THE PARADOX OF PERFORMANCE REGIMES: STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO TARGET REGIMES IN CHINESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT

2015 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 1152-1167 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIAYUAN LI
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
YIYAO HE

This paper constructs a DSGE model to study the relationship between the Chinese local government’s land policy, social welfare and economic fluctuations. I find that increasing the supply of residential land by the local government will reduce housing price and increase social welfare, but it crowds out the amount of industrial land and decreases final output and social welfare as well. This trade-off brings out an optimal supply ratio of residential land, 40%, in deterministic steady-state equilibrium. Besides, the local government is able to use dynamic pro-cyclical residential land supply policy to dampen economic fluctuations in China’s macroeconomy.


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