scholarly journals Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 846-856 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Henry Collin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism ◽  
Semantic Inferentialism

Abduction, Imagination, and Science

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-345
Author(s):  
Michael DeVito ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Abductive Reasoning ◽  
Central Component ◽  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

In this essay, I argue that developments in Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism—specifically, Thomas Crisp’s argument against a naturalistic metaphysics—have likely undermined the project of science for naturalists who are scientific realists. Scientific theorizing requires the use of abductive reasoning. A central component of abductive reasoning is the use of one’s imagination. However, Crisp’s argument provides us reason to doubt the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties as it relates to the imaginative abilities necessary for complex abductive reasoning.

BIBLICAL AND THEISTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT AGAINST NATURALISM

Zygon® ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Petteri Nieminen ◽  
Maarten Boudry ◽  
Esko Ryökäs ◽  
Anne-Mari Mustonen
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Does Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism work?

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-83
Author(s):  
WANG-YEN LEE
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Faculties ◽  
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

AbstractIn Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN), he contends that someone who holds both naturalism (N) and evolution (E) acquires an undefeated defeater for her belief that ‘human cognitive faculties are reliable’ (R) and as a result an undefeated defeater for everything else she believes when she comes to realize that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable. I argue for two theses in this paper. First, when a naturalist-evolutionist comes to think that P(R/N&E) is inscrutable, that does not constitute an undefeated defeater for her belief that R if her original grounds for believing R are something other than an assessment of P(R/N&E). Second, even if she acquires an undefeated defeater for her belief that R when she comes to think that P(R/N&E) is inscrutable, it does not follow that she has a defeater for all her other beliefs. The main contribution lies in my response to Plantinga's attempt to resist my second thesis.

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