The Effect of Political Parties on the Distribution of Income in the American States: 1917-2011

2018 ◽  
Vol 99 (3) ◽  
pp. 895-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Widestrom ◽  
Thomas J. Hayes ◽  
Christopher Dennis
1991 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Gray ◽  
David Lowery

ABSTRACTThis paper extends previous analyses of industrial policy from a corporatist perspective. We advocate a mid-level measure of group influence; the measure is based upon analysis of newspaper stories. A preliminary exploration of NewsBank data is reported, and several interesting trends in economic development policy are isolated. Business and education are heavily involved in policymaking whereas labor and political parties are not at all involved. On the whole, a meso-corporatist model in which business, state government, and education are partners seems to fit better than a business capture model. Some speculations are offered about this new American form of corporatism and its resemblance to the Japanese case.


1983 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 691-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel C. Patterson ◽  
Gregory A. Caldeira

In this inquiry, we focus upon the question, “Why are political parties more competitive in some states than they are in others?” We have measured partisan competition as the closeness between the two major political parties in the results of state-level elections, and we have chosen to analyze elections in American states in the 1970s. To account for variations among the states on the dimension of partisan competitiveness, we formulate and present four discrete lines of reasoning—including socio-demographics, urbanization, diversity, and the strength of party organizations. We test each of these avenues of explanation in turn, always taking into account the watershed between North and South in partisan competition. The results vindicate the utility of our general approach, although we do find that each of the four modes of explanation is wanting in some respect. In a full-blown multivariate context, we report that educational levels and urbanization do influence variations among states in partisan competition. Equally compelling and perhaps more interesting, the strength and activism of local party organizations in the states profoundly affect political competitiveness, even when we take stark regional differences into consideration.


Author(s):  
Dylan L. Yingling ◽  
Daniel J. Mallinson

Background: Though evidence-based policy (EBP) has attracted considerable attention from the public, academics, and governments, prior studies have revealed little about how political parties, institutions, and policy context shape the adoption and implementation of these policies in the American states.Aims and objectives: Develop objective criteria for measuring these policies, as well as a hierarchy which describes the features that make some policies more advanced. This paper presents the first comprehensive study on EBP in the American states.Methods: Using assessments by the Pew and MacArthur foundations to measure EBP in the states for four topics: criminal justice, juvenile justice, behavioural health, and child welfare. Assess the relationship between EBP use and state political and institutional factors.Results: Democratic governors, Republican legislatures, state innovativeness are significant predictors of EBP engagement.Discussion and conclusions: This research makes a substantial contribution to the study of EBP and opens new avenues for future research on the political, cultural, and institutional factors that influence EBP adoption and implementation. In an era of extreme partisanship, our study finds that EBP is a policy niche where actors and institutions across political parties use research evidence to inform effective and efficient policies in ways that maximise the electoral incentives that such policies can offer.


1976 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley D. Hopper

V. O. Key’s proposition that one-party politics in the American states has been destructive of both the dominant and minor parties in such systems fits California’s political experience very nicely. From 1893 to 1932 California Republicans captured almost all statewide offices and they maintained huge legislative majorities. Furthermore, both parties entered the 1930’s with little institutionalized capacity for performing the basic nominating and campaigning functions. It appears, therefore, that the notorious weakness of political parties in California could be accounted for in terms of Key’s theories of the debilitating impact of one-party politics. Understandably, however, this line of speculation raises questions in the minds of those students of California politics who are aware of the several studies that particularly credit crossfiling for the weakness of California parties at mid-century. Consequently, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate the relationship between intensity of interparty competition and crossfiling in California politics during the first half of this century. In establishing this relationship, this study first shows that crossfiling did not become a general practice until after the end of California’s one-party era (1893-1932). The analysis then goes on to demonstrate that, during the one-party 1920’s, crossfiling occurred more often in the relatively competitive areas of the state than in the most profoundly one-party areas. Finally, a deviant case analysis develops the correspondence between the incidence of successful crossfiling (winning both parties’ primaries) and the relative competitiveness of types of offices.


2013 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 552-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Rigby ◽  
Gerald C. Wright

Author(s):  
Mark D. Brewer ◽  
Jeffrey M. Stonecash
Keyword(s):  

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