God and gratuitous evil (Part II)

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 913-922 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaas J. Kraay
Keyword(s):  
Gratuitous Evil

C. S. Lewis & John Hick on Theodicy: Superficially Similar but Significantly Different

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28
Author(s):  
Brian M. Williams
Keyword(s):  
John Hick ◽  
Broad Category ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Greater Good

In the April 2014 edition of The Journal of Inklings Studies, Mark S. M. Scott compared the theodicies of C. S. Lewis and John Hick, concluding that there are ‘significant structural and substantive affinities’ between the two. In my essay, I too analyze these theodicies but arrive at a different conclusion. I argue two points: First, I argue that Lewis’ and Hick’s theodicies bear merely superficial similarities. Second, and more importantly, I argue that they stand in significant opposition to one another at fundamental points. The purpose of this essay is to set Lewis’ views on suffering apart from Hick’s and to suggest that, in the end, perhaps Lewis’ theodicy should not be included in the broad category of ‘greater-good’ theodicies, and would therefore be immune to attacks leveled against Hick’s theodicy as well as the various attacks leveled against the greater-good approach in general. For those who reject the greater-good approach and who hold that gratuitous evil does not count against God’s moral perfection, Lewis’ theodicy could serve as a helpful starting point from which one could develop more thoroughly a non-greater-good theodicy.

scholarly journals How to Solve the Problem of Evil

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 442-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mooney ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.

God and Gratuitous Evil

2019 ◽  
pp. 54-67
Author(s):  
William Hasker
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Problem Of Evil

In Chapter 3 of this volume, Klaas Kraay presented a critique of William Hasker’s necessity-of-gratuitous-evil defense against the evidential problem of evil (the NGE defense). Hasker’s response here in Chapter 4 contends that the defense survives all of Kraay’s objections. Most important of these objections is the contention that there is far too much gratuitous evil to be accounted for by Hasker’s defense.

Gratuitous evil and divine providence

2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN R. RHODA
Keyword(s):  
Divine Providence ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractDiscussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of ‘gratuitous evil’ that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how plausibly they can resist it. I then assess the four models, concluding that theists are better off vis-à-vis the evidential argument if they reject meticulous providence.

scholarly journals Chrzan on Necessary Gratuitous Evil

1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Hasker ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Gratuitous Evil

Anti-Theism, Pro-Theism, and Gratuitous Evil

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-369
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
The World

Ebrahim Azadegan recently argues that personal anti-theism, the view that it’s rational for a particular individual to prefer that God not exist, is a form of gratuitous evil. He justifies this evil by arguing that the anti-theist is uniquely positioned to bargain, implore, and plea to God. I argue that Azadegan faces a paradox. Once the anti-theist recognizes that God plus anti-theism makes the world better, she should convert to pro-theism. But then there can be no reflective anti-theists who could add value to the world. Ignorance is a requirement of the anti-theist who can offer these unique goods.

On Necessary Gratuitous Evils

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Michael James Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Gratuitous Evil ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Standard Position ◽  
State Of Affairs

The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings.

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