Tractable Compensation Plan under Asymmetric Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 1212-1218
Author(s):  
Ruina Yang ◽  
Yinhua Mai ◽  
Chung‐Yee Lee ◽  
Chung‐Piaw Teo
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Compensation Plan

scholarly journals The Quota-Based Compensation Plan in Fashion Retailing Industry under Asymmetric Information

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingzhu Yu ◽  
Ruina Yang ◽  
Lijun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Compensation Plan ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selling Effort ◽  
Production Decision

We study a compensation plan problem in the fashion retailing industry, which involves a risk-neutral fashion retailer and a risk-neutral salesperson, in a two-stage game framework with asymmetric information. In the first stage, the fashion retailer provides a menu of compensation plans to the salesperson who decides which plan to sign based on his superior market demand information. Confronted with the asymmetric demand information, the fashion retailer could observe market information from the salesperson's response by designing a menu of compensation plans rather than a single one to the salesperson. In the second stage, the fashion retailer then makes production decision and the salesperson determines his selling effort. We consider both adverse selection and moral hazard. We adopt the quota-based plan to derive the fashion retailer’s optimal compensation plan design and the salesperson's best response. We emphasize the impact of the quota level on the system outcomes. The results reveal that a higher quota level is disadvantageous to the fashion retailer but advantageous to the salespersons.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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