What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?

Ratio ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 322-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline T. Arruda
Keyword(s):  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

scholarly journals Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation

Philosophia ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 1345-1364
Author(s):  
Adam R. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

scholarly journals Colloquium 2 How to Argue about Aristotle about Practical Reason

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-58
Author(s):  
Giles Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

Abstract In this paper, I consider Aristotle’s views in relation to the Humean theory of motivation (HTM). I distinguish three principles which HTM is committed to: the ‘No Besires’ principle, the ‘Motivation Out—Desire In’ principle, and the ‘Desire Out—Desire In’ principle. To reject HTM, one only needs to reject one of these principles. I argue that while it is plausible to think that Aristotle accepts the first two principles, there are some grounds for thinking that he might reject the third.

Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-490
Author(s):  
CAROLINE T. ARRUDA
Keyword(s):  
Moral Status ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Humean Theory Of Motivation ◽  
Humean Theory ◽  
Judgment Internalism ◽  
Theory Of Motivation

AbstractI show that an overlooked feature of our moral life—moral status—provides a route to vindicating naturalist moral realism in much the same way that the Humean theory of motivation and judgment internalism are used to undermine it. Moral status presents two explanatory burdens for metaethical views. First, a given view must provide an ecumenical explanation of moral status, which does not depend on the truth of its metaethical claims (say, that there are mind-independent facts about moral status). Second, its explanation must be consistent with persistent normative ethical disagreement about what constitutes moral status. I conclude that naturalist moral realism succeeds, while quasi-realism fails because it cannot meet the latter requirement. This argument has three results: we have a new route for metaethical vindication more generally and for naturalist moral realism in particular; quasi-realism's plausibility is undermined by an inability to explain disagreement, but not for the familiar reasons.

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