The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stoljar
Keyword(s):  
Regress Objection

The False Guarantee and Regress Objections

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  
The Third ◽  
Descriptive Property ◽  
Regress Objection

This chapter argues that if normative predicates ascribe descriptive properties, there must be something that makes it the case that a certain normative predicate ascribes a certain descriptive property. It then considers three assumptions that reductive realists could make about what makes this the case. It argues that if they make the first assumption, their view runs into the false guarantee objection. It argues that if they make the second assumption, their view runs into the regress objection. And it argues that if reductive realists make the third assumption, this returns them to the choice between the first two assumptions. The chapter concludes that if there are normative properties, these properties are not identical to descriptive properties.

scholarly journals The Theistic Argument from Beauty: A Philonian Critique

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 149-158
Author(s):  
Brian Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Natural World ◽  
Design Argument ◽  
Theistic Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Regress Objection ◽  
Divine Beauty

In this paper I consider an understudied form of the design argument which focuses on the beauty of the natural world and which argues, on that basis, that the world requires a divine Artist in order to explain its beauty. Against this view, one might raise a question concerning the beauty of, and in, this divine Artist. What explains the divine beauty? This kind of explanatory regress objection is exactly like that used by Philo in Hume’s Dialogues to undercut standard versions of the design argument focused on the orderliness of the world. Here I argue that Philo’s explanatory regress objection likewise significantly undercuts versions of the design argument focusing on the beauty of the world.

scholarly journals Why We Should Take Moral Uncertainty Seriously

2020 ◽  
pp. 11-38
Author(s):  
William MacAskill ◽  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
Toby Ord
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Significant Issue ◽  
Moral Uncertainty ◽  
Regress Objection

In this chapter we introduce the topic of moral uncertainty, argue that moral uncertainty is a real and significant issue, and argue that there are non-trivial answers to the question, ‘Given that we are morally uncertain, how ought we to act in light of that uncertainty?’ In particular, we argue that there is an answer to the question of what a morally conscientious agent rationally should do when she is morally uncertain. We shall also consider and defend against some recent objections to the very project of trying to develop an account of decision-making under moral uncertainty: we’ll call these the fetishism objection; the regress objection; the blameworthiness objection; the conscientiousness objection; and the disanalogy with prudence objection.

Further Views

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Kantian Constructivism ◽  
Regress Objection

This chapter discusses several further views about normative judgements and properties. It argues that cognitivist expressivism and descriptive fictionalism face the symmetry objection, that Kantian constructivism faces a version of the regress objection, that Humean constructivism faces the false guarantee objection, that Kantian constitutivism faces either the reduction argument or the false guarantee and regress objections, and that quietism faces the symmetry objection. The chapter then considers different views about what makes a judgement or property normative, and explains how the book’s arguments are compatible with all of these views. It ends by showing that the conclusions of the previous chapters entail that the error theory is true.

scholarly journals Asymmetry cannot solve the circularity/regress problem of property structuralism

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralf Busse
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Relational Structure ◽  
Metaphysical Necessity ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Graph Theoretic ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Regress Objection ◽  
Fundamental Physical ◽  
Dispositional Properties

AbstractStrong dispositional monism (SDM), the position that all fundamental physical properties consist in dispositional relations to other properties, is naturally construed as property structuralism. J. Lowe’s circularity/regress objection (CRO) constitutes a serious challenge to SDM that questions the possibility of a purely relational determination of all property essences. The supervenience thesis of A. Bird’s graph-theoretic asymmetry reply to CRO can be rigorously proved. Yet the reply fails metaphysically, because it reveals neither a metaphysical determination of identities on a purely relational basis nor a determination specifically of identities in the sense of essences. Asymmetry is thus not by itself sufficient for a solution to CRO. But it cannot even help to answer CRO when a model for the determination of essences is taken as a basis. Nor is asymmetry necessary for a reply, as property structures may well be symmetric. A metaphysics of dispositional properties as grounded in a purely relational structure faces serious obstacles, and the properties would not be fundamental. Since essence and grounding are notions of metaphysical priority, there can be no essentially dispositional metaphysically fundamental properties, and the prospects of a “coherentist” metaphysics of basic properties are dim. A modal retreat that refrains from a post-modal conception of essence and simply claims that fundamental properties play dispositional roles by metaphysical necessity is unsatisfactory.

A Regress Objection to Thagard’s Theory of Deductive Coherence

Erkenntnis ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 80 (5) ◽  
pp. 975-986
Author(s):  
Mathieu Beirlaen
Keyword(s):  
Regress Objection

scholarly journals Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities

Erkenntnis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Standard Version ◽  
Powerful Qualities ◽  
Canonical Version ◽  
Regress Objection ◽  
Rival View

AbstractThe powerful qualities view of properties is currently enjoying a surge in popularity. Recently, I have argued that the standard version of the view (associated with C.B. Martin and John Heil) is no different from a rival view: the pure powers position. I have also argued that the canonical version of the powerful qualities view faces the same problem as the pure powers view: the dreaded regress objection. Joaquim Giannotti disagrees. First, Giannotti thinks that the standard version of the powerful qualities view can be differentiated from the pure powers view. Second, Giannotti argues that the powerful qualities view is not susceptible to the regress objection. Third, he argues that there is another reasonable version of the powerful qualities view available, which makes use of the notion of ‘aspects’. In this note, I respond to Giannotti. I argue that all three of Giannotti’s arguments are unsuccessful.

ACCESSIBILISM DEFINED

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hatcher
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Regress Objection

ABSTRACTAccessibilism is a version of epistemic internalism on which justification is determined by what is accessible to the subject. I argue that misunderstandings of accessibilism have hinged on a failure to appreciate an ambiguity in the phrase ‘what is accessible to the subject’. I first show that this phrase may either refer to the very things accessible to the subject, or instead to the facts about which things are accessible to her. I then discuss Ralph Wedgwood's (2002: 350–2) argument that accessibilism absurdly implies that an infinite regress of facts, each more complex than the last, must be accessible to the subject. I show that this regress objection only threatens the ‘very things’ disambiguation of accessibilism, not the ‘facts about’ disambiguation. After this, I discuss the relationships between the motivations for accessibilism and these two disambiguations. We will see that these motivations appear to support each disambiguation. But I will argue this appearance depends on a mistake. Just as only the ‘facts about’ disambiguation escapes the regress objection, it is also the only disambiguation which enjoys genuine support from the motivations for accessibilism. For these reasons, I recommend that future discussions of accessibilism focus on the ‘facts about’ disambiguation.

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