Strength in numbers: The forces of constituency size, legislator identity, and institutional position on veterans’ representation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsey Cormack
Keyword(s):  
1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 997-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Marvin Overby ◽  
Beth M. Henschen ◽  
Michael H. Walsh ◽  
Julie Strauss

The increasing public attention paid to Supreme Court nominations has elevated the salience of Senate confirmation battles, raising interesting questions about the impact of constituency preferences on senators' voting behavior. In this article, we explore this relationship using a logistical regression model to examine the impacts of African-American constituency size and the proximity of reelection on the roll call behavior of senators on the Clarence Thomas confirmation vote. Our analyses indicate that these factors were both statistically and substantively significant in the Thomas case. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of such findings.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rikhil R. Bhavnani

Malapportionment doubly penalizes people from relatively large electoral districts or constituencies by under-representing them in the legislature and in the political executive or cabinet. The latter effect has not been studied. This article develops theoretical reasons for large constituency disadvantage in the cabinet formation process, and tests them using a new repeated cross-sectional dataset on elections and cabinet formation in India’s states, from 1977–2007. A one-standard-deviation increase in relative constituency size is associated with a 22 per cent fall in the probability of a constituency’s representative being in the cabinet. Malapportionment affects cabinet inclusion by causing large parties to focus on winning relatively small constituencies. These effects are likely to hold in parliamentary systems, and in other contexts where the legislature influences cabinet inclusion.


2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 269
Author(s):  
Edward L. Lascher
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
George S. Ford ◽  
Mark Thornton ◽  
Marc Ulrich

Abstract The growth of government has long been a core issue of public economics with a vast array of hypotheses offered and empirical investigations conducted. One key element of this quest, with respect to democratic governments, has been the size of the legislature which is seen increasing, decreasing, or neutral with respect to the growth of government. We argue that the inconclusive empirical results are the result of a misspecification and that instead of legislature size, it is constituency size that matters and that the larger the constituency size, the more government grows because of poorer representation. We test this hypothesis using the case of the United Kingdom over the 20th century and find that constituency size is positively related to the growth of government.


2009 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Borisyuk ◽  
C. Rallings ◽  
M. Thrasher ◽  
R. Johnston
Keyword(s):  

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