: ordinary speakers take both appearance and underlying nature to be central in their categorization judgments. Moreover, our results indicate that speakers’ categorization judgments are gradual, and proportional to the degree of similarity between new samples and familiar, “standard” samples. These findings pose problems for traditional theories, both externalist and internalist.

scholarly journals Folk intuitions about reference change and the causal theory of reference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Wiegmann ◽  
Steffen Koch
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Historical View ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Folk Intuitions

In this paper, we present and discuss the findings of two experiments about reference change. Cases of reference change have sometimes been invoked to challenge traditional versions of semantic externalism, but the relevant cases have never been tested empirically. The experiments we have conducted use variants of the famous Twin Earth scenario to test folk intuitions about whether natural kind terms such as ‘water’ or ‘salt’ switch reference after being constantly (mis)applied to different kinds. Our results indicate that this is indeed so. We argue that this finding is evidence against Saul Kripke’s causal-historical view of reference, and at least provisional evidence in favor of the causal source view of reference as suggested by Gareth Evans and Michael Devitt.

Presentationalism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matti Eklund
Keyword(s):  
Twin Earth ◽  
Moral Twin Earth

This chapter explores the view—“presentationalism”—that normative sentences and propositions are mind-independently true, but what they represent is not normative. There are no normative properties or facts. This view, whatever in the end its fate, combines attractive features of realism and antirealism. The view is curiously absent from prominent accounts of the theoretical options. The possibility of a view like this problematizes important arguments in the literature, for example certain arguments for non-naturalism, and shows that one must be careful to distinguish between normative facts and normative truths. Toward the end of the chapter, I consider whether the Moral Twin Earth arguments present problems for the view.

Two Substantively Moorean Responses and the Project of Refuting Skepticism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith DeRose
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Brain In A Vat

In this chapter, substantive Mooreanism, according to which one does know that one is not a brain in a vat, is explained, and two main varieties of it are distinguished. Contextualist Mooreanism, (a) on which it is only claimed that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat according to ordinary standards for knowledge, and (b) on which one seeks to defeat bold skepticism (according to which one doesn’t know simple, seemingly obvious truths about the external world, even by ordinary standards for knowledge), is contrasted with Putnam-style responses, on which one seeks to refute the skeptic, utilizing semantic externalism. Problems with the Putnam-style attempt to refute skepticism are identified, and then, more radically, it is argued that in important ways, such a refutation of skepticism would not have provided an adequate response to skepticism even if it could have been accomplished.

Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self‐Knowledge

2000 ◽  
pp. 285-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian P. McLaughlin ◽  
Michael Tye
Keyword(s):  
Twin Earth ◽  
Self Knowledge

Disagreement, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics

2020 ◽  
pp. 14-52
Author(s):  
Billy Dunaway
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Moral Twin Earth

Moral Twin Earth thought experiments appear to show that practical language is highly stable, and that many possible users of practical language are capable of having genuine disagreements with each other. This chapter clarifies a tempting generalization of this idea, which is that the members of every pair of possible users of moral language are capable of having a genuine disagreement. This is the Universal Disagreement thesis. It then shows how this thesis can be adapted to a contextualist semantics for ‘ought’ and other practical terms. It concludes by arguing that, for the realist, the central explanatory target is a claim about the stability of practical language.

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