scholarly journals Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 192-204
Author(s):  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Conservatism

Psychic Phenomena and the Existence of God

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl
Keyword(s):  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Meta Analyses

This chapter applies the conclusions of the previous chapters to two cases of controversial belief: atheistic belief and the denial of psychic phenomena (psi). In both cases, in line with so-called “phenomenal conservatism,” the felt obviousness—to the denier—of the non-existence of what they’re denying figures large in their knowledge, if they have it. In both cases, the deniers’ knowledge runs up counterarguments—for example, the fine tuning argument or meta-analyses of a number of controlled studies that purport to demonstrate the existence of psychic phenomena. But these arguments need not destroy knowledge, even if the atheist or psi-denier can’t figure out what’s wrong with those arguments. Knowledge can survive precisely because some atheists and psi-deniers lack sufficient methodological expertise, though it’s crucial that there is no consensus of trustworthy experts offering testimony that the counterarguments are sound.

scholarly journals Against Phenomenal Conservatism

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 213-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Hanna
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Conservatism

scholarly journals Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-Defeat

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moti Mizrahi ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Conservatism

scholarly journals Phenomenal Conservatism, Reflection and Self-Defeat

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julien Beillard ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Conservatism

Towards a Broader Construal of Evidence

2020 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-139
Author(s):  
Frederick D. Aquino ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Informal Approach

John Henry Newman’s philosophical reflection on the nature of faith and its relation to evidence is fascinating, complex, and slightly misleading; yet it shows constructive promise. In particular, I argue that his broader construal of reason should concomitantly play out in a broader construal of evidence. Accordingly, I show how Newman’s distinction between different modes of reasoning informs his understanding of the relationship between faith and evidence. I conclude with three areas that deserve further epistemological attention and development: namely, a more expansive construal of evidence in light of Newman’s broader account of reason, a more constructive understanding of the relationship between his cumulative, though informal, approach and natural theology, and whether his account of faith and evidence operates with a kind of phenomenal conservatism.

An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism

Erkenntnis ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 82 (6) ◽  
pp. 1381-1390
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Conservatism

scholarly journals Religious experience and the probability of theism: comments on Swinburne

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPH JÄGER
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Religious Experience ◽  
Prior Probability ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
Religious Experiences ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Rival Hypothesis

AbstractI discuss the role of religious experience in Richard Swinburne's probabilistic case for theism. Swinburne draws on his principle of credulity to argue that, if in addition to other evidence we consider that many people have theistic religious experiences, theism comes out as more probable than not. However, on many plausible probability assignments for the relevant non-experiential evidence, the conditional probability of theism already converges towards 1. Moreover, an argument analogous to a general Bayesian argument against phenomenal conservatism suggests that, after we take account of evidence from religious experience, the probability of theism cannot be greater than the prior probability that the best rival hypothesis is false. I conclude that these observations are compatible with what Swinburne would call ‘weak rational belief’ in theism and that such weak belief can be strong enough for rational faith.

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