Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague

The papers presented in this volume cover topics, such as the “phenomenal concept strategy,” to defend materialism from anti-materialist intuitions, the doctrine of representationalism about phenomenal character, the modal argument against materialism, the nature of demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology. On the one hand, I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot work and that representationalism has certain fatal flaws, at least if it’s to be joined to a materialist metaphysics. On the other, I defend materialism from the modal argument, arguing that it relies on a questionable conflation of semantic and metaphysical issues. I also provide a naturalistic theory of demonstrative thought, criticizing certain philosophical arguments involving that notion in the process. I argue as well that the peculiarly subjective nature of secondary qualities provides a window into the nature of the relation between phenomenal character and intentional content, and conclude that relation involves a robust notion of acquaintance.

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Conscious thinking and cognitive phenomenology: topics, views and future developments

Philosophical Explorations ◽

10.1080/13869795.2016.1176230 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 95-113 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Marta Jorba ◽

Dermot Moran

Keyword(s):

Cognitive Phenomenology ◽

Future Developments ◽

Conscious Thinking

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Cognitive Phenomenology and Indirect Sense

Metaphysica ◽

10.1515/mp-2015-0002 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Bradley Richards

Keyword(s):

Intentional Content ◽

Cognitive Phenomenology

AbstractAcquaintance with the non-sensory cognitive phenomenology of a given intentional content can act as a Fregean sense presenting that content. This provides (i) a mechanism for acquaintance with (a kind of) sense, (ii) a sense that is subject and context invariant, and (iii) a mechanism for the immediate presentation of a referent. This kind of sense can be used to defend

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Think Twice, It’s All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self / trans. from English V. A. Sermaksheva

Omsk Scientific Bulletin Series Society History Modernity ◽

10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-4-124-129 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 6 (4) ◽

pp. 124-129

Author(s):

V. A. Sermaksheva ◽

Keyword(s):

The Self ◽

Stream Of Consciousness ◽

Single Animal ◽

Human Animal ◽

Tim Bayne

According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases – cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity – are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne’s arguments are flawed, and that animalism is capable of handling the case.

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Centres without Sensibility

Virtual Subjects, Fugitive Selves ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198864684.003.0016 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 118-123

Author(s):

Jonardon Ganeri

Keyword(s):

Eleventh Century ◽

Human Being ◽

Cognitive Phenomenology ◽

Central Asian ◽

Virtual Subject

A fundamental claim in Pessoa’s philosophy is that selves are grounded in fields of experience. What, though, if there are no sensations? This very possibility, which seems at first sight to be wholly unavailable to Pessoa, is exactly what is countenanced by the eleventh-century Central Asian philosopher Avicenna. Avicenna says that one can imagine a human being who is created out of nothing flying through the air but having no sensory perceptions. However, there is a phenomenological field, and so a type of centrality, available even to the flying man. A positional conception of self can be grounded in the centrality of a purely cognitive phenomenology. If a purely cognitive landscape of presence is a possibility, then so too is a virtual subject, a heteronym, whose manner of experiencing is purely cognitive.

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