scholarly journals The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 731-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Phenomenology

Quality and Content

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Phenomenal Concept ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Modal Argument ◽  
Demonstrative Thought ◽  
Naturalistic Theory ◽  
Phenomenal Concept Strategy ◽  
The One

The papers presented in this volume cover topics, such as the “phenomenal concept strategy,” to defend materialism from anti-materialist intuitions, the doctrine of representationalism about phenomenal character, the modal argument against materialism, the nature of demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology. On the one hand, I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot work and that representationalism has certain fatal flaws, at least if it’s to be joined to a materialist metaphysics. On the other, I defend materialism from the modal argument, arguing that it relies on a questionable conflation of semantic and metaphysical issues. I also provide a naturalistic theory of demonstrative thought, criticizing certain philosophical arguments involving that notion in the process. I argue as well that the peculiarly subjective nature of secondary qualities provides a window into the nature of the relation between phenomenal character and intentional content, and conclude that relation involves a robust notion of acquaintance.

Cognitive Phenomenology and Indirect Sense

Metaphysica ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley Richards
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Content ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology

AbstractAcquaintance with the non-sensory cognitive phenomenology of a given intentional content can act as a Fregean sense presenting that content. This provides (i) a mechanism for acquaintance with (a kind of) sense, (ii) a sense that is subject and context invariant, and (iii) a mechanism for the immediate presentation of a referent. This kind of sense can be used to defend

Centres without Sensibility

2020 ◽  
pp. 118-123
Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri
Keyword(s):  
Eleventh Century ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Virtual Subject

A fundamental claim in Pessoa’s philosophy is that selves are grounded in fields of experience. What, though, if there are no sensations? This very possibility, which seems at first sight to be wholly unavailable to Pessoa, is exactly what is countenanced by the eleventh-century Central Asian philosopher Avicenna. Avicenna says that one can imagine a human being who is created out of nothing flying through the air but having no sensory perceptions. However, there is a phenomenological field, and so a type of centrality, available even to the flying man. A positional conception of self can be grounded in the centrality of a purely cognitive phenomenology. If a purely cognitive landscape of presence is a possibility, then so too is a virtual subject, a heteronym, whose manner of experiencing is purely cognitive.

On the Limits of the Method of Phenomenal Contrast

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTINA FÜRST
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
First Person ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
The Face ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

ABSTRACT:The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate aboutcognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation of the method's dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on first-person performances of phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical standoff in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.

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