Resignation as Promotion? Executive Turnover and Early Departures in the Argentine Congress, 1983–2017

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Lucardi ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Natán Skigin
Keyword(s):  
Executive Turnover

Executive Turnover and Outside Directors on Two-Tiered Boards

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 158-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Balsmeier ◽  
Achim Buchwald ◽  
Alexander Dilger
Keyword(s):  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Outside Directors

The Economic Consequences of Financial Misreporting: Evidence from Employee Perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinghua Gao ◽  
Yonghong Jia
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Employee Turnover ◽  
Labor Demand ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Employee Perspective ◽  
Financial Misreporting ◽  
Employee Tenure

This study investigates the economic consequences of financial misreporting from the employee perspective. Specifically, we examine two employee reactions: (1) exiting from misreporting firms and (2) reducing holding of employer stock, in both the misreporting period and the post-restatement period. We find an increase in employee turnover and a decrease in employee holding of employer stock in the post-restatement period (restatement effect) and some evidence that employees start to react in the period of misreporting (misreporting effect). We also find some evidence that the misreporting effect varies with employee tenure in the misreporting period and the restatement effect varies with the severity of misreporting in the post-restatement period. We further show that our results are not driven by labor demand, increased likelihood of executive turnover, declining stock prices, internal control weakness disclosure, and poor firm performance.

Non-Electoral Executive Turnover and Low-Capacity Democracy in Southern Africa

2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-215
Author(s):  
Nathan Munier
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Southern Africa ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
Dominant Parties ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Insight Into

What do non-electoral turnovers tell us about the relationship between elections, executive turnover, and democratisation? Can they contribute to democratisation? To gain insight into these questions, we consider the experiences of Southern Africa. While transfers of executive authority have become commonplace in Southern Africa, they do not necessarily coincide with elections and rarely involve partisan turnover. Neither the mode nor the form of executive turnover corresponds clearly with prior assessments of democracy. This study examines recent non-electoral turnovers in Zimbabwe (November 2017), South Africa (February 2018), and Botswana (April 2018). This research finds that non-electoral transfers of presidential authority in Southern Africa represent efforts by dominant parties to manage factional conflicts and enhance their ability to benefit from incumbency in competitive elections. While non-electoral turnover in executive authority might promote democracy under some conditions, they do more to sustain dominant party rule and a stagnate level of low-capacity democracy.

Changes at the Top: The Antecedents of Executive Turnover and Succession

2008 ◽  
pp. 164-197
Author(s):  
Sydney Finkelstein ◽  
Donald C. Hambrick ◽  
Albert A. Cannella
Keyword(s):  
Executive Turnover

Executive Turnover and the Investigation of Former Leaders in New Democracies

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292090564
Author(s):  
Donna Bahry ◽  
Young Hun Kim
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Limited Impact ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Elected Leaders ◽  
Leadership Turnover

What prompts governments in new democracies to investigate elected leaders once they leave office? Theorizing about democratic regimes suggests that leadership turnover by constitutional means should generate few such cases: democratic entry to and exit from office are thought to prompt benign treatment from successor administrations. Yet over a third of democratically elected presidents and prime ministers who left office between 1970 and 2011 have faced investigations for malfeasance. This study analyzes the conditions that generate such cases. We find that the odds of investigation rise when there is strong evidence of former leaders’ personal culpability; but also when the executive regime is presidential, and the judiciary lacks independence from other branches. Partisanship has a more limited impact: co-partisanship with the incumbent reduces the odds of investigation for ex-prime ministers, but sharing a party label with an incumbent offers no such protection to a former president.

Go your own way: Exploring the causes of top executive turnover

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (7) ◽  
pp. 1151-1168
Author(s):  
Joel L. Andrus ◽  
Michael C. Withers ◽  
Stephen H. Courtright ◽  
Steven Boivie
Keyword(s):  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Top Executive

Corporate litigation and executive turnover

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 268-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Aharony ◽  
Chelsea Liu ◽  
Alfred Yawson
Keyword(s):  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Corporate Litigation

Determinants and Market Consequences of Auditor Dismissals after Accounting Restatements

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 1051-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen M. Hennes ◽  
Andrew J. Leone ◽  
Brian P. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Market Consequences

ABSTRACT This study examines the conditions under which financial restatements lead corporate boards to dismiss external auditors and how the market responds to those dismissal announcements. We find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after more severe restatements but that the severity effect is primarily attributable to the dismissal of non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big 4 auditors. We also document that among corporations with Big 4 auditors, those that are larger and more complex operationally are less likely to dismiss their auditors. Combined, this evidence suggests that firms with higher switching costs and fewer replacement auditor choices are less likely to dismiss their auditors after a restatement, which is informative to the debates about the costs and benefits of mandatory auditor rotation and limited competition in the audit market. Additionally, we examine contemporaneous executive turnover and find evidence that boards view auditor dismissals as complementary rather than substitute responses to restatements. Finally, we investigate the market reaction to auditor dismissals after restatements. The market reaction to the dismissal is significantly more positive following more severe restatements (5.9 percent) relative to less severe restatements (0.6 percent) when the client engages a comparably sized auditor. This positive market reaction is consistent with firms restoring financial reporting credibility by replacing their auditors and highlights the important role that auditors play in the financial markets. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

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